Developed Countries

Executive Summary Europe Is Russia's Key Gas Customer Full-on rationing of natural gas by Germany took a step closer to reality, as the standoff with Russia over its insistence on being paid in roubles for gas plays out. News that Germany initiated its first step toward rationing spiked European and UK natgas prices by more than 12% on Wednesday. Higher prices for coal, oil and renewable energy will follow, as these energy sources compete at the margin with natgas in Europe. Inflation and inflation expectations will move higher if Germany ultimately rations scarce natgas supplies. We are watching to see who blinks first – Germany or Russia. The risk of aluminum-smelter shut-downs in Europe once again is elevated. Other metals-refining operations also are at risk of shutdown if rationing is invoked. Trade difficulties arising from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and related sanctions will lead to further bottlenecks on base-metal exports from Russia, as Rusal warned this week. This will further confound the energy transition. Western governments will be forced to accelerate investments and subsidies in carbon-capture technology as fossil-fuel usage and prospects revive. Bottom Line: Fast-changing EU natural gas supply-demand dynamics are impacting competing energy and base metals markets.  This is throwing up confusion around the global renewable-energy transition and extending its timetable.  Fossil fuels fortunes are being revived, as a result. We remain long commodity index exposure and the equities of oil-and-gas producers and base-metals miners.   Feature Events in the EU natural gas markets are changing rapidly in the wake of fast-changing developments in the Russia-Ukraine war.  In the wake of these changes, economic prospects for Europe and Russia are rapidly evolving – both potentially negatively over the short run. Full-on rationing of natural gas by Germany took a step closer to reality, as its standoff with Russia over payment for gas in roubles plays out.  News Germany is preparing its citizens for rationing spiked European and UK natgas prices by more than 12% Wednesday. It's not clear whether Russia or Germany are bluffing on this score.  Russia's oil and gas exports last year accounted for close to 40% of the government's budget. According to Russia's central bank, crude and product revenue last year amounted to just under $180 billion, while pipeline and LNG shipments of natgas generated close to $62 billion last year.  Europe is Russia's biggest natgas market, accounting for ~ 40% of its exports.  However, as the relative shares of revenues indicate, natgas exports are less important to Russia than crude and liquids exports.  Losing this revenue stream for a year would amount to losing ~ $25 billion of revenue, all else equal.  In the event, however, the net loss might be lower, since this would put a bid under the natgas market ex-Europe, which would offset part or most of the lost natgas sales to Europe.  If Russia is able to re-market those lost volumes, it could offset the loss of European sales. Knock-On Effects The immediate knock-on effect of this news turns out to be higher prices for oil, UK and European natgas.  This is not unexpected, as gasoil competes at the margin with natgas in space heating markets, while competition across regions also can be expected to increase.  Once again, the risk of aluminum-smelter shut-downs in Europe is elevated if rationing is imposed by Germany.  Other metals-refining operations also are at risk of shutdown if rationing is invoked.  Lastly, fertilizer production in Europe would be materially impacted, given some 70% of fertilizer costs are accounted for by natgas. In addition to these endogenous EU effects, trade difficulties arising from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and related sanctions will lead to further bottlenecks on base-metal exports from Russia, as Rusal warned this week.1 This will further confound the energy transition as the world's third-largest aluminum smelter faces sanctions – official and self-imposed – and the loss of inputs from Western suppliers, along with reduced access to capital and funding from the West. If, over time, Russia's base metals industries are degraded by the lack of access to capital and technology as oil and gas will be, the global renewable-energy transition will be slowed considerably.   We already expect Russia's oil and gas production to fall over time due to the economic isolation created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, rendering it a diminished member of OPEC 2.0.  Russia accounts for ~ 10% of global crude oil supplies, and is the second largest producer of crude oil in the coalition.  A long-term degradation of its production profile will exacerbate the persistent imbalance between demand relative to supply globally, which continues to force oil inventories lower (Chart 1). On the metals side, Russia accounts for 6%, 5% and 4% of global primary aluminum, refined nickel and copper production.  Persistent supply deficits have left inventories in these markets – particularly nickel and copper – tight and getting tighter (Chart 2).2 Chart 1Oil Inventories Remain Tight... Chart 2… As Do Metals Inventories Europe's Radical Pivot In a little over a month's time, the EU has been forced to abandon once-immutable post-Cold War beliefs shared by the electorate and politicians of all stripes.  Ever-deepening commercial ties with Russia did not ensure EU energy security, nor did they obviate what arguably is any state's primary responsibility: Protecting and defending its citizens.  Because of its failed engagement policy with Russia over the post-Cold War interval, the EU is forced to scramble to restore its energy production and expand its sources of energy imports.  In addition, it is repeatedly asserting its intent to "double down" of the speed of its renewable-energy transition.  And, last but certainly not least, it is forced to rapidly rearm itself in industrial commodity markets that are in the midst of prolonged physical deficits and inventory drawdowns.3 The Russian invasion of Ukraine spurred the EU to action on both the energy and defense fronts.  It is rushing head-long into eliminating its dependence on Russia for fuel, particularly natural gas, and will pursue re-arming its member states forthwith (Chart 3).  Chart 3Weaning EU Off Russian Gas Will Prove Difficult On the energy front, the EU adopted a two-prong approach to cleave itself from Russian natgas: 1) Diversify its sources of natural gas, which largely will be in the form of liquified natural gas (LNG), and 2) doubling down on renewable energy generation. EU officials are aiming to replace two-thirds of their Russian gas imports by the end of this year, which is an ambitious target.  Over the next two years or so, EU officials hope to fully wean themselves from Russian natgas via a combination of infrastructure buildouts and a renewed push to increase domestic production, which was being throttled back by earlier attempts to secure increased Russian supplies, and a strong focus on renewables. EU's US LNG Deal The EU signed a deal with the US to receive an additional 15 Bcm of natural gas in 2022, and 50 Bcm annually by 2030, which is equal to ~ 30% of the EU’s 2020 Russian gas imports.  How exactly this will be done is unknown. In 2021, the EU imported 155 bcm of natgas from Russia, or more than 3x the amount being discussed with the US; 14 bcm of that was LNG.4 Just exactly what meeting of the minds was achieved between the EU and US government is totally unclear at this point.  The US is not an LNG supplier, nor can it order private companies to renege on existing contacts.  The US government likely will use its good offices to attempt to persuade Asian buyers to allow their contracted volumes to be diverted to European buyers, but that would, in all likelihood, mean they would switch to another fuel (e.g., coal) as an alternative if they take that deal.  This would, we believe, require some sort of financial incentive to induce such behavior. US liquefaction capacity is also running at near full capacity (Chart 4). While there are projects in the pipeline, in the medium-term (2 – 5 years) the lack of export capacity will act as a constraint to the amount of LNG that can be shipped to the EU. Chart 4Europe Critical To Russia's Gas Industry For Russia, its shipments of gas to OECD-Europe represent more than 70% of its exports (Chart 5). Arguably, Europe is just as important to Russia as Russia is to Europe.  With the EU set on a course to sever ties completely, Russia will be forced to invest in pipeline capacity to take more of its gas to China via the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. In the short-term, US LNG exports to the EU will face headwinds since much of Central and Eastern Europe rely on piped gas from Russia. As a result, many countries within Europe are not equipped with sufficient regasification facilities and are running at near peak utilization rates (Chart 6).  Germany does not have any such capacity.  Chart 5Not Much Room For US LNG Exports To Grow… Chart 6…Or For Additional European LNG Imports LNG import facilities that have additional intake capacity in the Iberian Peninsula and Eastern Europe do not have sufficient pipeline capacity to move gas inland.  This will require additional infrastructure investment as well.  To deal with this lack of infrastructure, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands are moving quickly to procure Floating Storage and Regasification (FSRUs) to convert LNG back to its gaseous state.  While not the five-year proposition a dedicated LNG train requires to bring on line, setting up FSRUs still could be a years-long process.5 How quickly these assets can be mobilized, and the volumes they can deliver remain to be seen. Investment Implications Fast-changing EU natural gas supply-demand dynamics are impacting competing energy and base metals markets.  This is throwing up confusion around the global renewable-energy transition and extending its timetable.  Fossil fuels fortunes are being revived, as a result. At this point it is impossible to handicap the odds of a cut-off of Russian natgas to Europe, or its duration if it does occur.  Either way, competitive suppliers to Russia – particularly US shale-gas producers selling into the LNG market and the vessels that transport it – will benefit regardless of the course taken by Germany and Russia on rationing. We remain long commodity index via the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF, and the equities of oil-and-gas producers and base-metals miners via the PICK, XME and XOP ETFs.   Commodity Round-Up Energy: Bullish Oil prices were whipsawed by new reports suggesting Russia would substantially reduce its military operations in Kyiv ahead of ceasefire talks with Ukraine, only to have that speculation dashed by US officials indicating nothing had changed in the status quo to warrant such a view.  Markets restored the risk premium that fell out of prices on the unwarranted speculation, with Brent prices once again above $110/bbl this week.  At present, the fundamental oil picture remains tight.  In the run-up to a decision from OPEC 2.0's March meeting today, we continued to expect  KSA, the UAE and Kuwait to increase production by up to 1.6mm b/d this year, and another 600k b/d next year.  To date, OPEC 2.0 has fallen short by ~ 1.2mm b/d since it started returning production taken off line during the pandemic.  In return for higher output, we continue to expect the US to deepen its commitment to defending the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states making up core-OPEC 2.0.  If we do not see an increase in core-OPEC 2.0 production, we will have to re-assess our fundamental outlook on KSA's, the UAE's and Kuwait's ability to increase production.  We also will have to determine whether – even if the supply is available to return to the market – these states have embraced a revenue-maximization strategy, given the fiscal breakeven price for these states now averages ~ $64/bbl.  It also is possible that heavily discounted Russian crude oil – trading more than $30/bbl below Brent (vs. the standard $2.50/bbl Urals normally commands) – convinces core-OPEC 2.0 states that oil prices are not so high for large EM buyers like India and China as to create demand destruction.  We believe the latter view likely is prevailing at present.  We continue to expect Brent to average $93/bbl this year and next (Chart 7). Base Metals: Bullish BHP Group Ltd. will invest more than $10 billion to expand metals production over the next 50 years in Chile.  The metals giant aims to stay ESG compliant, provided there is a supportive investment environment provided by the Chilean government. Resource-rich Latin American countries such as Chile and Peru have elected left-leaning governments intent on redistributing mining profits and ensuring companies comply with the ESG framework. As Chile considers raising mining royalties and redrafts its constitution, mining investment in the country has stalled. Political uncertainty in these countries has coincided with low global copper inventories (Chart 8) and high demand. Chart 7 Chart 8     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see Aluminum Giant Rusal Flags Stark Risks Triggered by War in Ukraine published by Bloomberg on March 30, 2022. 2     Please see our Special Report entitled Commodities' Watershed Moment, published on March 10, 2022.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    Please see footnote 2. 4    Please see How Deep Is Europe's Dependence on Russian Oil? published by the Columbia Climate School on March 14, 2022. 5    Please see Europe battles to secure specialised ships to boost LNG imports published by ft.com 28 March 2022.  Germany appears to be most advanced in its procurement of FSRU capacity, and is close to concluding a deal that would allow it to regasify 27 bcm annually.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021  

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights There is no evidence of a decline in US corporate credit or bank lending spreads over the past few decades, meaning that any excess savings effect structurally depressing interest rates is occurring in the Treasury market. We note the possible mechanisms of action for excess savings to lower government bond yields, by lowering the current policy rate, expectations for the policy rate in the future, or the term premium on long-maturity bonds. To investigate the impact that excess savings may be having on bond yields, we define historical periods of abnormal yields based on the gap between long-maturity Treasury yields and the potential rate of economic growth. This reflects our view that potential growth is the equilibrium interest rate under normal economic conditions. Since 1960, there have been three major episodes when the difference between bond yields and economic growth was large and persistent, but the first two seem to be easily explained by the stance of US monetary policy rather than by a savings/investment imbalance. The excess savings story better fits the facts after 2000. We do find evidence that a global savings glut lowered bond yields during the early-2000s, and it may have even modestly contributed to the excessive household credit demand that ultimately caused the global financial crisis. But as a deviation from equilibrium, the effect of the global savings glut was relatively insignificant compared to what has prevailed over the past decade. Excess savings did certainly play a role in lowering long-term investor expectations for the Federal funds rate during the last economic cycle, but it did so for cyclical reasons that spanned several years rather than as a result of demographic effects or other structural factors unrelated to the business cycle. That is an important distinction, as long-term investor expectations for the Fed funds rate remained low in the second half of the last economic expansion despite a reduction in savings and significantly stronger growth. The historical impact of FOMC meetings on the structural decline in long-maturity US Treasury yields strongly implies that fixed-income investors have been guided by the Fed to expect a lower average Fed funds rate. It is our view that the Fed has a backward-looking neutral rate outlook, informed by an incomplete understanding of the economic circumstances of the latter half of the last expansion. A low neutral rate narrative has become entrenched in the minds of investors and the Fed itself, and we regard this as the primary factor anchoring yields at the long-end of the maturity spectrum. This phenomenon is only likely to dissipate once short-term interest rates rise and a recession does not materialize. While the nearer-term outlook more likely favors a neutral or at best modestly short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio, investors should remain structurally short duration in response to a potentially rapid shift in long-term interest rate expectations from the Fed and fixed-income investors over the coming few years. Feature Chart II-110-Year US Treasury Yields Are The Lowest Relative To Headline Inflation In Over 60 Years For many investors, one of the most striking features of the pandemic, especially over the past year, is how low US long-maturity government bond yields have remained in the face of the highest headline consumer price inflation in four decades (Chart II-1). To many investors, this has provided even further evidence of a structural “excess savings” effect that has kept interest rates well below the prevailing rate of economic activity. The theory of secular stagnation, revived by Larry Summers in late 2013, is a related concept, but many investors believe that interest rates will remain low even in a world in which the US economy is growing at or even above its trend. The fundamental basis for this view is the idea that over the longer term, the real rate of interest is determined by the balance (or imbalance) between desired savings and investment, and that advanced economies have and will continue to experience excess savings – defined as a chronically high level of desired savings relative to the investment opportunities available. According to this view, in order for the actual level of savings to equal investment, interest rates must fall. Chart II-2Do Excess Savings Explain This Gap? (Spoiler: No) This report challenges the view that excess savings are mostly responsible for the current level of long-term bond yields in the US. We agree that excess savings have played a role in explaining changes in long-term bond yields at different points over the past 20 years; we also agree that it is normal for interest rates in advanced economies to trend down over time in response to a demographically-driven decline in potential growth. But our goal is not to explain the downtrend in interest rates over time. Instead, we aim to explain the gap between the level of long-term bond yields today and the prevailing rate of economic activity, or consensus forecasts of the trend rate of growth (Chart II-2). We do not believe that this gap is economically justified, nor do we believe that it is driven by excess savings. We conclude that the Fed’s backward-looking neutral rate outlook is the primary factor anchoring US Treasury yields at the long-end of the maturity spectrum. This is only likely to change once short-term interest rates rise and a recession does not materialize; it suggests that investors should remain structurally short duration in response to a potentially rapid shift in long-term interest rate expectations from the Fed and fixed-income investors over the coming few years. Excess Savings And Interest Rates: Defining A “Mechanism Of Action” Households, businesses, and governments can directly purchase debt securities in capital markets, but they do not typically provide loans directly to borrowers. Direct lending usually occurs through the banking system, which means that excess savings would only lower interest rates in the economy through one of the following ways: By lowering the Fed funds rate By lowering long-maturity government bond yields relative to the Fed funds rate, by reducing either the term premium or investors’ expectations for the average Fed funds rate in the future By lowering corporate bond yields relative to duration-matched government bond yields By lowering lending rates on bank loans relative to banks’ cost of borrowing Charts II-3-II-5 highlight that there is no evidence of a structural decline in corporate credit spreads or bank lending rates relative to the Fed funds rate, so we can rule out this effect as a mechanism of action for excess savings to have structurally lowered interest rates. Chart II-6 highlights that interest paid on bank deposits lags the Fed funds rate, so we can also rule out the idea that excess deposits force the Fed to keep the effective Fed funds rate low. Chart II-3No Evidence Of A Structural Decline In Corporate Credit Spreads… Chart II-4…Or Auto Loan Rate Spreads… Chart II-5…Or Personal Loan Rate Spreads… Chart II-6...Or Bank Deposit Rate Spreads This means that if excess savings are depressing interest rates in the US, that the effect is truly occurring in the Treasury market. As noted, this could occur by lowering the current policy rate, expectations for the policy rate in the future, or the term premium on long-maturity bonds. Related Report  The Bank Credit AnalystR-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks All of these effects are certainly possible. Keynes’ paradox of thrift highlights that excess savings can manifest itself as a chronic shortfall in aggregate demand, which would persistently lower the Fed funds rate as the Fed responds to a long period of high unemployment. This could also lower the term premium on long-maturity bond yields in a scenario in which the Fed repeatedly engages in asset purchases to help stabilize aggregate demand. As well, domestic excess savings could lower the term premium on long-maturity bond yields, as aging savers directly purchase government securities as part of their retirement portfolios. Finally, foreign capital inflows could also cause this effect, especially if they originate from countries with chronic current account surpluses that use an increase in US dollar reserves to purchase long-maturity US government securities. Table II-1 summarizes these possible mechanisms of action for excess savings to lower US government bond yields. With these mechanisms in mind, we review the past 60 years to identify periods of “abnormal” bond yields, with the goal of understanding whether excess savings appear to explain major gaps. Table II-1Possible Mechanisms Of Action For Excess Savings To Lower Long-Term Government Bond Yields Identifying Periods Of “Abnormal” Long-Maturity Bond Yields Chart II-7There Have Been Three Distinct Periods Of Abnormal Long-Maturity Bond Yields Chart II-7 shows the difference between nominal 10-year US Treasury yields and nominal potential GDP growth. Panel 2 shows an alternative version of this series using the ten-year median annualized quarterly growth rate of nominal GDP in lieu of estimates of potential growth, which highlights a generally similar relationship. This approach to defining “abnormal” long-maturity bond yields reflects our view that the potential rate of economic growth is the equilibrium interest rate under normal economic conditions. To see why, given that GDP also effectively represents gross domestic income, an interest rate that is persistently below the potential growth rate of the economy would create a strong incentive to borrow on the part of households and especially firms. Chart II-7 makes it clear that the relationship has been mean-reverting over time, but that there have been three major episodes when the difference between bond yields and economic growth was large and persistent. The first episode occurred from 1960 to the late 1970s, and saw government bond yields average well below the prevailing rate of economic growth. We do not see this period as having been caused by an excess of desired savings relative to investment. As we discussed in our November Special Report,1 this gap represented a period of persistently easy monetary policy which contributed to excessive aggregate demand and a structural rise in inflation. The second major episode is also easily explained, as it occurred in response to the first. Following a decade of high inflation, Fed chair Paul Volcker raised interest rates aggressively beginning in 1979 to combat inflationary expectations, which led to a two-decade period of generally tight monetary policy. Like the first period, this was not caused by an imbalance between desired savings and investment. The third episode has prevailed since the late-1990s, and has seen a negative yield/growth gap on average – albeit one that has been smaller than what occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. From 2000 to 2007, the gap was generally negative, although it turned positive by the end of the economic cycle. It was modestly negative on average from 2008 to 2010, and only became persistently negative starting in 2011. The gap fell to a new low during the COVID-19 pandemic, and remains wider today than at any point during the last economic recovery. It is these post-2000 periods of a persistently negative yield/growth gap that should be closely investigated for evidence of an excess savings effect. The Global Savings Glut As noted, prior to 2000, the yield/growth gap in the US seems clearly explained by the Fed’s monetary policy stance, not by an excess savings effect. So the question is whether there is any evidence of excess savings having caused this negative gap since 2000. In our view, the answer is yes, but the effect was relatively small compared to what prevails today. We do find evidence of a global savings glut during the early-2000s. Chart II-8 highlights that the private and external sector savings/investment balances in China and emerging markets more generally were persistently positive during the 2000s. Chart II-9 highlights that multiple estimates of the term premium declined around that time – especially during Greenspan’s “conundrum” period of between 2004 and 2005. Chart II-8There Was A Global Savings Glut Prior To The Global Financial Crisis Chart II-9The Global Savings Glut Does Seem To Have Lowered The Term Premium On US 10-Year TreasurysChart II-10 breaks down the components of the 10-year yield into the 5-year yield and the 5-year/5-year forward yield, and highlights that the negative correlation between the two components lasted for only one year. Overall, the 10-year Treasury yield was lower than potential growth for roughly two years as a result of the global savings glut effect.       Chart II-10Still, The Global Savings Glut Effect Did Not Last Long And Was Not Especially Large In Magnitude This was a significant event, and it may even have modestly contributed to the excessive household credit demand that ultimately caused the global financial crisis. But as a deviation from equilibrium, it was relatively insignificant compared to what has prevailed over the past decade. Excess Savings And US Household Deleveraging Chart II-11Most Of The Post-2007 Decline In 10-Year Yields Is Attributable To Lower Long-Term Fed Funds Rate Expectations Chart II-11 highlights that, relative to June 2007 levels, the vast majority of the cumulative decline in the 10-year Treasury yield has occurred because of a decline in implied long-term expectations for the Fed funds rate, rather than a major decline in the term premium. The chart also shows that almost all the decline in implied long-term interest rate expectations since 2007 occurred during the 2008/2009 recession. This normally occurs during a recession as investors price in a low average Fed funds rate at the short end of the curve; the anomaly is that these expectations remained permanently low even as the economy recovered and as the Fed raised interest rates from 2015 to 2018. To us, Chart II-11 also underscores that the Fed’s asset purchases are not the main culprit behind low long-maturity bond yields today, given that the decline in long-term expectations for the Fed funds rate persisted even as the Fed stopped purchasing assets in 2014. It is not difficult to see why investors lowered their long-term Fed funds rate expectations in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, even as economic recovery took hold. Chart II-12 highlights that the “balance sheet” nature of the 2008/2009 recession unleashed the longest period of US household deleveraging in the post-WWII period, and Chart II-13 highlights that this occurred despite extremely low interest rates – and in contrast to other countries like Canada that did not experience the same loss in household net worth. Chart II-12Household Deleveraging Did Lower The Neutral Rate For Several Years Following The Global Financial Crisis Chart II-13The US Balance Sheet Recession Structurally Impaired Credit Demand For Several Years After 2008     Given that interest rates represent the price of borrowing, it is entirely unsurprising that a US balance sheet recession led to a persistent period in which credit growth was essentially unresponsive to interest rates, as households struggled to rebuild wealth lost during the recession and were unable to, or uninterested in, releveraging. This is another way of saying that the neutral rate of interest fell during that period, which we agree did occur. It is also accurate to characterize the US as having experienced a sharp increase in desired savings over that period, as highlighted by the explosion in the US private sector financial balance in the initial years of the last economic recovery (Chart II-14). Chart II-14Excess Savings Surged After 2008, But Eventually Normalized. Long-Term Rate Expectations Ignored The Normalization. So excess savings did certainly play a role in lowering long-term investor expectations for the Federal funds rate during the last economic cycle, but it did so because of cyclical reasons that spanned several years rather than because of demographic effects or other structural factors unrelated to the business cycle. That is an important distinction, because while Chart II-14 shows that this excess savings effect eventually waned in importance, long-term investor expectations for the Fed funds rate remained low in the second half of the last economic expansion. Chart II-15Growth Was Historically Weak Last Cycle, But Only Because Of The First Few Years Of The Expansion Chart II-15 highlights that the cumulative annualized growth in real per capita GDP during the last economic cycle was significantly below that of the average of previous expansions, but this was only the case because of the very slow growth period between 2008 and 2014. Per capita growth during the latter half of the expansion was comparable to that of previous expansions, and this occurred while the Fed was raising interest rates. And yet, investors only modestly raised their long-term interest rate expectations during that period. In our view, it is this fact that holds the key to understanding why investors’ long-term rate expectations are still low today. An Alternative Explanation For Today’s Extremely Low Long-Maturity Bond Yields Chart II-16Fixed-Income Investors Have Been Guided By The Fed To Expect A Low Average Fed Funds Rate Chart II-16 highlights that, since 1990, all of the structural decline in US 10-year Treasury yields has occurred within a three-day window on either side of FOMC meetings. This strongly suggests that fixed-income investors have been guided by the Fed to expect a low average Fed funds rate, which is consistent with how similar 5-year/5-year forward US Treasury yields are in relation to published FOMC and market participant estimates of the average longer-run Fed funds rate (as shown in Chart II-2). This raises the important question of why the Fed did not revise up its expectation for the neutral rate during or following the second half of the last economic expansion, when growth was much stronger than during the first half. In our view, one of the clearest articulations of the Federal Reserve’s understanding of the neutral rate of interest was presented in a 2015 speech by Lael Brainard at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Brainard noted the following: “The neutral rate of interest is not directly observable, but we can back out an estimate of the neutral rate by relying on the observation that output should grow faster relative to potential growth the lower the federal funds rate is relative to the nominal neutral rate. In today’s circumstances, the fact that the US economy is growing at a pace only modestly above potential while core inflation remains restrained suggests that the nominal neutral rate may not be far above the nominal federal funds rate, even now. In fact, various econometric estimates of the level of the neutral rate, or similar concepts, are consistent with the low levels suggested by this simple heuristic approach.”2 Chart II-17The Fed, Wrongly, Sees The 2019 Experience As Having Confirmed A Low Neutral Rate... Given how the Fed determines the neutral rate is, two factors explain why the Fed’s estimates of the neutral rate have not increased (and, in fact, fell modestly in March). First, core inflation remained below 2% from 2015-2019, despite the fact that the economy was clearly growing at an above-trend pace during this period in the face of Fed rate hikes. We have noted in previous reports the role that the 2014 collapse in oil prices had on household inflation expectations. The latter were already vulnerable to a disinflationary shock, given how negative the output gap had been in the first half of the expansion.3 We do not think that the decline in inflation expectations that occurred following the 2014 collapse in oil prices reflects a low neutral rate, but rather we believe that the Fed saw this as a conundrum that supported the expectation of a low average Fed funds rate. The second event explaining the Fed’s persistently low long-term rate expectations is the fact that the Fed was forced to cut interest rates in 2019, which we believe it saw as confirmation that the stance of monetary policy had become either meaningfully less easy or openly tight. From the Fed’s point of view, this perspective was also supported by recessionary indicators, such as the inversion of the 2-10 yield curve (Chart II-17), and popular (but now discontinued) econometric estimates of the real neutral rate of interest, such as those calculated by the Laubach-Williams model (panel 3). Chart II-18...Without Appreciating The Damaging Impact The China-US Trade War Had On Global Activity However, this view entirely ignores the fact that the US and global economies were negatively impacted in 2018 and 2019 by a politically-motivated nonmonetary shock to aggregate demand: the China-US trade war, which also impacted or targeted several major advanced economies. Chart II-18 highlights that global trade uncertainty exploded during this period, which severely damaged business confidence around the world and caused a slowdown in global industrial production. Tighter Chinese policy also likely contributed to the slowdown in global activity, but the bottom line is that factors other than US monetary policy contributed to economic weakness during this period, and that it is incorrect to infer from the 2018/2019 experience that interest rates rose to or exceeded the neutral rate of interest. In short, it is our view that the Fed has simply become backward-looking in how it perceives the neutral rate of interest; it has not yet observed a period when the Fed funds rate has risen to its estimate of neutral but is unambiguously still easy. Fixed-income investors, having demonstrably anchored their own assessments to those of the Fed over the past 30 years, have had no basis to come to a meaningfully different conclusion. We believe that the Fed’s backward-looking low neutral rate outlook has now become entrenched in the minds of investors and the Fed itself, and is the primary factor anchoring yields at the long-end of the maturity spectrum. This will probably only change once short-term interest rates rise and a recession does not materialize. As a final point, we clearly acknowledge that private savings increased massively during the pandemic. Investors who are inclined to see excess savings as the primary driver of low bond yields will point to this fact. But this was a forced increase in savings, rather than a desired one. The rise in household sector savings occurred mostly because of a substantial reduction in services spending, as pandemic restrictions and forced changes in behavior prevented the consumption of many services. The household savings rate has already returned to its pre-pandemic level in the US, and 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yields have risen to a higher point than they were prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. US households are likely to deploy a portion of their enormous stock of excess savings, as the pandemic continues to recede in importance, which is one of the main reasons to expect that the US economy will not succumb to a recession over the coming 12-18 months – and why investors and the Fed may soon be presented with evidence that warrants an increase in their long-term interest rate expectations. Investment Conclusions There are two important investment implications of the view that the Fed’s backward-looking neutral rate projection is the primary factor anchoring yields at the long end of the maturity spectrum. As we noted in Section 1 of our report, the first implication is that investors will likely be faced with a recession scare as the 2-10 yield curve durably inverts and as rate sensitive sectors of the economy, such as housing, inevitably slow in response to the extremely sharp rise in mortgage rates that has occurred over the past three months. We believe that it is ultimately the level of interest rates that matters for economic activity, rather than the change in interest rates. Large changes over short periods of time, however, create a degree of uncertainty about the trajectory of rates that temporarily impacts economic activity. This underscores that investors should not maintain an aggressively overweight stance toward global equities in a multi-asset portfolio, as it is likely that concerns about corporate profits will increase significantly at some point this year. The second investment implication is that US long-maturity bond yields could increase to much higher levels over the coming 12-24 months than many investors expect, in a scenario in which pandemic-driven price pressure dissipates, real wages recover, and no major politically-driven nonmonetary policy shocks emerge. We acknowledge that long-term interest rate expectations are unlikely to change until hard evidence of the economy’s capacity to tolerate interest rates above the Fed’s implied current estimate of the neutral rate emerges. This is a case, however, when we believe that investors should heed the now-famous words of Rüdiger Dornbusch: “In economics, things take longer to happen than you think they will, and then they happen faster than you thought they could.” As such, while the nearer-term outlook more likely favors a neutral or at best modestly short duration stance within a fixed-income portfolio, investors should remain structurally short duration in response to a potentially rapid shift in long-term interest rate expectations from the Fed and fixed-income investors over the coming few years. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "Gauging The Risk Of Stagflation," dated October 29, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Lael Brainard, Normalizing Monetary Policy When The Neutral Rate Is Low, December 2015 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "The Modern-Day Phillips Curve, Future Inflation, And What To Do About It," dated December 18, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary Energy and National Security Will Drive the Market Our 2022 key views are broadly on track. Biden’s shift from domestic to foreign policy is dominating the other views.   However, Democrats still have a 65% chance of passing a reconciliation bill that will raise taxes to pay for green energy and prescription drug caps. Then gridlock will set in. The US is developing a new national consensus. Generational change is promoting the shift to proactive fiscal policy to address the country’s social unrest and rising foreign policy challenges. Polarization is still at peak levels in the short term but will fall over the coming decade as the US pursues “nation building” at home while confronting geopolitical rivals. The return of Big Government is being priced into the bond market today. But it will be Limited Big Government, as the sharp spike in inflation today will provoke a backlash. Recommendation Inception Level Inception Date Return Long Aerospace And Defense Vs. Broad Market (Cyclical)   30-Mar-22   Long Oil And Gas Transportation And Storage Vs. Broad Market (Cyclical)   30-Mar-22   Long Refinitive Renewable Energy Vs. Broad Market (Tactical)   30-Mar-22   Bottom Line: Investors dedicated to the US market should stay tactically defensive. Cyclically favor the new US policy consensus on national defense, infrastructure, cyber security, and energy security. Feature The title of our annual outlook was “Gridlock Begins Before The Midterms.” We argued that Biden would still have some room for legislative maneuver in the first half of 2022 but that checks and balances would grow as the year went on. Checks will grow due to (1) the looming midterm elections; (2) Biden’s falling political capital and need to rely on executive action; (3) rising foreign policy challenges. Of these, foreign policy has proven decisive, with Russia invading Ukraine and the US and Europe imposing economic sanctions. The resulting energy shock is adding to inflation, weighing on consumer confidence, stock market multiples, and investor sentiment (Chart 1). Having said that, we also argued that congressional Democrats still had enough political capital to pass a watered-down fiscal 2022 budget reconciliation bill before the scene of action shifted to the White House. The second quarter is the last chance for this prediction to come true – and we are sticking with our 65% odds. The reconciliation bill will be even more watered down than we expected. But the point is that fiscal policy – especially tax hikes – can still move markets in the second quarter, even though inflation, the Fed, and the war will have a bigger influence. Chart 1US Seeks National Security And Energy Security Related Report  US Political Strategy2022 Key Views: Gridlock Begins Before The Midterms The war in Europe is clearly the most important political, geopolitical, and policy dynamic for investors this year. It is prompting some important congressional action that speaks to Biden’s room for maneuver in the first half of the year. In so doing it reinforces our long-term themes of “Peak Polarization” and “Limited Big Government.” As Americans face rising foreign policy challenges, a new bipartisanship is emerging, particularly on industrial and trade policy. Checking Up On Our Three Key Views For 2022 Here are our three key trends for 2022 with comments about their development over the past three months: 1.   From Single-Party Rule To Gridlock: We argued that the Biden administration would pass a watered-down reconciliation bill on a party-line vote by June at latest. Then Congress would grind to a halt for election campaigning, to be followed by Republicans taking one or both chambers of Congress, restoring gridlock and making it hard to pass major legislation from the second half of 2022 through 2024. This view is still generally on track. The basis for believing that a bill will still pass is that the Democrats are in trouble in the midterms and badly need a legislative victory. Public opinion polls suggest they face a beating reminiscent of President Trump and the Republicans in 2018 (Chart 2). Democrats trail Republicans in enthusiasm. Only about 45% of Democrats and 42% of Biden voters are enthusiastic to vote, while 50% of Republicans and 54% of Trump voters are enthusiastic. Men, who lean Republican, are more enthusiastic than women, by 51% to 38%, according to the pollster Morning Consult.1 With the economy and foreign policy rising as the most important issues of the election, Democrats have lost their key issues of health care and the pandemic. Notably Democrats have also lost ground on traditional strengths like education. However, the Ukraine war has put a new emphasis on energy security which Democrats are harnessing to repackage their climate agenda. Hence Democrats will make a last-ditch effort to pass a reconciliation bill before the summer campaigning gets under way. The “Build Back Better” plan was always going to be watered down but now it will be extensively revised. The bill will now have to be closer to neutral in its impact on the deficit so as not to feed inflation. Public opinion polls back in January, when the bill was primarily a social welfare bill, showed 61% of political independents in favor, not to mention 85% of Democrats. A majority of independents supported the bill even when asked about each provision separately and when the tax hikes were made plain.2 By halting progress on the left-wing version of the bill that the House of Representatives passed late last year, West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin saved his party from passing a highly stimulative fiscal bill in the middle of the biggest outbreak of inflation since the 1980s, when the output gap was virtually closed (Chart 3). Chart 2Democrats Not Faring Much Better Than Trump Republicans In 2018 Chart 3Output Gap Closed, No More Stimulus Needed Now Manchin will face a “Build Back Slimmer” bill that will be harder to oppose when Congress comes back from Easter.3 Our research over the past year suggests that Manchin is likely to vote for a bill that meets his main demands. The bill will be crafted for his approval. Manchin supports corporate tax hikes, funding for green energy transition (as long as it is not punitive toward certain sources or technologies), and a cap on prescription drug costs.4 Tax hikes, such as a minimum 15% corporate tax rate on book earnings, will be included, albeit diluted from the original proposals. Most investors have forgotten about the risk of tax hikes altogether so stock investors may not be happy that the US is hiking taxes amid inflation. Earnings estimates for the year are not reflecting any negative news, whether energy shock, or weak consumer confidence, or new taxes (Chart 4). If the bill fails to pass, equity investors may well cheer, since they are worried about inflation rather than deflation and the bill will not truly be deficit-neutral. Chart 4Inflation, War, Potentially Tax Hikes Will Weigh On Earnings Estimates Given Democrats’ thin majorities in both houses (222 versus 210 seats in the House and 50 versus 50 seats in the Senate), a single defection in the Senate can derail the bill, so we cannot have high conviction that it will pass. We are sticking with our 65% subjective odds. Passage of a reconciliation bill will slightly help Democrats’ fortunes ahead of the midterm but Republicans are still highly likely to win at least the House of Representatives. So the transition to gridlock will still occur. Only very rarely do ruling parties gain seats in the midterms. Biden’s loss of support among women voters is a tell-tale sign that trouble looms, as was the case for the Obama administration at this stage in its first term (Chart 5). The implication for financial markets is that the budget reconciliation bill will bring a negative surprise in the form of tax hikes that will weigh on bullish or pro-cyclical sentiment in the second quarter, at least marginally. Chart 5Women Like Biden Less Than Obama, Who Suffered Midterm Losses Chart 6Biden's Energy Shock 2.   From Legislative To Executive Power: Similarly we anticipated a transition from legislative action to executive action over the course of 2022. After the budget reconciliation bill is decided, the president will have to rely on executive action to achieve any policy goals. We expected this trend to derive from Biden’s regulatory aims as well as from the need to respond to rising geopolitical challenges, especially the energy shock (Chart 6). This shock is the single biggest reason for the market consensus that Democrats will lose Congress this year. The chief equity sector winner was the energy industry, as we expected. Now Biden needs to encourage rather than discourage supply. Until Biden decides whether to lift sanctions on Iran, volatility will prevail in energy markets. But Biden will condone domestic energy production, with a view to alleviating shortages prior to 2024. He will abandon his left wing and adopt the Obama administration’s permissiveness toward domestic energy, which will help oil and natural gas rig counts to rise (Chart 7). Renewable energy policy will gain traction as it will now clearly be seen in the context of national security and energy security. It also combines trade policy with national security in the form of exports to allies. The US now has a free pass to help Europe diversify away from Russian energy. Not that the US can replace Russia but merely that it can make a dent in both oil and liquefied natural gas (Chart 8). Subsidies for green energy are still likely but not a carbon tax or punitive measures toward the fossil fuel industry. Chart 7Biden Revives Obama Truce With O&G Chart 8US Helps Europe Diversify Away From Russia 3.   From Domestic To Foreign Policy: We fully expected Biden to be forced to pay attention to foreign affairs in 2022, despite his desire to focus on the voter ahead of midterms. We argued that he would maintain a defensive or reactive foreign policy since he would not want to create higher inflation ahead of the midterms and yet oil producers like Russia or Iran would go on offensive due to energy shortage. While Biden has imposed harsh sanctions on Russia, we still define his foreign policy as defensive rather than offensive. First, Biden is reacting to a Russian attack and will not sabotage a ceasefire. Second, Biden is carving out exceptions to US sanctions rather than disciplining or coercing allies into adopting US policy. The administration’s chief foreign policy aim is to refurbish US alliances. Hence the US condones the EU’s continued energy imports from Russia, thus ensuring that Russian energy makes it into the global market, unless the Russians cut natural gas exports (Chart 9). Nevertheless a risk to our view is that Biden will start to adopt a more offensive foreign policy, especially if Democrats are floundering ahead of the midterms. He could turn more aggressive about sanction enforcement if Russia starts bombarding Kyiv again. Or he could slap broad sanctions on China for helping Russia bypass sanctions. To be clear, we fully expect secondary sanctions on China, based on US record of doing so, but we expect them to be targeted rather than broad (Table 1). Chart 9Russian Energy Still Reaches Global Market Table 1US Will Slap China With Sanctions Over Russia – Sooner Or Later Foreign policy will define US politics and policy in 2022. What matters for markets is whether the energy supply shock gets worse as a result of Biden’s handling of Russia and Iran. A worse energy shock will amplify stock market volatility. On one hand, if Biden suffers a humiliating foreign policy defeat, it will reinforce the negative trends for Democrats in the 2022-24 cycle. Since Republicans, especially former President Trump, would be expected to pursue an offensive rather than defensive foreign and trade policy (e.g. toward Iran’s nuclear program and China’s economy), global economic policy uncertainty would rise and investor risk appetite would fall in this situation (Chart 10). On the other hand, investors will be surprised if Biden achieves a remarkable domestic or foreign policy success that boosts Democrats’ odds in 2022. An early ceasefire in Ukraine combined with a reconciliation bill would give Biden and Democrats a boost. Global policy uncertainty might rise anyway but it would not be super-charged and it would be flat-to-down relative to US policy uncertainty. Democrats could conceivably retain control of the Senate in the latter case. Our quantitative election model says Democrats have a 49% chance of retaining the Senate (Chart 11). This means the election is too close to call, though subjectively we would agree with the model and bet on the Republicans since they only need to gain one seat on a net basis. The model shows Georgia and Arizona flipping back to the Republican side. If the economy and opinion polling improve between now and November, the swing states will see higher probabilities of Democrats staying in power but the model is trending against Democrats and shows their odds of victory falling in every state. Chart 10US Political Outlook Affects Relative Policy Uncertainty Chart 11Senate Race Too Close To Call, But Quant Model Now Tips Republicans Anything that pares Democrats’ expected losses in Congress will cause US economic policy uncertainty to rise since it goes against the consensus view. Moreover if Republicans only win the House, they will be obstructionist and disruptive in 2023-24, whereas if they win all of Congress they will have to produce bills and try to compromise with Biden. Thus a Republican House but Democratic Senate would imply an increase in policy uncertainty. By contrast, anything that hurts the Democrats will reinforce current expectations and imply that tax hikes might fail, or that they will freeze after the reconciliation bill, which would be marginally positive for US equity investors in an inflationary context. Bottom Line: Democrats still have a 65% subjective chance of passing a reconciliation bill that raises taxes. Investors should favor defensives over cyclicals. Checking Up On Our Strategic Themes For The 2020s Our central long-term thesis is that generational change, social instability, and foreign policy threats are generating a new national consensus in the United States, particularly on economic policy. Hence US political polarization is peaking in the short run and will decline over the long run. The new consensus rests on proactive fiscal policy and a larger government role in the economy to reduce social unrest and improve national security. Table 2 shows our three strategic US political themes. The past year’s inflation surge and the Ukraine war will affect these themes, so we make the following points: Table 2US Political Strategy Structural Themes 1.   Millennials/Gen Z Rising: Labor market participation is recovering rapidly from the pandemic. However, workers older than 55 years are not rejoining rapidly, implying that retirees are staying retired and not yet chasing rising wages. Prime age women, however, are rejoining the work force, in a sign that as kids get back to school mothers can return to work (Chart 12). The implication is that the labor shortage will continue for the foreseeable future due to the generational transition but not due to any shift toward traditional values or lifestyles among young women. 2.   Peak Polarization: Polarization has fallen after the 2020 election, as expected, but will likely stay at or near peak levels over the 2022-24 election cycle (Chart 13). Chart 12Generational Shift Evident In Labor Participation Chart 13Polarization Near Peak Levels But Will Fall Over Long Run For example, Biden’s reconciliation bill will feed polarization in 2022, since it can only pass on a party-line vote. But its tax and spending programs will have majority support, will redirect funds from corporations that pay low effective tax rates toward corporations that provide renewable energy solutions. Domestic manufacturing will benefit. Another example: Another Biden-Trump showdown in 2024 will fuel polarization but 2024 or 2028 and subsequent elections will see fresh faces with updated policy platforms. The merging of trade protectionism and renewable energy exemplifies the new policy evolution. Again, with polarization at historic levels, domestic terrorism of whatever stripe is a pronounced risk in 2022 and the coming years. But any significant political violence will ultimately drive a new national consensus in favor of federalism. 3.   Limited Big Government: The story of the 2000s and 2010s was the revival of Big Government, first in the George W. Bush national security state, then in the Barack Obama liberal spending tradition, then in the big spending Republican tradition with Trump, and finally in the liberal tradition again with Biden. The combination of popular discontent at home and great power struggle abroad means that the US is unlikely to slash either social programs or defense spending. As for tax hikes, aggressive tax hikes are impractical. Biden may pass some tax hikes but the budget deficit will continue to expand over the long run (Chart 14). At the same time, the shift to Big Government is occurring with an American context. The geography, constitution, and political system militate against centralization. The return of inflation means that fiscal conservatism will also make a comeback, starting with Republicans in the House in 2023, who will oppose new spending as a standard opposition tactic. So while Big Government has returned, and bond investors are pricing this sea change by pushing up Treasury yields, nevertheless the market will also need to price the fact that the growth of government still faces structural limits. Chart 14Reconciliation Bill Will Have Miniscule Impact On Budget Outlook These structural themes face crosswinds in 2022. The Millennials and younger generations will not carry the day in the midterm election – the Baby Boomers and Greatest Generation will. Peak polarization will bring negative surprises for investors over the 2022-24 election cycle and potentially even in 2024-28 if Trump is reelected. A Democratic reconciliation bill will expand government programs in 2022, while Republicans will revert to big spending ways if they gain full control of government again in 2025. Nevertheless the evidence suggests that generational change, peak polarization, and limited big government will prevail over time. The younger generations favor more proactive fiscal policy. Fiscal policy will address social unrest and geopolitical threats. But big government will drive inflation, which will in turn force voters to impose limits on government over the long run. Bottom Line: The US will opt to inflate away its debt over the long run – but it will also need growth and some structural reform once the ills of inflation become fully absorbed by voters. The huge bout of inflation in 2022 is only the beginning of this political process, though it will also accelerate the process. Investment Takeaways Stocks tend to be flattish ahead of midterm elections. This includes elections when a united government becomes gridlocked as is likely in 2022-23. Equities tend to perform better after election uncertainty passes. The transition from single-party government to gridlock also tends to imply higher yields until after the election is over, at which point yields decline (Chart 15). Single-party governments can manipulate fiscal policy to try to stay in power. Chart 15Stocks Tend To Be Flat, Bond Yields High, Until After Midterm Elections Defensives are outperforming cyclicals on slowing growth, rising interest rates, rising labor costs and energy prices, and rising uncertainty. Our worst call for Q1 was our tactical long growth over value stocks. We made this trade knowing it went against our strategic approach, which has favored value over growth since we launched the US Political Strategy in January 2021. Our reasoning was that a geopolitical crisis would cause a temporary spike in energy prices but a longer drop in bond yields. In fact bond yields rose anyway. We still think tech is increasingly attractive, especially after the corporate minimum tax passes. The brief inversion of the 2-year/10-year yield curve suggests the US economy is flirting with recession. Other parts of the curve are not yet confirming this signal and there can be a long lead time between inversion and recession. However, there is not yet a ceasefire in Ukraine and certainly not a durable ceasefire. The US and Iran do not yet have a deal to avoid a major increase in geopolitical tensions. The risk of a bigger energy shock from Russia or Iran or both is significant and could shorten the cycle. We recommend going strategically long S&P 500 oil and gas transportation and storage relative to the broad market. We also recommend taking advantage of the lull in fighting in Ukraine to join our Geopolitical Strategy in going strategically long US defense stocks relative to the broad market. Tactically we recommend going long renewable energy since the Democrats’ pending reconciliation bill will benefit from broader public recognition of the need for the energy security of both the US and its allies (Chart 16). Chart 16Go Long Defense, Energy Storage, And Renewables Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     See “National Tracking Poll,” Morning Consult and Politico, #2202029, February 5-6, 2022, assets.morningconsult.com. 2     Admittedly this poll is by a left-leaning organization but polling throughout 2021 supports the general conclusion that a majority of political independents support the key proposals. See Anika Dandekar and Ethan Winter, “Majority of Voters Still Want the Build Back Better Act Passed,” Data for Progress, January 4, 2022, dataforprogress.org. 3    See Nick Sobczyk and Nico Portuondo, “Democrats eye ‘Build Back Slimmer’ on reconciliation,” E&E News, March 24, 2022, eenews.net. 4    See Eugene Daniels, “The Left Gears Up to Take on Manchin Again,” Politico, March 29, 2022, politico.com. See also “Regan, McCarthy, Wyden talk revival of BBB,” The Fence Post, March 25, 2022, thefencepost.com.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets