Precious Metals

Highlights The sharp fall in the bond-to-gold ratio is an important signal to pay heed to. It might suggest that confidence in the U.S. dollar is finally waning. If correct, the sharp rally in crypto currencies over the past few months warrants monitoring. We are maintaining a pro-cyclical currency stance, while cognizant of the fact that many growth barometers remain in freefall. Oil and petrocurrencies are being supported by geopolitical risk, but a rebound in underlying demand could supercharge the uptrend. We are looking to buy a speculative basket of the Russian ruble and Colombian peso versus the U.S. dollar or Japanese yen. The Norges Bank remains the most hawkish G10 central bank. Hold long NOK/SEK positions. Meanwhile, North Sea crude should continue trading at a premium to WTI, while Norway should also outperform Canada domestically. Remain short CAD/NOK at current levels. Feature Chart I-1Major Peak In The Bond-To-Gold Ratio Gold continues to outperform Treasurys, which has historically been an ominous sign for the U.S. dollar. Ever since the end of the Bretton Woods agreement broke the gold/dollar link in the early ‘70s, bullion has stood as a viable threat to dollar liabilities, capturing the ebbs and flows of investor confidence in the greenback tick for tick. With the Federal Reserve’s dovish shift, we may just have triggered one of the necessary catalysts for a selloff in the U.S. dollar (Chart I-1).   The implications for currency strategy could be far and wide, especially vis-à-vis our procyclical stance. For example, one of the crosses we are watching fervently is the AUD/JPY exchange rate, since the Aussie tends to be a high-beta currency among G10 FX traders, while the yen tends to be the lowest. More importantly, the AUD/JPY cross is bouncing off an important technical level, having failed to punch below the critical 72-74 zone. In our eyes, the recent bounce could be the prologue to a reflationary rally. On Gold One beneficiary from a lower U.S. dollar is gold. Gold may be breaking out to multi-year highs, but the important takeaway for macro traders is that we may be entering a seismic shift in the investment landscape. Almost every major economy now has or is inching towards negative real interest rates. So, investors who are worried about the U.S. twin deficits and the crowded trade of being long Treasurys will shift into gold, given other major bond markets are getting perilously expensive. Gold has a long-standing relationship with negative interest rates, though the correlation has shifted over time (Chart I-2). The intuition behind falling real rates and rising gold prices is that low rates reduce the opportunity cost of holding non-income generating assets such as gold. And while odds are that yields may creep higher from current low levels, this will still be bullish for gold, if driven by rising inflation expectations. Gold tends to be a “Giffen good” meaning physical demand tends to increase as prices rise.  Support for the dollar is fraying at the edges, judging from relative interest rate differentials, international flows and balance-of-payment dynamics. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that the global allocation of foreign exchange reserves towards the U.S. dollar peaked at about 72% in the early 2000s and has been in a downtrend since. At the same time, foreign central banks have been amassing tremendous gold reserves, notably Russia and China, almost to the tune of the total annual output of the yellow metal (Chart I-3). The U.S. dollar remains the reserve currency of the world today, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fading. Chart I-2Gold And Real ##br##Yields Chart I-3Central Banks Are Absorbing Most Gold Production   Gold tends to be a “Giffen good” meaning physical demand tends to increase as prices rise. Ever since the gold bubble burst in 2011, both financial and jewelry demand has evaporated. The reality is that both China and India went on a buying binge of coins and jewelry during gold’s last bull market, and there is no reason to expect this time to be different (Chart I-4). For all the talk about flexible exchange rate regimes, it seems as if the world’s major central banks have been fixing their exchange rates to the gold price (Chart I-5). This suggests that gold price risks could be asymmetric to the upside, at least for now. A fall in prices encourages accumulation by EM central banks as a way to diversify out of their dollar reserves, while a rise in prices encourages financial demand and jewelry consumption. Chart I-4Gold Is A Giffen Good Chart I-5Fixed Exchange Rates Versus Gold?   The explosive rise in cryptocurrency prices highlights that the world is becoming flush again with liquidity, but also signals trepidation against global monetary policy settings (Chart I-6). In its basic function, money should be a store of value, a unit of account and a medium of exchange. Bitcoin’s high price volatility violates its function as a unit of account, but so do other currencies such as the Venezuelan peso or the Turkish Lira. In all, this boosts the demand for alternative assets, including gold. Bottom Line: Interest rate differentials are moving against the dollar, but our important takeaway – that gold continues to outperform Treasurys – is an ominous sign. This is bullish for pro-cyclical currency trades and gold. Chart I-6Confidence In The Dollar Is Waning On Oil Oil prices have been supported by rising geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and Iran, but will be supercharged if demand bottoms later this year. The view of our Geopolitical strategists is that the risk of escalation between the two factions is high, given Iran has been pinned into a corner with falling oil exports.1 Together with a falling U.S. dollar, this will be categorically bullish for petrocurrencies. In the cases of Canada and Norway, petroleum represents around 20% and 60% of total exports, so it is easy to see why a big fluctuation in the price of oil can have deep repercussions for their external balances. Our baseline still calls for Brent prices to touch $75/bbl by year-end. Oil demand tends to follow the ebbs and flows of the business cycle, and demand is contracting along with the slowdown in global trade (Chart I-7). But there is rising evidence of more and more activity along sea routes, judging from the Baltic Dry and Harpex shipping indexes. With over 60% of global petroleum consumed fueling the transportation sector, this is positive. This obviously hinges critically on a resolution to the trade war between the U.S. and China. However, with Chinese and Indian oil imports still growing healthily, this should also put a floor under global demand growth (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Global Oil Demand Has Been Weak Chart I-8Oil Demand Green Shoots Any increase in oil demand will materialize at a time when OPEC spare capacity is low. Global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of both Venezuelan and Iranian exports. Unplanned outages wiped off about 1.5% of supply in 2018, and lost output from both countries is nudging the oil market dangerously close to a negative supply shock (Chart I-9). The explosive rise in cryptocurrency prices signals trepidation against global monetary policy settings. In terms of petrocurrencies, there remains a gaping wedge that has opened vis-à-vis the price of oil (Chart I-10). While it is true that the landscape for oil production is rapidly shifting with the U.S. shale revolution grabbing market share from both OPEC and non-OPEC members, terms of trade still matter for petrocurrencies. Chart I-9A New Oil Baron Chart I-10Opportunity Or Regime Shift?   The positive correlation between petrocurrencies and oil has been gradually eroded as the U.S. economy has become less and less of an oil importer. Meanwhile, Norwegian production has been falling for a few years. In statistical terms, petrocurrencies had a near-perfect positive correlation with oil around the time U.S. production was about to take off (Chart I-11). Since then, that correlation has fallen from around 0.8 to roughly 0.3. This is why it may be increasingly more profitable to be long petrocurrencies versus a basket of oil-consuming nations, rather than the U.S. Chart I-11Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies Bottom Line: Both the CAD and NOK remain positively correlated with oil. So do the Russian ruble and the Colombian and Mexican pesos. That said, a loss of global market share has hurt the oil sensitivity of many petrocurrencies. Transportation bottlenecks for Canadian crude and falling production in Norway are also added negatives. Remain Long NOK/SEK And Short CAD/NOK The Norges Bank remains the most hawkish G10 central bank, having hiked interest rates to 1.25% at last week’s meeting. Governor Øystein Olsen signaled further rate increases later this year – at a time when global central banks are turning dovish. This will continue to put upward pressure under the Norwegian krone. Our recommendation is to stay long NOK/SEK and short CAD/NOK. Both the CAD and NOK remain positively correlated with oil. So do the Russian ruble and the Colombian and Mexican pesos.  The Norwegian economy remains closely tied to oil, with the bottom in oil prices in 2016 having jumpstarted employment growth, business confidence and wage growth. With inflation near the central bank’s target and our expectation for oil prices to grind higher, we agree with the central bank’s assessment that the future path of interest rates is likely higher (Chart I-12). Short CAD/NOK positions are an excellent way to play U.S. dollar downside (Chart I-13). The 6.50-6.60 level for the CAD/NOK has proven to be a formidable resistance since 2015. Chart I-12The Norwegian Economy Will Rebound Chart I-13Sell USD Via CAD/NOK At $20/bbl, the discount between Western Canadian Select crude oil and Brent has narrowed, but remains wide. This has usually pinned CAD/NOK around the 6.30 level (Chart I-14). The NOK tends to outperform the SEK when oil prices are rising. This trade also benefits from a positive carry. Both the Canadian and Norwegian housing markets continue to be frothy, but in the latter it has been concentrated in Oslo, with Bergen and Trondheim having had more muted increases. In Canada, the rise in house prices could rotate to smaller cities, as macro-prudential measures implemented in Toronto and Vancouver nudge investors away from those markets. The Canadian government has decided to provide residents with a potential line of credit in exchange for equity stakes of up to 10% in residential homes. While this does little to improve the affordability of houses in expensive cities, it almost guarantees that those in competitive markets will be bid up. This will encourage a continued buildup of household leverage, which is a long-term negative for the Canadian dollar (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Oil Differentials Will Weigh On CAD/NOK Chart I-15The CAD Looks Vulnerable Longer-Term Bottom Line: Remain short CAD/NOK and long NOK/SEK for a trade. Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Escalation … Everywhere,” dated June 21, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been mostly negative: The Markit composite PMI fell to 50.6 in June. Both manufacturing and services fell to 50.1 and 50.7 respectively. On the housing market front, existing home sales increased by 2.5% month-on-month in May. However, new home sales contracted by 7.8% month-on-month. The house price index increased by 0.4% month-on-month in April. Both Dallas and Richmond Fed Manufacturing indices fell to -12.1 and 3 in June. Advanced goods trade balance fell to $74.55 billion in May.  Final annualized Q1 GDP was unchanged at 3.1% quarter-on-quarter, and core PCE increased by 1.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. DXY index has been flat this week. As we mentioned in last week’s report, we are closely monitoring the bond-to-gold ratio to gauge the direction of the U.S. dollar. Gold prices continue to soar this week by 5% due to safe-haven buying, the Fed’s dovish pivot, and rising inflation expectations. Our bias is that the balance of forces are moving away from the U.S. dollar. Report Links: Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 EUR/USD And The Neutral Rate Of Interest - June 14, 2019 Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area remain negative: The Markit composite PMI increased to 52.1 in June. The manufacturing PMI increased slightly to 47.8, and services PMI increased to 53.4. Sentiment remains depressed in June: Business climate fell to 0.17; Industrial confidence decreased to -5.6; Economic sentiment dropped to 103.3; Services sentiment came in at 11; Consumer confidence declined to -7.2. EUR/USD has been flat this week. The dovish message by Mario Draghi last week has limited the upside for the euro recently. However, in the long term, the dovish contest by global central banks will support a global economic recovery. That said, the trade war remains one of the biggest downside risks to our baseline scenario. Any deal or no-deal coming out of the G20 summit will likely re-shape expectations for the global economy and the euro. Report Links: Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 EUR/USD And The Neutral Rate Of Interest - June 14, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: Headline and core CPI fell to 0.7% and 0.5% year-on-year respectively in May. The Nikkei manufacturing PMI declined to 49.5 in June.  The leading economic index increased to 95.9 in April. The coincident index rose to 102.1 in April. Retail sales grew by 1.2% year-on-year in May. USD/JPY rose by 0.2% this week. The BoJ published the monetary policy meetings minutes this week, highlighting the upside and downside risk factors to their forecast. Close attention is being paid to outside economic developments and the scheduled consumption tax hike for the fiscal year 2019, and peaking-out of Olympic games-related demand and IT sector developments for the fiscal year 2020. Besides that, the BoJ members agree that the accommodative monetary policy should be sustained for an extended period. Report Links: Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Short USD/JPY: Heads I Win, Tails I Don’t Lose Too Much - May 31, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been negative: Public sector net borrowing fell to £4.5 billion in May. CBI retailing survey fell to -42 in June, from a previous reading of -27. GBP/USD fell by 0.4% this week. The probability of a “no-deal” Brexit has increased as a result of the new leadership contest. However, during the inflation report hearings this week, BoE Governor Carney highlighted that unless the next PM makes a “no-deal” Brexit their preferred policy, additional dovishness might not be warranted. We continue to favor the pound but will respect the stop loss at 1.25 if triggered. Report Links: Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been positive: CBA composite PMI increased to 53.1 in June. Manufacturing and services PMI increased to 51.7 and 53.3 respectively. ANZ Roy Morgan weekly consumer confidence increased slightly from 114.2 to 114.3. AUD/USD increased by 1% this week, now trading around 0.6996. Any good news coming out of the trade deal during the G20 summit could support the Aussie dollar and put a floor under this cross. Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns- April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Exports and imports both increased to NZ$5.81 billion and NZ$5.54 billion in May. The total trade balance fell to NZ$264 million in May. ANZ activity outlook fell to 8 in June, and business confidence fell to -38.1. NZD/USD increased by 1.7% this week. On Wednesday, the RBNZ kept interest rates unchanged at 1.5% and the market is currently pricing a 71.6% probability of rate cuts for the next policy meeting in August. Our bias remains that while the kiwi will benefit from broad dollar weakness, it will underperform its antipodean counterpart. We remain long AUD/NZD and SEK/NZD. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly positive: Retail sales growth slowed down to 0.1% month-on-month in April. Wholesale trade sales soared by 1.7% month-on-month in April. Bloomberg Nanos weekly confidence index rose to 57.8. CFIB business barometer increased to 61.5 in June. USD/CAD fell by 0.8% this week. The Canadian dollar continues to strengthen on the back of positive data surprises and recovering oil prices. U.S. EIA reported falling commercial crude oil inventories for last week. The tension continues between the U.S. and Iran. Moreover, OPEC is likely to cut their oil supply during the next meeting beginning in July. All these factors point to higher oil prices and will likely lift the loonie. ­­­Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There is little data from Switzerland this week: ZEW expectations index fell to -30 in June. USD/CHF has been flat this week. We remain overweight the franc in the long run due to solid Swiss economic fundamentals, including a high savings rate, rising productivity, and current account surplus. It also serves as a perfect hedge to any downside risks, both economic and geopolitical. The long CHF/NZD recommendation in our April 26 weekly report remains valid, though we do not have this trade on. Report Links: What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There is little data from Norway this week: Retail sales contracted by 1.3% in May. USD/NOK has been flat this week. The Norwegian krone remains one of our favorite currencies due to the rising oil prices and widening interest rate differentials. The front section of this bulletin reinforces our bullish petrocurrency view. Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mostly positive: Producer price inflation fell to 3.5% year-on-year in May. Trade balance increased to 8.3 billion SEK in May. USD/SEK fell by 0.8% this week. As we mentioned before, the Swedish exports could be a very powerful leading indicator of the global economy. In May, the Swedish exports increased to 137 billion SEK from 129 billion SEK in April. Hold on to our long SEK/NZD position. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights U.S. consumption remains robust despite the recent intensification of global growth headwinds. The G-20 meeting will not result in an escalation nor a major resolution of Sino-U.S. tensions. Kicking the can down the road is the most likely outcome. China’s reflationary efforts will intensify, impacting global growth in the second half of 2019. Fearful of collapsing inflation expectations, global central banks are easing policy, which is supporting global liquidity conditions and growth prospects. Bond yields have upside, especially inflation expectations. Equities have some short-term downside, but the cyclical peak still lies ahead. The equity rally will leave stocks vulnerable to the inevitable pick-up in interest rates later this cycle. Gold stocks may provide an attractive hedge for now. A spike in oil prices creates a major risk to our view. Stay overweight oil plays. Feature Global growth has clearly deteriorated this year, and bond yields around the world have cratered. German yields have plunged below -0.3% and U.S. yields briefly dipped below 2%. Even if the S&P 500 remains near all-time highs, the performance of cyclical sectors relative to defensive ones is corroborating the message from the bond market. Bonds and stocks are therefore not as much in disagreement as appears at first glance. To devise an appropriate strategy, now more than ever investors must decide whether or not a recession is on the near-term horizon. Answering yes to this question means bond prices will continue to rise, the dollar will rally further, stocks will weaken, and defensive stocks will keep outperforming cyclical ones. Answering no, one should sell bonds, sell the dollar, buy stocks, and overweight cyclical sectors. The weak global backdrop can still capsize the domestic U.S. economy. We stand in the ‘no’ camp: We do not believe a recession is in the offing and, while the current growth slowdown has been painful, it is not the end of the business cycle. Logically, we are selling bonds, selling the dollar and maintaining a positive cyclical stance on stocks. We also expect international equities to outperform U.S. ones, and we are becoming particularly positive on gold stocks. Oil prices should also benefit from the upcoming improvement in global growth. Has The U.S. Economy Met Its Iceberg? Investors betting on a recession often point to the inversion of the 3-month/10-year yield curve and the performance of cyclical stocks. However, we must also remember Paul Samuelson’s famous quip that “markets have predicted nine of the five previous recessions.” In any case, these market moves tell us what we already know: growth has weakened. We must decide whether it will weaken further. A simple probit model based on the yield curve slope and the new orders component of the ISM Manufacturing Index shows that there is a 40% probability of recession over the next 12 months. We need to keep in mind that in 1966 and 1998, this model was flagging a similar message, yet no recession followed over the course of the next year (Chart I-1). This means we must go back and study the fundamentals of U.S. growth. Chart I-1The Risk Of A Recession Has Risen, But It Is Not A No Brainer Chart I-2Lower Rates Will Help Residential Investment On the purely domestic front, the U.S. economy is not showing major stresses. Last month, we argued that we are not seeing the key symptoms of tight monetary policy: Homebuilders remain confident, mortgage applications for purchases are near cyclical highs, homebuilder stocks have been outperforming the broad market for three quarters, and lumber prices are rebounding.1 Moreover, the previous fall in mortgage yields is already lifting existing home sales, and it is only a matter of time before residential investment follows (Chart I-2). Households remain in fine form. Real consumer spending is growing at a 2.8% pace, and despite rising economic uncertainty, the Atlanta Fed GDPNow model expects real household spending to expand at a 3.9% rate in the second quarter (Chart I-3). This is key, as consumers’ spending and investment patterns drive the larger trends in the economy.2 Chart I-3Consumers Are Spending Chart I-4The Labor Market Is Still Doing Fine... Going forward, we expect consumption to stay the course. Despite its latest dip, consumer confidence remains elevated, household debt levels have fallen from 134% of disposable income in 2007 to 99% today, and debt-servicing costs only represent 9.9% of after-tax income, a multi-generational low. In this context, stronger household income growth should support spending. The May payrolls report is likely to have been an anomaly. Layoffs are still minimal, initial jobless claims continue to flirt near 50-year lows, the Conference Board’s Leading Credit index shows no stress, and the employment components of both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISM are at elevated levels (Chart I-4). If these leading indicators of employment are correct, both the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers and salaries have upside (Chart I-5), especially as productivity growth is accelerating. Despite these positives, the weak global backdrop can still capsize the domestic U.S. economy, and force the ISM non-manufacturing PMI to converge toward the manufacturing index. If global growth worsens, the dollar will strengthen, quality spreads will widen and stocks will weaken, resulting in tighter financial conditions. Since economic and trade uncertainty is still high, further deterioration in external conditions will cause U.S. capex to collapse. Employment would follow, confidence suffer and consumption fall. Global growth still holds the key to the future. Following The Chinese Impulse As the world’s foremost trading nation, Chinese activity lies at the center of the global growth equation. The China-U.S. trade war remains at the forefront of investors’ minds. The meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping over the next two days is important. It implies a thawing of Sino-U.S. trade negotiations. However, an overall truce is unlikely. An agreement to resume the talks is the most likely outcome. No additional tariffs will be levied on the remaining $300 billion of untaxed Chinese exports to the U.S., but the previous levies will not be meaningfully changed. Removing this $300 billion Damocles sword hanging over global growth is a positive at the margin. However, it also means that the can has been kicked down the road and that trade will remain a source of headline risk, at least until the end of the year. Chart I-6The Rubicon Has Been Crossed Trade uncertainty will nudge Chinese policymakers to ease policy further. In previous speeches, Premier Li Keqiang set the labor market as a line in the sand. If it were to deteriorate, the deleveraging campaign could be put on the backburner. Today, the employment component of the Chinese PMI is at its lowest level since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart I-6). This alone warrants more reflationary efforts by Beijing. Adding trade uncertainty to this mix guarantees additional credit and fiscal stimulus. More Chinese stimulus will be crucial for Chinese and global growth. Historically, it has taken approximatively nine months for previous credit and fiscal expansions to lift economic activity. We therefore expect that over the course of the summer, the imports component of the Chinese PMI should improve further, and the overall EM Manufacturing PMI should begin to rebound (Chart I-7, top and second panel). More generally, this summer should witness the bottom in global trade, as exemplified by Asian or European export growth (Chart I-7, third and fourth panel). The prospect for additional Chinese stimulus means that the associated pick-up in industrial activity should have longevity. Global central banks are running a brand new experiment. We are already seeing one traditional signpost that Chinese stimulus is having an impact on growth. Within the real estate investment component of GDP, equipment purchases are growing at a 30% annual rate, a development that normally precedes a rebound in manufacturing activity (Chart I-8, top panel). We are also keeping an eye out for the growth of M1 relative to M2. When Chinese M1 outperforms M2, it implies that demand deposits are growing faster than savings deposits. The inference is that the money injected in the economy is not being saved, but is ready to be deployed. Historically, a rebounding Chinese M1 to M2 ratio accompanies improvements in global trade, commodities prices, and industrial production (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7The Turn In Chinese Credit Will Soon Be Felt Around The World Chart I-8China's Stimulus Is Beginning To Have An Impact   To be sure, China is not worry free. Auto sales are still soft, global semiconductor shipments remain weak, and capex has yet to turn the corner. But the turnaround in credit and in the key indicators listed above suggests the slowdown is long in the tooth. In the second half of 2019, China will begin to add to global growth once again. Advanced Economies’ Central Banks: A Brave New World Chart I-9The Inflation Expectations Panic While China is important, it is not the only game in town. Global central banks are running a brand new experiment. It seems they have stopped targeting realized inflation and are increasingly focused on inflation expectations. The collapse in inflation expectations is worrying central bankers (Chart I-9). Falling anticipated inflation can anchor actual inflation at lower levels than would have otherwise been the case. It also limits the downside to real rates when growth slows, and therefore, the capacity of monetary policy to support economic activity. Essentially, central banks fear that permanently depressed inflation expectations renders them impotent. The change in policy focus is evident for anyone to see. As recently as January 2019, 52% of global central banks were lifting interest rates. Now that inflation expectations are collapsing, other than the Norges Bank, none are doing so (Chart I-10). Instead, the opposite is happening and the RBA, RBNZ and RBI are cutting rates. Moreover, as investors are pricing in lower policy rates around the world, G-10 bond yields are collapsing, which is easing global liquidity conditions. Indeed, as Chart I-11 illustrates, when the share of economies with falling 2-year forward rates is as high as it is today, the BCA Global Leading Indicator rebounds three months later. Chart I-10Central Banks Are In Easing Mode, Everywhere The European Central Bank stands at the vanguard of this fight. As we argued two months ago, deflationary pressures in Europe are intact and are likely to be a problem for years to come.3 The ECB is aware of this headwind and knows it needs to act pre-emptively. Four months ago, it announced a new TLRTO-III package to provide plentiful funding for stressed banks in the European periphery. On June 6th, ECB President Mario Draghi unveiled very generous financing terms for the TLTRO-III. Last week, at the ECB’s Sintra conference in Portugal, ECB Vice President Luis de Guindos professed that the ECB could cut rates if inflation expectations weaken. The following day, Draghi himself strongly hinted at an upcoming rate cut in Europe and a potential resumption of the ECB QE program. These measures are starting to ease financial conditions where Europe needs it most: Italy. An important contributor to the contraction in the European credit impulse over the past 21 months was the rapid tightening in Italian financial conditions that followed the surge in BTP yields from May 2018. Now that the ECB is becoming increasingly dovish, Italian yields have fallen to 2.1%, and are finally below the neutral rate of interest for Europe. BTP yields are again at accommodative levels. Chart I-11This Much Of An Easing Bias Boosts Growth Prospects With financial conditions in Europe easing and exports set to pick up in response to Chinese growth, European loan demand should regain some vigor. Meanwhile, the TLTRO-III measures, which are easing bank funding costs, should boost banks’ willingness to lend. The European credit impulse is therefore set to move back into positive territory this fall. European growth will rebound, and contribute to improving global growth conditions. The Fed’s Patience Is Running Out The Federal Reserve did not cut interest rates last week, but its intentions to do so next month were clear. First, the language of the statement changed drastically. Gone is the Fed’s patience; instead, there is an urgency to “act as appropriate to sustain the expansion.” Second, the fed funds rate projections from the Summary of Economic Projections were meaningfully revised down. In March, 17 FOMC participants expected the Fed to stay on hold for the remainder of 2019, while six foresaw hikes. Today, eight expect a steady fed funds rate, but seven are calling for two rate cuts this year. Only one member is still penciling in a hike. Moreover, nine out of 17 participants anticipate that rates will be lower in 2020 than today (Chart I-12). The FOMC’s unwillingness to push back very dovish market expectations signals an imminent interest rate cut. Like other advanced economy central banks, the Fed’s sudden dovish turn is aimed at reviving moribund inflation expectations (Chart I-13). In order to do so, the Fed will have to keep real interest rates at low levels, at least relative to real GDP growth. Even if the real policy rate goes up, so long as it increases more slowly than GDP growth, it will signify that money supply is growing faster than money demand.4 TIPS yields are anticipating these dynamics and will likely remain soft relative to nominal interest rates. Chart I-13...As Inflation Expectations Plunge Since the Fed intends to conduct easy monetary policy until inflation expectations have normalized to the 2.3% to 2.5% zone, our liquidity gauges will become more supportive of economic activity and asset prices over the coming two to three quarters: Our BCA Monetary indicator has not only clearly hooked up, it is now above the zero line, in expansionary territory (see Section III, page 41). Excess money growth, defined as money-of-zero-maturity over loan growth, is once again accelerating. This cycle, global growth variables such as our Global Nowcast, BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator, or worldwide export prices have all reliably followed this variable (Chart I-14). After collapsing through 2018, our U.S. Financial Liquidity Index is rebounding sharply, and the imminent end of the Fed’s balance sheet runoff will only solidify this progress. This indicator gauges how cheap and plentiful high-powered money is for global markets. Its recovery suggests that commodities, globally-traded goods prices, and economic activity are all set to improve (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Excess Money Has Turned Up Chart I-15Improving Liquidity Conditions Argue That Nominal Growth Will Pick Up...   The dollar is losing momentum and should soon fall, which will reinforce the improvement in global liquidity conditions. A trough in our U.S. Financial Liquidity Index is often followed by a weakening dollar (Chart I-16). Moreover, the Greenback’s strength has been turbocharged by exceptional repatriations of funds by U.S. economic agents (Chart I-17). The end of the repatriation holiday along with a more dovish Fed and the completion of the balance sheet runoff will likely weigh on the dollar. Once the Greenback depreciates, the cost of borrowing for foreign issuers of dollar-denominated debt will decline, along with the cost of liquidity, especially if the massive U.S. repatriation flows are staunched. This will further support global growth conditions. Chart I-16...And That The Dollar Will Turn Down... Trade relations are unlikely to deteriorate further, China is likely to stimulate more aggressively; and easing central banks around the world, including the Fed, are responding to falling inflation expectations. This backdrop points to a rebound in global growth in the second half of the year. As a corollary, the deflationary patch currently engulfing the world should end soon after. As a result, this growing reflationary mindset should delay any recession until late 2021 if not 2022. However, as the business cycle extends further, greater inflationary pressures will build down the road and force the Fed to lift rates – even more than it would have done prior to this wave of easing. Chart I-17...Especially If Repatriation Flows Slow Investment Implications Bonds BCA’s U.S. Bond Strategy service relies on the Golden Rule of Treasury Investing. This simple rule states that when the Fed turns out to be more dovish than anticipated by interest rate markets 12 months prior, Treasurys outperform cash. If the Fed is more hawkish than was expected by market participants, Treasurys underperform (Chart I-18). Today, the Treasury market’s outperformance is already consistent with a Fed generating a very dovish surprise over the next 12 months. However, the interest rate market is already pricing in a 98% probability of two rates cuts this year, and the December 2020 fed funds rate futures imply a halving of the policy rate. The Fed is unlikely to clear these very tall dovish hurdles as global growth is set to rebound, the fed funds rate is not meaningfully above neutral and the household sector remains resilient. Chart I-18Treasurys Already Anticipate Large Dovish Surprises Reflecting elevated pessimism toward global growth, the performance of transport relative to utilities stocks is as oversold as it gets. The likely rebound in this ratio should push yields higher, especially as foreign private investors are already aggressively buying U.S. government securities (Chart I-19). As occurred in 1998, Treasury yields should rebound soon after the Fed begins cutting rates. Moreover, with all the major central banks focusing on keeping rates at accommodative levels, the selloff in bonds should be led by inflation breakevens, also as occurred in 1998 (Chart I-20), especially if the dollar weakens. Chart I-19Yields Will Follow Transportation Relative To Utilities Stocks Chart I-201998: Yields Rebounded As Soon As The Fed Began Cutting     Equities A global economic rebound should provide support for equities on a cyclical horizon. The tactical picture remains murky as the stock market may have become too optimistic that Osaka will deliver an all-encompassing deal. However, this short-term downside is likely to prove limited compared to the cyclical strength lying ahead. This is particularly true for global equities, where valuations are more attractive than in the U.S. Chart I-21Easier Liquidity Conditions Lead To Higher Stock Prices Even if the S&P 500 isn’t the prime beneficiary of the recovery in global growth, it should nonetheless generate positive absolute returns on a cyclical horizon. As Chart I-21 illustrates, a pickup in our U.S. Financial Liquidity Index often precedes a rally in U.S. stocks. Since the U.S. Financial Liquidity Index has done a superb job of forecasting the weakness in stocks over the past 18 months, it is likely to track the upcoming strength as well. A weaker dollar should provide an additional tailwind to boost profit growth, especially as U.S. productivity is accelerating. This view is problematic for long-term investors. The cheapness of stocks relative to bonds is the only reason why our long-term valuation index is not yet at nosebleed levels Chart I-22). If we are correct that the current global reflationary push will build greater inflationary pressures down the road and will ultimately result in even higher interest rates, this relative undervaluation of equities will vanish. The overall valuation index will then hit near-record highs, leaving the stock market vulnerable to a very sharp pullback. Long-term investors should use this rally to lighten their strategic exposure to stocks, especially when taking into account the risk that populism will force a retrenchment in corporate market power, an issue discussed in Section II. Gone is the Fed’s patience; instead, there is an urgency to “act as appropriate to sustain the expansion.” In this environment, gold stocks are particularly attractive. Central banks are targeting very accommodative policy settings, which will limit the upside for real rates. Moreover, generous liquidity conditions and a falling dollar should prove to be great friends to gold. These fundamentals are being amplified by a supportive technical backdrop, as gold prices have broken out and the gold A/D line keeps making new highs (Chart I-23). Chart I-22Beware What Will Happen To Valuations Once Rates Rise Again Chart I-23Strong Technical Backdrop For The Gold   Structural forces reinforce these positives for gold. EM reserve managers are increasingly diversifying into gold, fearful of growing geopolitical tensions with the U.S. (Chart I-24). Meanwhile, G-10 central banks are not selling the yellow metal anymore. This positive demand backdrop is materializing as global gold producers have been focused on returning cash to shareholders instead of pouring funds into capex. This lack of investment will weigh on output growth going forward. Chart I-24EM Central Banks Are Diversifying Into Gold This emphasis on returning cash to shareholders makes gold stocks particularly attractive. Gold producers are trading at a large discount to the market and to gold itself as investors remain concerned by the historical lack of management discipline. However, boosting dividends, curtailing debt levels and only focusing on the most productive projects ultimately creates value for shareholders. A wave of consolidation will only amplify these tailwinds. Our overall investment recommendation is to overweight stocks over bonds on a cyclical horizon while building an overweight position in gold equities. Our inclination to buy gold stocks transcends our long-term concerns for equities, as rising long-term inflation should favor gold as well. The Key Risk: Iran The biggest risk to our view remains the growing stress in the Middle East. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team assigns a less than 40% chance that tensions between the U.S. and Iran will deteriorate into a full-fledged military conflict. The U.S.’s reluctance to respond with force to recent Iranian provocations may even argue that this probability could be too high. Nonetheless, if a military conflict were to happen, it would involve a closing of the Strait of Hormuz, a bottleneck through which more than 20% of global oil production transits. In such a scenario, Brent prices could easily cross above US$150/bbl. Chart I-25Oil Inventories Are Set To Decline To mitigate this risk, we recommend overweighting oil plays in global portfolios. Not only would such an allocation benefit in the event of a blow-up in the Persian Gulf, oil is supported by positive supply/demand fundamentals and Brent should end the year $75/bbl. After five years of limited oil capex, Wood Mackenzie estimates that the supply of oil will be close to 5 million barrels per day smaller than would have otherwise been the case. Moreover, OPEC and Russia remain disciplined oil producers, which is limiting growth in crude output today. Meanwhile, in light of the global growth deceleration, demand for oil has proved surprisingly robust. Demand is likely to pick up further when global growth reaccelerates in the second half of the year. As a result, BCA’s Commodity and Energy Strategy currently expects additional inventory drawdowns that will only push oil prices higher in an environment of growing global reflation (Chart I-25). A falling dollar would accentuate these developments.   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 27, 2019 Next Report: July 25, 2019   II. The Productivity Puzzle: Competition Is The Missing Ingredient Productivity growth is experiencing a cyclical rebound, but remains structurally weak. The end of the deepening of globalization, statistical hurdles, and the possibility that today’s technological advances may not be as revolutionary as past ones all hamper productivity. On the back of rising market power and concentration, companies are increasing markups instead of production. This is depressing productivity and lowering the neutral rate of interest. For now, investors can generate alpha by focusing on consolidating industries. Growing market power cannot last forever and will meet a political wall. Structurally, this will hurt asset prices.   “We don’t have a free market; don’t kid yourself. (…) Businesspeople are enemies of free markets, not friends (…) businesspeople are all in favor of freedom for everybody else (…) but when it comes to their own business, they want to go to Washington to protect their businesses.” Milton Friedman, January 1991. Despite the explosion of applications of growing computing power, U.S. productivity growth has been lacking this cycle. This incapacity to do more with less has weighed on trend growth and on the neutral rate of interest, and has been a powerful force behind the low level of yields at home and abroad. In this report, we look at the different factors and theories advanced to explain the structural decline in productivity. Among them, a steady increase in corporate market power not only goes a long way in explaining the lack of productivity in the U.S., but also the high level of profit margins along with the depressed level of investment and real neutral rates. A Simple Cyclical Explanation The decline in productivity growth is both a structural and cyclical story. Historically, productivity growth has followed economic activity. When demand is strong, businesses can generate more revenue and therefore produce more. The historical correlation between U.S. nonfarm business productivity and the ISM manufacturing index illustrates this relationship (Chart II-1). Chart II-1The Cyclical Behavior Of Productivity Chart II-2Deleveraging Hurts Productivity Since 2008, as households worked off their previous over-indebtedness, the U.S. private sector has experienced its longest deleveraging period since the Great Depression. This frugality has depressed demand and contributed to lower growth this cycle. Since productivity is measured as output generated by unit of input, weak demand growth has depressed productivity statistics. On this dimension, the brief deleveraging experience of the early 1990s is instructive: productivity picked up only after 1993, once the private sector began to accumulate debt faster than the pace of GDP growth (Chart II-2). The recent pick-up in productivity reflects these debt dynamics. Since 2009, the U.S. non-financial private sector has stopped deleveraging, removing one anchor on demand, allowing productivity to blossom. Moreover, the pick-up in capex from 2017 to present is also helping productivity by raising the capital-to-workers ratio. While this is a positive development for the U.S. economy, the decline in productivity nonetheless seems structural, as the five-year moving average of labor productivity growth remains near its early 1980s nadir (Chart II-3). Something else is at play. The Usual Suspects Three major forces are often used to explain why observed productivity growth is currently in decline: A slowdown in global trade penetration, the fact that statisticians do not have a good grasp on productivity growth in a service-based economy, and innovation that simply isn’t what it used to be. Slowdown In Global Trade Penetration Two hundred years ago, David Ricardo argued that due to competitive advantages, countries should always engage in trade to increase their economic welfare. This insight has laid the foundation of the argument that exchanges between nations maximizes the utilization of resources domestically and around the world. Rarely was this argument more relevant than over the past 40 years. On the heels of the supply-side revolution of the early 1980s and the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization took off. The share of the world's population participating in the global capitalist system rose from 30% in 1985 to nearly 100% today. The collapse in new business formation in the U.S. is another fascinating development. Generating elevated productivity gains is simpler when a country’s capital stock is underdeveloped: each unit of investment grows the capital-to-labor ratio by a greater proportion. As a result, productivity – which reflects the capital-to-worker ratio – can grow quickly. As more poor countries have joined the global economy and benefitted from FDI and other capital inflows, their productivity has flourished. Consequently, even if productivity growth has been poor in advanced economies over the past 10 years, global productivity has remained high and has tracked the share of exports in global GDP (Chart II-4). Chart II-4The Apex Of Globalization Represented The Summit Of Global Productivity Growth This globalization tailwind to global productivity growth is dissipating. First, following an investment boom where poor decisions were made, EM productivity growth has been declining. Second, with nearly 100% of the world’s labor supply already participating in the global economy, it is increasingly difficult to expand the share of global trade in global GDP and increase the benefit of cross-border specialization. Finally, the popular backlash in advanced economies against globalization could force global trade into reverse. As economic nationalism takes hold, cross-border investments could decline, moving the world economy further away from an optimal allocation of capital. These forces may explain why global productivity peaked earlier this decade. Productivity Is Mismeasured Recently deceased luminary Martin Feldstein argued that the structural decline in productivity is an illusion. As the argument goes, productivity is not weak; it is only underestimated. This is pure market power, and it helps explain the gap between wages and productivity. A parallel with the introduction of electricity in the late 19th century often comes to mind. Back then, U.S. statistical agencies found it difficult to disentangle price changes from quantity changes in the quickly growing revenues of electrical utilities. As a result, the Bureau Of Labor Statistics overestimated price changes in the early 20th century, which depressed the estimated output growth of utilities by a similar factor. Since productivity is measured as output per unit of labor, this also understated actual productivity growth – not just for utilities but for the economy as a whole. Ultimately, overall productivity growth was revised upward. Chart II-5Plenty Of Room To Mismeasure Real Output Growth In today’s economy, this could be a larger problem, as 70% of output is generated in the service sector. Estimating productivity growth is much harder in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector, as there is no actual countable output to measure. Thus, distinguishing price increases from quantity or quality improvements is challenging. Adding to this difficulty, the service sector is one of the main beneficiaries of the increase in computational power currently disrupting industries around the world. The growing share of components of the consumer price index subject to hedonic adjustments highlight this challenge (Chart II-5). Estimating quality changes is hard and may bias the increase in prices in the economy. If prices are unreliably measured, so will output and productivity. Chart II-6A Multifaceted Decline In Productivity Pushing The Production Frontier Is Increasingly Hard Another school of thought simply accepts that productivity growth has declined in a structural fashion. It is far from clear that the current technological revolution is much more productivity-enhancing than the introduction of electricity 140 years ago, the development of the internal combustion engine in the late 19th century, the adoption of indoor plumbing, or the discovery of penicillin in 1928. It is easy to overestimate the economic impact of new technologies. At first, like their predecessors, the microprocessor and the internet created entirely new industries. But this is not the case anymore. For all its virtues, e-commerce is only a new method of selling goods and services. Cloud computing is mainly a way to outsource hardware spending. Social media’s main economic value has been to gather more information on consumers, allowing sellers to reach potential buyers in a more targeted way. Without creating entirely new industries, spending on new technologies often ends up cannibalizing spending on older technologies. For example, while Google captures 32.4% of global ad revenues, similar revenues for the print industry have fallen by 70% since their apex in 2000. If new technologies are not as accretive to production as the introduction of previous ones were, productivity growth remains constrained by the same old economic forces of capex, human capital growth and resource utilization. And as Chart II-6 shows, labor input, the utilization of capital and multifactor productivity have all weakened. Some key drivers help understand why productivity growth has downshifted structurally. Chart II-8Demographics Are Hurting Productivity Let’s look at human capital. It is much easier to grow human capital when very few people have a high-school diploma: just make a larger share of your population finish high school, or even better, complete a university degree. But once the share of university-educated citizens has risen, building human capital further becomes increasingly difficult. Chart II-7 illustrates this problem. Growth in educational achievement has been slowing since 1995 in both advanced and developing economies. This means that the growth of human capital is slowing. This is without even wading into whether or not the quality of education has remained constant. Human capital is also negatively impacted by demographic trends. Workers in their forties tend to be at the peak of their careers, with the highest accumulated job know-how. Problematically, these workers represent a shrinking share of the labor force, which is hurting productivity trends (Chart II-8). The capital stock too is experiencing its own headwinds. While Moore’s Law seems more or less intact, the decline in the cost of storing information is clearly decelerating (Chart II-9). Today, quality adjusted IT prices are contracting at a pace of 2.3% per annum, compared to annual declines of 14% at the turn of the millennium. Thus, even if nominal spending in IT investment had remained constant, real investment growth would have sharply decelerated (Chart II-10). But since nominal spending has decelerated greatly from its late 1990s pace, real investment in IT has fallen substantially. The growth of the capital stock is therefore lagging its previous pace, which is hurting productivity growth. Chart II-10The Impact Of Slowing IT Deflation Chart II-11A Dearth Of New Businesses   The collapse in new business formation in the U.S. is another fascinating development (Chart II-11). New businesses are a large source of productivity gains. Ultimately, 20% of productivity gains have come from small businesses becoming large ones. Think Apple in 1977 versus Apple today. A large decline in the pace of new business formation suggests that fewer seeds have been planted over the past 20 years to generate those enormous productivity explosions than was the case in the previous 50 years. The X Factor: Growing Market Concentration Chart II-12Wide Profit Margins: A Testament To The Weakness Of Labor The three aforementioned explanations for the decline in productivity are all appealing, but they generally leave investors looking for more. Why are companies investing less, especially when profit margins are near record highs? Why is inflation low? Why has the pace of new business formation collapsed? These are all somewhat paradoxical. This is where a growing body of works comes in. Our economy is moving away from the Adam Smith idea of perfect competition. Industry concentration has progressively risen, and few companies dominate their line of business and control both their selling prices and input costs. They behave as monopolies and monopsonies, all at once.1 This helps explain why selling prices have been able to rise relative to unit labor costs, raising margins in the process (Chart II-12). Let’s start by looking at the concept of market concentration. According to Grullon, Larkin and Michaely, sales of the median publicly traded firms, expressed in constant dollars, have nearly tripled since the mid-1990s, while real GDP has only increased 70% (Chart II-13).2 The escalation in market concentration is also vividly demonstrated in Chart II-14. The top panel shows that since 1997, most U.S. industries have experienced sharp increases in their Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI),3 a measure of concentration. In fact, more than half of U.S. industries have experienced concentration increases of more than 40%, and as a corollary, more than 75% of industries have seen the number of firms decline by more than 40%. The last panel of the chart also highlights that this increase in concentration has been top-heavy, with a third of industries seeing the market share of their four biggest players rise by more than 40%. Rising market concentration is therefore a broad phenomenon – not one unique to the tech sector.     This rising market concentration has also happened on the employment front. In 1995, less than 24% of U.S. private sector employees worked for firms with 10,000 or more employees, versus nearly 28% today. This does not seem particularly dramatic. However, at the local level, the number of regions where employment is concentrated with one or two large employers has risen. Azar, Marinescu and Steinbaum developed Map II-1, which shows that 75% of non-metropolitan areas now have high or extreme levels of employment concentration.4 Chart II-15The Owners Of Capital Are Keeping The Proceeds Of The Meagre Productivity Gains This growing market power of companies on employment can have a large impact on wages. Chart II-15 shows that real wages have lagged productivity since the turn of the millennium. Meanwhile, Chart II-16 plots real wages on the y-axis versus the HHI of applications (top panel) and vacancies (bottom panel). This chart shows that for any given industry, if applicants in a geographical area do not have many options where to apply – i.e. a few dominant employers provide most of the jobs in the region – real wages lag the national average. The more concentrated vacancies as well as applications are with one employer, the greater the discount to national wages in that industry.5 This is pure market power, and it helps explain the gap between wages and productivity as well as the widening gap between metropolitan and non-metropolitan household incomes. Growing market power and concentration do not only compress labor costs, they also result in higher prices for consumers. This seems paradoxical in a world of low inflation. But inflation could have been even lower if market concentration had remained at pre-2000s levels. In 2009, Matthew Weinberg showed that over the previous 22 years, horizontal mergers within an industry resulted in higher prices.6 In a 2014 meta-study conducted by Weinberg along with Orley Ashenfelter and Daniel Hosken, the authors showed that across 49 studies ranging across 21 industries, 36 showed that horizontal mergers resulted in higher prices for consumers.7 While today’s technology may be enhancing the productive potential of our economies, this is not benefiting output and measured productivity. Instead, it is boosting profit margins. In a low-inflation environment, the only way for companies to garner pricing power is to decrease competition, and M&As are the quickest way to achieve this goal. After examining nearly 50 merger and antitrust studies spanning more than 3,000 merger cases, John Kwoka found that, following mergers that augmented an industry’s concentration, prices increased in 95% of cases, and on average by 4.5%.8 In no industry is this effect more vividly demonstrated than in the healthcare field, an industry that has undergone a massive wave of consolidation – from hospitals, to pharmacies to drug manufacturers. As Chart II-17 illustrates, between 1980 and 2016, healthcare costs have increased at a much faster pace in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. However, life expectancy increased much less than in other advanced economies. In this context of growing market concentration, it is easy to see why, as De Loecker and Eeckhout have argued, markups have been rising steadily since the 1980s (Chart II-18, top panel) and have tracked M&A activity (Chart II-18, bottom panel).9 In essence, mergers and acquisitions have been the main tool used by firms to increase their concentration. Another tool at their disposal has been the increase in patents. The top panel of Chart II-19 shows that the total number of patent applications in the U.S. has increased by 3.6-fold since the 1980s, but most interestingly, the share of patents coming from large, dominant players within each industry has risen by 10% over the same timeframe (Chart II-19, bottom panel). To use Warren Buffet’s terminology, M&A and patents have been how firms build large “moats” to limit competition and protect their businesses. Chart II-18Markups Rise Along With Growing M&A Activity Chart II-19How To Build A Moat?   Why is this rise in market concentration affecting productivity? First, from an empirical perspective, rising markups and concentration tend to lead to lower levels of capex. A recent IMF study shows that the more concentrated industries become, the higher the corporate savings rate goes (Chart II-20, top panel).10 These elevated savings reflect wider markups, but also firms with markups in the top decile of the distribution display significantly lower investment rates (Chart II-20, bottom panel). If more of the U.S. output is generated by larger, more concentrated firms, this leads to a lower pace of increase in the capital stock, which hurts productivity.   Second, downward pressure on real wages is also linked to a drag on productivity. Monopolies and oligopolies are not incentivized to maximize output. In fact, for any market, a monopoly should lead to lower production than perfect competition would. Diagram II-I from De Loecker and Eeckhout shows that moving from perfect competition to a monopoly results in a steeper labor demand curve as the monopolist produces less. As a result, real wages move downward and the labor participation force declines. Does this sound familiar? The rise of market power might mean that in some way Martin Feldstein was right about productivity being mismeasured – just not the way he anticipated. In a June 2017 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, Peter Berezin showed that labor-saving technologies like AI and robotics, which are increasingly being deployed today, could lead to lower wages (Chart II-21).11 For a given level of technology in the economy, productivity is positively linked to real wages but inversely linked to markups – especially if the technology is of the labor-saving kind. So, if markups rise on the back of firms’ growing market power, the ensuing labor savings will not be used to increase actual input. Rather, corporate savings will rise. Thus, while today’s technology may be enhancing the productive potential of our economies, this is not benefiting output and measured productivity. Instead, it is boosting profit margins.12 Unsurprisingly, return on assets and market concentration are positively correlated (Chart II-22).     Finally, market power and concentration weighing on capex, wages and productivity are fully consistent with higher returns of cash to shareholders and lower interest rates. The higher profits and lower capex liberate cash flows available to be redistributed to shareholders. Moreover, lower capex also depresses demand for savings in the economy, while weak wages depress middle-class incomes, which hurts aggregate demand. Additionally, higher corporate savings increases the wealth of the richest households, who have a high marginal propensity to save. This results in higher savings for the economy. With a greater supply of savings and lower demand for those savings, the neutral rate of interest has been depressed. Investment Implications First, in an environment of low inflation, investors should continue to favor businesses that can generate higher markups via pricing power. Equity investors should therefore continue to prefer industries where horizontal mergers are still increasing market concentration. Second, so long as the status quo continues, wages will have a natural cap, and so will the neutral rate of interest. This does not mean that wage growth cannot increase further on a cyclical basis, but it means that wages are unlikely to blossom as they did in the late 1960s, even within a very tight labor market. Without too-severe an inflation push from wages, the business cycle could remain intact even longer, keeping a window open for risk assets to rise further on a cyclical basis. Third, long-term investors need to keep a keen eye on the political sphere. A much more laissez-faire approach to regulation, a push toward self-regulation, and a much laxer enforcement of antitrust laws and merger rules were behind the rise in market power and concentration.13 The particularly sharp ascent of populism in Anglo-Saxon economies, where market power increased by the greatest extent, is not surprising. So far, populists have not blamed the corporate sector, but if the recent antitrust noise toward the Silicon Valley behemoths is any indication, the clock is ticking. On a structural basis, this could be very negative for asset prices. An end to this rise in market power would force profit margins to mean-revert toward their long-term trend, which is 4.7 percentage-points below current levels. This will require discounting much lower cash flows in the future. Additionally, by raising wages and capex, more competition would increase aggregate demand and lift real interest rates. Higher wages and aggregate demand could also structurally lift inflation. Thus, not only will investors need to discount lower cash flows, they will have to do so at higher discount rates. As a result, this cycle will likely witness both a generational peak in equity valuations as well as structural lows in bond yields. As we mentioned, these changes are political in nature. We will look forward to studying the political angle of this thesis to get a better handle on when these turning points will likely emerge. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   III. Indicators And Reference Charts Over the past two weeks, the ECB has made a dovish pivot, President Trump announced he would meet President Xi, and the Fed telegraphed a rate cut for July. In response, the S&P 500 made marginal new highs before softening anew. This lack of continuation after such an incredible alignment of stars shows that the bulls lack conviction. These dynamics increase the probability that the market sells off after the G-20 meeting, as we saw last December following the supposed truce in Buenos Aires. The short-term outlook remains dangerous. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) confirms this intuition. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive readings from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if stong market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Cheaper valuations, a pick-up in global growth or an actual policy easing is required before stocks can resume their ascent. The cyclical outlook is brighter than the tactical one. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. and Japan continues to improve. However, it remains flat in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. In aggregate, the WTP currently suggests that investors are still inclined to add to their stock holdings. Hence, we expect global investors will continue to buy the dips. Our Monetary Indicator is moving deeper into stimulative territory, supporting our cyclically constructive equity view. The Fed and the ECB are set to cut rates while other global central banks have been opening the monetary spigots. This will support global monetary conditions. The BCA Composite Valuation Indicator, an amalgamation of 11 measures, is in overvalued territory, but it is not high enough to negate the positive message from our Monetary Indicator, especially as our Composite Technical Indicator remains above its 9-month moving average. These dynamics confirm that despite the near-term downside, equities have more cyclical upside. According to our model, 10-year Treasurys are now expensive. Moreover, our technical indicator is increasingly overbought while the CRB Raw Industrials is oversold, a combination that often heralds the end of bond rallies. Additionally, duration surveys show that investors have very elevated portfolio duration, and both the term premium and Fed expectations are very depressed. Considering this technical backdrop, BCA’s economic view implies minimal short-term downside for yields, but significant downside for Treasury prices over the upcoming year. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar remains very expensive. Additionally, after forming a negative divergence with prices, our Composite Technical Indicator is falling quickly. Being a momentum currency, the dollar could suffer significant downside if this indicator falls below zero. Monitor these developments closely. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1       Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2019," dated May 30, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report "Give Credit Where Credit Is Due," dated November 27, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3       Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Europe: Here I Am, Stuck In A Liquidity Trap," dated April 25, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4       Money demand is mostly driven by the level of activity and wealth. If the price of money – interest rates – is growing more slowly than money demand, the most likely cause is that money supply is increasing faster than money demand and policy is accommodative. 5       A monopsony is a firm that controls the price of its input because it is the dominant, if not unique, buyer of said input. 6       G. Grullon, Y. Larkin and R. Michaely, “Are Us Industries Becoming More Concentrated?,” April 2017. 7       The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated by taking the market share of each firm in the industry, squaring them, and summing the result. Consider a hypothetical industry with four total firm where firm1, firm2, firm3 and firm4 has 40%, 30%, 15% and 15% of market share, respectively. Then HHI is 402+302+152+152 = 2,950. 8       J. Azar, I. Marinescu, M. Steinbaum, “Labor Market Concentration,” December 2017. 9     J. Azar, I. Marinescu, M. Steinbaum, “Labor Market Concentration,” December 2017. 10     M. Weinberg, “The Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 4, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages 433–447. 11     O. Ashenfelter, D. Hosken, M. Weinberg, "Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages S67 - S100. 12    J. Kwoka, “Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy,” MIT Press, 2015. 13     J. De Loecker, J. Eeckhout, G. Unger, "The Rise Of Market Power And The Macroeconomic Implications," Mimeo 2018. 14     “Chapter 2: The Rise of Corporate Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Effects,” World Economic Outlook, April 2019. 15     Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds?"dated May 31, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 16     Productivity can be written as: 17     J. Tepper, D. Hearn, “The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition,” Wiley, November 2018. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights A rare market trifecta – propelled by investors seeking safe-haven assets, inflation hedges in the wake of the Fed’s dovish turn this past week, and portfolio diversification – will continue to keep gold well bid. It would only be natural for gold to have an episode of profit taking in the short term, following its 6.4% jump from ~ $1,340/oz beginning in mid-June. That said, we would use any profit-taking episode to get long gold, following its decisive break through resistance at $1,365/oz to a six-year high of $1,423.44/oz in New York spot trading on Tuesday, according to Bloomberg. The next significant resistance we see is at $1,790/oz. Energy: Overweight. Iran’s oil exports have fallen to ~ 300k b/d so far in June, according to Refinitiv Eikon, a data provider owned by Blackrock and Thomson Reuters. In mid-2018, exports exceeded 2.5mm b/d. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) re-assured markets its spare capacity allows it to meet customer demand. Separately, the U.S. EIA reported commercial crude oil inventories in the fell 12.8mm bbl, during the week ended June 21, 2019. This likely reflects the end of the longer-than-usual refinery turn-around season in the U.S. Base Metals: Neutral. Reduced copper concentrate supplies on the back of strike action at Codelco’s Chuquicamata mine in Chile have clobbered the Fastmarkets MB Asia – Pacific treatment and refining index, which stood at $53.50/MT June 21, its lowest level since 2013. A low index level indicates tight physical supplies. We are taking profits on our long September $3.00/lb COMEX copper calls vs. short September $3.30/lb COMEX copper calls at tonight's close. The position was up 192% at Tuesday's close. Precious Metals: Neutral. Markets await a possible re-start of Sino – U.S. trade talks at this weekend’s meeting in Osaka between presidents Xi and Trump at the G20. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA Crop Progress again showed corn planting behind schedule, clocking in at 96% vs. 100% on average this time of year. Corn emergence also is behind schedule, at 89% vs. an average 99% at this time of year. Only 56% of the crop was reported to be in good or excellent condition, vs. 77% last year at this time. We expect corn to remain well bid. Feature The three main drivers of gold demand – safe-haven buying, inflation hedging and portfolio diversification – will continue to sustain the metal’s powerful rally. Safe-haven demand propelled gold toward long-term resistance at $1,365/oz in mid-June, as the U.S. – Iran showdown in the Persian Gulf intensified. As U.S. messaging becomes more internally inconsistent – particularly the resolve of America to continue to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – uncertainty as to how the showdown will resolve increases. In response to recent attacks on commercial oil-product tankers near the Strait of Hormuz – where close to 20% of the world’s oil supply transits daily – the U.S. has deployed close to 30,000 military personnel to the Persian Gulf region, the highest level of sailors deployed anywhere in the world. However, President Trump has said he is willing to leave the U.S.’s resolve to defend freedom of navigation through the Strait “a question mark.”1 This will continue to keep a safe-haven bid under gold, until markets receive clarity on the U.S.’s commitment to its historical role, and resolution in one form or another on the showdown in the Gulf. Fed’s Dovish Turn Bullish For Gold As unnerving to markets as the showdown in the Gulf is, it was the Fed’s unexpectedly dovish turn this past week that really turbo-charged gold prices, pushing them through $1,400/oz. Although inflation does not appear to be a huge risk to the U.S. economy, we do expect the U.S. CPI to move higher in 2H19. With the U.S. economy remaining at or close to full employment, investors realized the “insurance cut” telegraphed by the U.S. central bank for next month’s Board of Governors meeting stands a very good chance of finally goosing inflation higher, and re-anchoring inflation expectations later this year, which have been moving lower since 2H18 (Chart of the Week). Indeed, as Peter Berezin notes, “The fact that market-based inflation expectations have dropped sharply since last autumn has clearly influenced the Fed’s thinking.”2 The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge (UIG) already is registering a build-up in U.S. inflationary pressures (Chart 2). Although inflation does not appear to be a huge risk to the U.S. economy, we do expect the U.S. CPI to move higher in 2H19, something we believe investors already are embedding in gold prices. Chart of the WeekThe Fed Wants Inflation Expectations Higher Chart 2Underlying Inflation Trends Indicate Higher U.S. Inflation   USD Weakness Will Support Gold Chart 3Weaker USD Will Boost Gold Prices The Fed’s more accommodative policy also will push the broad USD trade-weighted index (TWI) lower, which will be bullish for gold as well (Chart 3). U.S. CPI and the broad USD TWI are two of the strongest explanatory variables for gold prices we have found in our modeling, along with real U.S. interest rates.3 Expect Profit-Taking Technically, the sharp rally in gold prices over the short term is pushing gold prices toward “overbought” territory, which is why we are expecting a round of profit-taking in the near term (Chart 4). Our Gold Composite Indicator moved up half a standard deviation since the start of the year, thanks to the above-mentioned trifecta. This move took the metal from a neutral position at the beginning of the year into a relatively mild overbought level. With the sharp rally over the past two weeks, gold now appears to be mildly overbought.4 Gold’s price performance is outstripping our equity risk-premium indicator, which measures the difference between the S&P 500 earnings yield (i.e., the inverse of the forward price/earnings ratio) and real 10-year U.S. Treasury yields (Chart 5). This is not unexpected, and may be something of a catch-up following the strong gains put up by the equity index relative to gold last year. Chart 4Short-Term Profit-Taking Likely In Gold Market Chart 5Gold Price Gain Outstrips Equity Risk Premium Gold’s price performance is outstripping our equity risk-premium indicator. Bottom Line: Gold prices to remain well supported by a rare market trifecta – investors seeking safe-haven assets, inflation hedges following the Fed’s dovish turn this past week, and portfolio diversification. We are expecting a round of profit taking in gold over the short term. We would use these brief selloffs to get long gold. The next significant resistance we see is at $1,790/oz.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the June 20, 2019 Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Supply – Demand Balances Consistent With Higher Oil Prices" – particularly the section entitled “Will The U.S. Defend Gulf Sea Lanes?” beginning on p. 3. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. See also More U.S. Navy Personnel Deployed to Middle East Than Anywhere Else published by usni.org June 24, 2019. 2 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Gentle Jay," for BCA Research’s appraisal of last week Fed board of governors meeting. Published June 21, 2019. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. In it, our Chief Global Investment strategist Peter Berezin notes, “Right now, rising inflation is not much of a risk. However, the Fed’s dovish turn almost guarantees that the U.S. economy will overheat.” See also “The Fed’s Got Your Back,” published by BCA Research’s U.S. Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy June 25, 2019. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 We have found inflation and U.S. financial variables – particularly the USD broad trade-weighted index, and real U.S. interest rates – are the chief variables explaining gold prices. Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold,” published by October 12, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Our Gold Composite Indicator combines sentiment, speculative-position levels, relative strength, and momentum gauges to characterize overbought and oversold conditions. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights We update our long-range forecasts of returns from a range of asset classes – equities, bonds, alternatives, and currencies – and make some refinements to the methodologies we used in our last report in November 2017. We add coverage of U.K., Australian, and Canadian assets, and include Emerging Markets debt, gold, and global Real Estate in our analysis for the first time. Generally, our forecasts are slightly higher than 18 months ago: we expect an annual return in nominal terms over the next 10-year years of 1.7% from global bonds, and 5.9% from global equities – up from 1.5% and 4.6% respectively in the last edition. Cheaper valuations in a number of equity markets, especially Japan, the euro zone, and Emerging Markets explain the higher return assumptions. Nonetheless, a balanced global portfolio is likely to return only 4.7% a year in the long run, compared to 6.3% over the past 20 years. That is lower than many investors are banking on. Feature Since we published our first attempt at projecting long-term returns for a range of asset classes in November 2017, clients have shown enormous interest in this work. They have also made numerous suggestions on how we could improve our methodologies and asked us to include additional asset classes. This Special Report updates the data, refines some of our assumptions, and adds coverage of U.K., Australian, and Canadian assets, as well as gold, global Real Estate, and global REITs. Our basic philosophy has not changed. Many of the methodologies are carried over from the November 2017 edition, and clients interested in more detailed explanations should also refer to that report.1 Our forecast time horizon is 10-15 years. We deliberately keep this vague, and avoid trying to forecast over a 3-7 year time horizon, as is common in many capital market assumptions reports. The reason is that we want to avoid predicting the timing and gravity of the next recession, but rather aim to forecast long-term trend growth irrespective of cycles. This type of analysis is, by nature, as much art as science. We start from the basis that historical returns, at least those from the past 10 or 20 years, are not very useful. Asset allocators should not use historical returns data in mean variance optimizers and other portfolio-construction models. For example, over the past 20 years global bonds have returned 5.3% a year. With many long-term government bonds currently yielding zero or less, it is mathematically almost impossible that returns will be this high over the coming decade or so. Our analysis points to a likely annual return from global bonds of only 1.7%. Our approach is based on building-blocks. There are some factors we know with a high degree of certainly: such as the return on U.S. 10-year Treasury yields over the next 10 years (to all intents and purposes, it is the current yield). Many fundamental drivers of return (credit spreads, the small-cap premium, the shape of the yield curve, profit margins, stock price multiples etc.) are either steady on average over the cycle, or mean revert. For less certain factors, such as economic growth, inflation, or equilibrium short-term interest rates, we can make sensible assumptions. Most of the analysis in this report is based on the 20-year history of these factors. We used 20 years because data is available for almost all the asset classes we cover for this length of time (there are some exceptions, for example corporate bond data for Australia and Emerging Markets go back only to 2004-5, and global REITs start only in 2008). The period from May 1999 to April 2019 is also reasonable since it covers two recessions and two expansions, and started at a point in the cycle that is arguably similar to where we are today. Some will argue that it includes the Technology bubble of 1999-2000, when stock valuations were high, and that we should use a longer period. But the lack of data for many assets classes before the 1990s (though admittedly not for equities) makes this problematic. Also, note that the historical returns data for the 20 years starting in May 1999 are quite low – 5.8% for U.S. equities, for example. This is because the starting-point was quite late in the cycle, as we probably also are now.   We make the following additions and refinements to our analysis: Add coverage of the U.K., Australia, and Canada for both fixed income and equities. Add coverage of Emerging Markets debt: U.S. dollar and local-currency sovereign bonds, and dollar-denominated corporate credit. Among alternative assets, add coverage of gold, global Direct Real Estate, and global REITs. Improve the methodology for many alt asset classes, shifting from reliance on historical returns to an approach based on building blocks – for example, current yield plus an estimation of future capital appreciation – similar to our analysis of other asset classes. In our discussion of currencies, add for easy reference of readers a table of assumed returns for all the main asset classes expressed in USD, EUR, JPY, GBP, AUD, and CAD (using our forecasts of long-run movements in these currencies). Added Sharpe ratios to our main table of assumptions. The summary of our results is shown in Table 1. The results are all average annual nominal total returns, in local currency terms (except for global indexes, which are in U.S. dollars). Table 1BCA Assumed Returns Unsurprisingly, given the long-term nature of this exercise, our return projections have in general not moved much compared to those in November 2017. Indeed, markets look rather similar today to 18 months ago: the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield was 2.4% at end-April (our data cut-off point), compared to 2.3%, and the trailing PE for U.S. stocks 21.0, compared to 21.6. If anything, the overall assumption for a balanced portfolio (of 50% equities, 30% bonds, and 20% equal-weighted alts) has risen slightly compared to the 2017 edition: to 4.7% from 4.1% for a global portfolio, and to 4.9% from 4.6% for a purely U.S. one. That is partly because we include specific forecasts for the U.K., Australia, and Canada, where returns are expected to be slightly higher than for the markets we limited our forecasts to previously, the U.S, euro zone, Japan, and Emerging Markets (EM). Equity returns are also forecast to be higher than 18 months ago, mainly because several markets now are cheaper: trailing PE for Japan has fallen to 13.1x from 17.6x, for the euro zone to 15.5x from 18.0x, and for Emerging Markets to 13.6x from 15.4x (and more sophisticated valuation measures show the same trend). The long-term picture for global growth remains poor, based on our analysis, but valuation at the starting-point, as we have often argued, is a powerful indicator of future returns. We include Sharpe ratios in Table 1 for the first time. We calculate them as expected return/expected volatility to allow for comparison between different asset classes, rather than as excess return over cash/volatility as is strictly correct, and as should be used in mean variance optimizers. Chart 1Volatility Is Easier To Forecast Than Returns For volatility assumptions, we mostly use the 20-year average volatility of each asset class. As discussed above, historical returns should not be used to forecast future returns. But volatility does not trend much over the long-term (Chart 1). We looked carefully at volatility trends for all the asset classes we cover, but did not find a strong example of a trend decline or rise in any. We do, however, adjust the historic volatility of the illiquid, appraisal-based alternative assets, such as Private Equity, Real Estate, and Farmland. The reported volatility is too low, for example 2.6% in the case of U.S. Direct Real Estate. Even using statistical techniques to desmooth the return produces a volatility of only around 7%. We choose, therefore, to be conservative, and use the historic volatility on REITs (21%) and apply this to Direct Real Estate too. For Private Equity (historic volatility 5.9%), we use the volatility on U.S. listed small-cap stocks (18.6%). Looking at the forecast Sharpe ratios, the risk-adjusted return on global bonds (0.55) is somewhat higher than that of global equities (0.33). Credit continues to look better than equities: Sharpe ratio of 0.70 for U.S. investment grade debt and 0.62 for high-yield bonds. Nonetheless, our overall conclusion is that future returns are still likely to be below those of the past decade or two, and below many investors’ expectations. Over the past 20 years a global balanced portfolio (defined as above) returned 6.3% and a similar U.S. portfolio 7.0%. We expect 4.7% and 4.9% respectively in future. Investors working on the assumption of a 7-8% nominal return – as is typical among U.S. pension funds, for example – need to become realistic. Below follow detailed descriptions of how we came up with our assumptions for each asset class (fixed income, equities, and alternatives), followed by our forecasts of long-term currency movements, and a brief discussion of correlations. 1. Fixed Income We carry over from the previous edition our building-block approach to estimating returns from fixed income. One element we know with a relatively high degree of certainty is the return over the next 10 years from 10-year government bonds in developed economies: one can safely assume that it will be the same as the current 10-year yield. It is not mathematical identical, of course, since this calculation does not take into account reinvestment of coupons, or default risk, but it is a fair assumption. We can make some reasonable assumptions for returns from cash, based on likely inflation and the real equilibrium cash rate in different countries. After this, our methodology is to assume that other historic relationships (corporate bond spreads, default and recovery rates, the shape of the yield curve etc.) hold over the long run and that, therefore, the current level reverts to its historic mean. The results of our analysis, and the assumptions we use, are shown in Table 2. Full details of the methodology follow below. Table 2Fixed Income Return Calculations Projected returns have not changed significantly from the 2017 edition of this report. In the U.S., for the current 10-year Treasury bond yield we used 2.4% (the three-month average to end-April), very similar to the 2.3% on which we based our analysis in 2017. In the euro zone and Japan, yields have fallen a little since then, with the 10-year German Bund now yielding roughly 0%, compared to 0.5% in 2017, and the Japanese Government Bond -0.1% compared to zero. Overall, we expect the Bloomberg Barclays Global Index to give an annual nominal return of 1.7% over the coming 10-15 years, slightly up from the assumption of 1.5% in the previous edition. This small rise is due to the slight increase in the U.S. long-term risk-free rate, and to the inclusion for the first time of specific estimates for returns in the U.K., Australia, and Canada. Fixed Income Methodologies Cash. We forecast the long-run rate on 3-month government bills by generating assumptions for inflation and the real equilibrium cash rate. For inflation, in most countries we use the 20-year average of CPI inflation, for example 2.2% in the U.S. and 1.7% in the euro zone. This suggests that both the Fed and the ECB will slightly miss their inflation targets on the downside over the coming decade (the Fed targets 2% PCE inflation, but the PCE measure is on average about 0.5% below CPI inflation). Of course, this assumes that the current inflation environment will continue. BCA’s view is that inflation risks are significantly higher than this, driven by structural factors such as demographics, populism, and the advent of ultra-unorthodox monetary policy.2 But we see this as an alternative scenario rather than one that we should use in our return assumptions for now. Japan’s inflation has averaged 0.1% over the past 20 years, but we used 1% on the grounds that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) should eventually see some success from its quantitative easing. For the equilibrium real rate we use the New York Fed’s calculation based on the Laubach-Williams model for the U.S., euro zone, U.K., and Canada. For Japan, we use the BoJ’s estimate, and for Australia (in the absence of an official forecast of the equilibrium rate) we take the average real cash rate over the past 20 years. Finally, we assume that the cash yield will move from its current level to the equilibrium over 10 years. Government Bonds. Using the 10-year bond yield as an anchor, we calculate the return for the government bond index by assuming that the spread between 7- and 10-year bonds, and between 3-month bills and 10-year bonds will average the same over the next 10 years as over the past 20. While the shape of the yield curve swings around significantly over the cycle, there is no sign that is has trended in either direction (Chart 2). The average maturity of government bonds included in the index varies between countries: we use the five-year historic average for each, for example, 5.8 years for the U.S., and 10.2 years for Japan. Spread Product. Like government bonds, spreads and default rates are highly cyclical, but fairly stable in the long run (Chart 3). We use the 20-year average of these to derive the returns for investment-grade bonds, high-yield (HY) bonds, government-related securities (e.g. bonds issued by state-owned entities, or provincial governments), and securitized bonds (e.g. asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities). For example, for U.S. high-yield we use the average spread of 550 basis points over Treasuries, default rate of 3.8%, and recovery rate of 45%. For many countries, default and recovery rates are not available and so we, for example, use the data from the U.S. (but local spreads) to calculate the return for high-yield bonds in the euro zone and the U.K. Inflation-Linked Bonds. We use the average yield over the past 10 years (not 20, since for many countries data does not go back that far and, moreover, TIPs and their equivalents have been widely used for only a relatively short period.) We calculate the return as the average real yield plus forecast inflation. Chart 2Yield Curves Chart 3Credit Spreads & Default Rates     Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate Bond Indexes. We use the weights of each category and country (from among those we forecast) to derive the likely return from the index. The composition of each country’s index varies widely: for example, in the euro zone (27% of the global bond index), government bonds comprise 66% of the index, but in the U.S. only 37%. Only the U.S. and Canada have significant weightings in corporate bonds: 29% and 50% respectively. This can influence the overall return for each country’s index. Table 3Emerging Market Debt Emerging Market Debt. We add coverage of EMD: sovereign bonds in both local currency and U.S. dollars, and USD-denominated EM corporate debt. Again, we take the 20-year average spread over 10-year U.S. Treasuries for each category. A detailed history of default and recovery is not available, so for EM corporate debt we assume similar rates to those for U.S. HY bonds. For sovereign bonds, we make a simple assumption of 0.5% of losses per year – although in practice this is likely to be very lumpy, with few defaults for years, followed by a rush during an EM crisis. For EM local currency debt, we assume that EM currencies will depreciate on average each year in line with the difference between U.S. inflation and EM inflation (using the IMF forecast for both – please see the Currency section below for further discussion on this). After these calculations, we conclude that EM USD sovereign bonds will produce an annual return of 4.7%, and EM USD corporate bonds 4.5% – in both cases a little below the 5.6% return assumption we have for U.S. high-yield debt (Table 3).   2. Equities Our equity methodologies are largely unchanged from the previous edition. We continue to use the return forecast from six different methodologies to produce an average assumed return. Table 4 shows the results and a summary of the calculation for each methodology. The explanation for the six methodologies follows below. Table 4Equity Return Calculations The results suggest slightly higher returns than our projections in 2017. We forecast global equities to produce a nominal annual total return in USD of 5.9%, compared to 4.6% previously. The difference is partly due to the inclusion for the first time of specific forecasts for the U.K., Australia and Canada, which are projected to see 8.0%, 7.4% and 6.0% returns respectively. The projection for the U.S. is fairly similar to 2017, rising slightly to 5.6% from 5.0% (mainly due to a slightly higher assumption for productivity growth in future, which boosts the nominal GDP growth assumption). Japan, however, does come out looking significantly more attractive than previously, with an assumed return of 6.2%, compared to 3.5% previously. This is mostly due to cheaper valuations, since the growth outlook has not improved meaningfully. Japan now trades on a trailing PE of 13.1x, compared to 17.6x in 2017. This helps improve the return indicated by a number of the methodologies, including earnings yield and Shiller PE. The forecast for euro zone equities remains stable at 4.7%. EM assumptions range more widely, depending on the methodology used, than do those for DM. On valuation-based measures (Shiller PE, earnings yield etc.), EM generally shows strong return assumptions. However, on a growth-based model it looks less attractive. We continue to use two different assumptions for GDP growth in EM. Growth Model (1) is based on structural reform taking place in Emerging Markets, which would allow productivity growth to rebound from its current level of 3.2% to the 20-year average of 4.1%; Growth Model (2) assumes no reform and that productivity growth will continue to decline, converging with the DM average, 1.1%, over the next 10 years. In both cases, the return assumption is dragged down by net issuance, which we assume will continue at the 10-year average of 4.9% a year. Our composite projection for EM equity returns (in local currencies) comes out at 6.6%, a touch higher than 6.0% in 2017. Equity Methodologies Equity Risk Premium (ERP). This is the simplest methodology, based on the concept that equities in the long run outperform the long-term risk-free rate (we use the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield) by a margin that is fairly stable over time. We continue to use 3.5% as the ERP for the U.S., based on analysis by Dimson, Marsh and Staunton of the average ERP for developed markets since 1900. We have, however, tweaked the methodology this time to take into account the differing volatility of equity markets, which should translate into higher returns over time. Thus we use a beta of 1.2 for the euro zone, 0.8 for Japan, 0.9 for the U.K., 1.1 for both Australia and Canada, and 1.3 for Emerging Markets. The long-term picture for global growth remains poor, but valuation at the starting-point, as we have often argued, is a powerful indicator of future returns. Growth Model. This is based on a Gordon growth model framework that postulates that equity returns are a function of dividend yield at the starting point, plus the growth of earnings in future (we assume that the dividend payout ratio stays constant). We base earnings growth off assumptions of nominal GDP growth (see Box 1 for how we calculate these). But historically there is strong evidence that large listed company earnings underperform nominal GDP growth by around 1 percentage point a year (largely because small, unlisted companies tend to show stronger growth than the mature companies that dominate the index) and so we deduct this 1% to reach the earnings growth forecast. We also need to adjust dividend yield for share buybacks which in the U.S., for tax reasons, have added 0.5% to shareholder returns over the past 10 years (net of new share issuance). In other countries, however, equity issuance is significantly larger than buybacks; this directly impacts shareholders’ returns via dilution. For developed markets, the impact of net equity issuance deducts 0.7%-2.7% from shareholder returns annually. But the impact is much bigger in Emerging Markets, where dilution has reduced returns by an average of 4.9% over the past 10 years. Table 5 shows that China is by far the biggest culprit, especially Chinese banks. Table 5Dilution In Emerging Markets BOX 1 Estimating GDP Growth We estimate nominal GDP growth for the countries and regions in our analysis as the sum of: annual growth in the working-age population, productivity growth, and inflation (we assume that capital deepening remains stable over the period). Results are shown in Table 6. Table 6Calculations Of Trend GDP Growth For population growth, we use the United Nations’ median scenario for annual growth in the population aged 25-64 between 2015 and 2030. This shows that the euro zone and Japan will see significant declines in the working population. The U.S. and U.K. look slightly better, with the working population projected to grow by 0.3% and 0.1% respectively. There are some uncertainties in these estimates. Stricter immigration policies would reduce the growth. Conversely, greater female participation, a later retirement age, longer working hours, or a rise in the participation rate would increase it. For emerging markets we used the UN estimate for “less developed regions, excluding least developed countries”. These countries have, on average, better demographics. However, the average number hides the decline in the working-age population in a number of important EM countries, for example China (where the working-age population is set to shrink by 0.2% a year), Korea (-0.4%), and Russia (-1.1%). By contrast, working population will grow by 1.7% a year in Mexico and 1.6% in India. For productivity growth, we assume – perhaps somewhat optimistically – that the decline in productivity since the Global Financial Crisis will reverse and that each country will return to the average annual productivity growth of the past 20 years (Chart 4). Our argument is that the cyclical factors that depressed productivity since the GFC (for example, companies’ reluctance to spend on capex, and shareholders’ preference for companies to pay out profits rather than to invest) should eventually fade, and that structural and technical factors (tight labor markets, increasing automation, technological breakthroughs in fields such as artificial intelligence, big data, and robotics) should boost productivity. Based on this assumption, U.S. productivity growth would average 2.0% over the next 10-15 years, compared to 0.5% since 1999. Note that this is a little higher than the Congressional Budgetary Office’s assumption for labor productivity growth of 1.8% a year. Chart 4AProductivity Growth (I) Chart 4BProductivity Growth (II) Our assumptions for inflation are as described above in the section on Fixed Income. The overall results suggest that Japan will see the lowest nominal GDP growth, at 0.9% a year, with the U.S. growing at 4.4%. The U.K. and Australia come out only a little lower than the U.S. For emerging markets, as described in the main text, we use two scenarios: one where productivity grow continues to slow in the absence of reforms, especially in China, from the current 3.2% to converge with the average in DM (1.1%) over the next 10-15 years; and an alternative scenario where reforms boost productivity back to the 20-year average of 4.1%.   Growth Plus Reversion To Mean For Margins And Profits. There is logic in arguing that profit margins and multiples tend to revert to the mean over the long term. If margins are particularly high currently, profit growth will be significantly lower than the above methodology would suggest; multiple contraction would also lower returns. Here we add to the Growth Model above an assumption that net profit margin and trailing PE will steadily revert to the 20-year average for each country over the 10-15 years. For most countries, margins are quite high currently compared to history: 9.2% in the U.S., for example, compared to a 20-year average of 7.7%. Multiples, however, are not especially high. Even in the U.S. the trailing PE of 21.0x, compares to a 20-year average of 20.8x (although that admittedly is skewed by the ultra-high valuations in 1999-2000, and coming out of the 2007-9 recession – we would get a rather lower number if we used the 40-year average). Indeed, in all the other countries and regions, the PE is currently lower than the 20-year average. Note that for Japan, we assumed that the PE would revert to the 20-year average of the U.S. and the euro zone (19.2), rather than that of Japan itself (distorted by long periods of negative earnings, and periods of PE above 50x in the 1990s and 2000s).  Earnings Yield. This is intuitively a neat way of thinking about future returns. Investors are rewarded for owning equity, either by the company paying a dividend, or by reinvesting its earnings and paying a dividend in future. If one assumes that future return on capital will be similar to ROC today (admittedly a rash assumption in the case of fast-growing companies which might be tempted to invest too aggressively in the belief that they can continue to generate rapid growth) it should be immaterial to the investor which the company chooses. Historically, there has been a strong correlation between the earnings yield (the inverse of the trailing PE) and subsequent equity returns, although in the past two decades the return has been somewhat higher that the EY suggested, and so in future might be somewhat lower. This methodology produces an assumed return for U.S. equities of 4.8% a year. Shiller PE. BCA’s longstanding view is that valuation is not a good timing tool for equity investment, but that it is crucial to forecasting long-term returns. Chart 5 shows that there is a good correlation in most markets between the Shiller PE (current share price divided by 10-year average inflation-adjusted earnings) and subsequent 10-year equity returns. We use a regression of these two series to derive the assumptions. This points to returns ranging from 5.4% in the case of the U.S. to 12.5% for the U.K. Composite Valuation Indicator. There are some issues that make the Shiller PE problematical. It uses a fixed 10-year period, whereas cycles vary in length. It tends to make countries look cheap when they have experienced a trend decline in earnings (which may continue, and not mean revert) and vice versa. So we also use a proprietary valuation indicator comprising a range of standard parameters (including price/book, price/cash, market cap/GDP, Tobin’s Q etc.), and regress this against 10-year returns. The results are generally similar to those using the Shiller PE, except that Japan shows significantly higher assumed returns, and the U.K. and EM significantly lower ones (Chart 6). Chart 5Shiller PE Vs. 10-Year Return Chart 6Composite Valuation Vs. 10-Year Return     3. Alternative Investments We continue to forecast each illiquid alternative investment separately, but we have made a number of changes to our methodologies. Mostly these involve moving away from using historical returns as a basis for our forecasts, and shifting to an approach based on current yield plus projected future capital appreciation. In direct real estate, for example, in 2017 we relied on a regression of historical returns against U.S. nominal GDP growth. We move in this edition to an approach based on the current cap rate, plus capital appreciation (based on forecasts of nominal GDP growth), and taking into account maintenance costs (details below). We also add coverage of some additional asset classes: global ex-U.S. direct real estate, global ex-U.S. REITs, and gold. Table 7 summarizes our assumptions, and provides details of historic returns and volatility. Table 7Alternatives Return Calculations It is worth emphasizing here that manager selection is far more important for many alternative investment classes than it is for public securities (Chart 7). There is likely to be, therefore, much greater dispersion of returns around our assumptions than would be the case for, say, large-cap U.S. equities. Chart 7For Alts, Manager Selection Is Key Hedge Funds Chart 8Hedge Fund Return Over Cash Hedge fund returns have trended down over time (Chart 8). Long gone is the period when hedge funds returned over 20% per year (as they did in the early 1990s). Over the past 10 years, the Composite Hedge Fund Index has returned annually 3.3% more than 3-month U.S. Treasury bills. But that was entirely during an economic expansion and so we think it is prudent to cut last edition’s assumption of future returns of cash-plus-3.5%, to cash-plus-3% going forward. Direct Real Estate Our new methodology for real estate breaks down the return, in a similar way to equities, into the current cash yield (cap rate) plus an assumption of future capital growth. For the cap rate, we use the average, weighted by transaction volumes, of the cap rates for apartments, office buildings, retail, industrial real estate, and hotels in major cities (for example, Chicago, Los Angeles, Manhattan, and San Francisco for the U.S., or Osaka and Tokyo for Japan). We assume that capital values grow in line with each’s country’s nominal GDP growth (using the IMF’s five-year forecasts for this). We deduct a 0.5% annual charge for maintenance, in line with industry practice. Results are shown in Table 8. Our assumptions point to better returns from real estate in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. Not only is the cap rate in the U.S. higher, but nominal GDP growth is projected to be higher too. Table 8Direct Real Estate Return Calculations REITs We switch to a similar approach for REITs. Previously we used a regression of REITs against U.S. equity returns (since REITs tend to be more closely correlated with equities than with direct real estate). This produced a rather high assumption for U.S. REITs of 10.1%. We now use the current dividend yield on REITs plus an assumption that capital values will grow in line with nominal GDP growth forecasts. REITs’ dividend yields range fairly narrowly from 2.9% in Japan to 4.7% in Canada. We do not exclude maintenance costs since these should already be subtracted from dividends. The result of using this methodology is that the assumed return for U.S. REITs falls to a more plausible 8.5%, and for global REITs is 6.2%. Private Equity & Venture Capital Chart 9Private Equity Premium Has Shrunk Around It makes sense that Private Equity returns are correlated with returns from listed equities. Most academic studies have shown a premium over time for PE of 5-6 percentage points (due to leverage, a tilt towards small-cap stocks, management intervention, and other factors). However, this premium has swung around dramatically over time (Chart 9). Over the past 10 years, for example, annual returns from Private Equity and listed U.S. equities have been identical: 12%. However, there appears to be no constant downtrend and so we think it advisable to use the 30-year average premium: 3.4%. This produces a return assumption for U.S. Private Equity of 8.9% per year. Over the same period, Venture Capital has returned around 0.5% more than PE (albeit with much higher volatility) and we assume the same will happen going forward.   Structured Products In the context of alternative asset classes, Structured Products refers to mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities. We use the projected return on U.S. Treasuries plus the average 20-year spread of 60 basis points. Assumed return is 2.7%. Farmland & Timberland Chart 10Farm Prices Grow More Slowly Than GDP As with Real Estate and REITs, we move to a methodology using current cash yield (after costs) plus an assumption for capital appreciation linked to nominal GDP forecasts. The yield on U.S. Farmland is currently 4.4% and on Timberland 3.2%. Both have seen long-run prices grow significantly more slowly than nominal GDP growth. Since 1980, for example, farm prices have risen at a compound rate of 3.9% per acre, compared to U.S. nominal GDP growth of 5.2% and global GDP growth of 5.5% (Chart 10). We assume that this trend will continue, and so project farm prices to grow 1.5 percentage points a year more slowly than global GDP (using global, not U.S., economic growth makes sense since demand for food is driven by global factors). This produces a total return assumption of 6%. For timberland, we did not find a consistent relationship with nominal GDP growth and so assumed that prices would continue to grow at their historic rate over the past 20 years (the longest period for which data is available). We project timberland to produce an annual return of 4.8%. Commodities & Gold For commodities we use a very different methodology (which we also used in the previous edition): the concept that commodities prices consistently over time have gone through supercycles, lasting around 10 years, followed by bear markets that have lasted an average of 17 years (Chart 11). The most recent super-cycle was 2002-2012. In the period since the supercycle ended, the CRB Index has fallen by 42%. Comparing that to the average drop in the past three bear markets, we conclude that there is about 8% left to fall over the next nine years, implying an annual decline of about 1%. Our overall conclusion is that future returns are still likely to be below those of the past decade or two, and below many investors’ expectations. We add gold to our assumptions, since it is an asset often held by investors. However, it is not easy to project long-term returns for the metal. Since the U.S. dollar was depegged from gold in 1968, gold too has gone through supercycles, in the 1970s and 2002-11 (Chart 12). We find that change in real long-term interest rates negatively affects gold (logically since higher rates increase the opportunity cost of owning a non-income-generating asset). We use, therefore, a regression incorporating global nominal GDP growth and a projection of the annual change in real 10-year U.S. Treasury yields (based on the equilibrium cash rate plus the average spread between 10-year yields and cash). This produces an assumption of an annual return from gold of 4.7% a year. We continue to see this asset class more as a hedge in a portfolio (it has historically had a correlation of only 0.1 with global equities and 0.24 with global bonds) rather than a source of return per se.  Chart 11Commodities Still In A Bear Market Chart 12Gold Also Has Supercycles   4. Currencies Chart 13Currencies Tend To Revert To PPP All the return projections in this report are in local currency terms. That is a problem for investors who need an assumption for returns in their home currency. It is also close to impossible to hedge FX exposure over as long a period as 10-15 years. Even for investors capable of putting in place rolling currency hedges, GAA has shown previously that the optimal hedge ratio varies enormously depending on the home currency, and that dynamic hedges (i.e. using a simple currency forecasting model) produce better risk-adjust returns than a static hedge.3  Fortunately, there is an answer: it turns out that long-term currency forecasting is relatively easy due to the consistent tendency of currencies, in developed economies at least, to revert to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over the long-run, even though they can diverge from it for periods as long as five years or more (Chart 13). We calculate likely currency movements relative to the U.S. dollar based on: 1) the current divergence of the currency from PPP, using IMF estimates of the latter; 2) the likely change in PPP over the next 10 years, based on inflation differentials between the country and the U.S. going forward (using IMF estimates of average CPI inflation for 2019-2024 and assuming the same for the rest of the period). The results are shown in Table 9. All DM currencies, except the Australian dollar, look cheap relative to the U.S. dollar, and all of them, again excluding Australia, are forecast to run lower inflation that the U.S. implying that their PPPs will rise further. This means that both the euro and Japanese yen would be expected to appreciate by a little more than 1% a year against the U.S. dollar over the next 10 years or so. Table 9Currency Return Calculations PPP does not work, however, for EM currencies. They are all very cheap relative to PPP, but show no clear trend of moving towards it. The example of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s suggests that reversion to PPP happens only when an economy becomes fully developed (and is pressured by trading partners to allow its currency to appreciate). One could imagine that happening to China over the next 10-20 years, but the RMB is currently 48% undervalued relative to PPP, not so different from its undervaluation 15 years ago. For EM currencies, therefore, we use a different methodology: a regression of inflation relative to the U.S. against historic currency movements. This implies that EM currencies are driven by the relative inflation, but that they do not trend towards PPP. Based on IMF inflation forecasts, many Emerging Markets are expected to experience higher inflation than the U.S. (Table 10). On this basis, the Turkish lira would be expected to decline by 7% a year against the U.S. dollar and the Brazilian real by 2% a year. However, the average for EM, which we calculated based on weights in the MSCI EM equity index, is pulled down by China (29% of that index), Korea (15%) and Taiwan (12%). China’s inflation is forecast to be barely above that in the U.S, and Korean and Taiwanese inflation significantly below it. MSCI-weighted EM currencies, consequently, are forecast to move roughly in line with the USD over the forecast horizon. One warning, though: the IMF’s inflation forecasts in some Emerging Markets look rather optimistic compared to history: will Mexico, for example, see only 3.2% inflation in future, compared to an average of 5.7% over the past 20 years? Higher inflation than the IMF forecasts would translate into weaker currency performance. Table 10EM Currencies In Table 11, we have restated the main return assumptions from this report in USD, EUR, JPY, GBP, AUD, and CAD terms for the convenience of clients with different home currencies. As one would expect from covered interest-rate parity theory, the returns cluster more closely together when expressed in the individual currencies. For example, U.S. government bonds are expected to return only 0.8% a year in EUR terms (versus 2.1% in USD terms) bringing their return closer to that expected from euro zone government bonds, -0.4%. Convergence to PPP does not, however, explain all the difference between the yields in different countries. Table 11Returns In Different Base Currencies 5. Correlations Chart 14Correlations Are Hard To Forecast We have not tried to forecast correlations in this Special Report. As discussed, historical returns from different asset classes are not a reliable guide to future returns, but it is possible to come up with sensible assumptions about the likely long-run returns going forward. Volatility does not trend much over the long term, so we think it is not unreasonable to use historic volatility data in an optimizer. But correlation is a different matter. As is well known, the correlation of equities and bonds has moved from positive to negative over the past 40 years (mainly driven by a shift in the inflation environment). But the correlation between major equity markets has also swung around (Chart 14). Asset allocators should preferably use rough, conservative assumptions for correlations – for example, 0.1 or 0.2 for the equity/bond correlation, rather than the average -0.1 of the past 20 years. We plan to do further work to forecast correlations in a future edition of this report.  But for readers who would like to see – and perhaps use – historic correlation data, we publish below a simplified correlation matrix of the main asset classes that we cover in this report (Table 12). We would be happy to provide any client with the full spreadsheet of all asset classes . Table 12Correlation Matrix Garry Evans Chief Global Asset Allocation Strategist garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “What Returns Can You Expect?”, dated 15 November 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises,” dated 22 May 2019, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 3      Please see GAA Special Report, “Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors,” dated 29 September 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com  

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights U.S. inflation is on a structural uptrend. Monetary and fiscal policy, populism, and demographics will tend to push inflation higher over the coming decade. How can investors protect portfolios against inflation risk? We look at periods of rising inflation to determine which assets were the best inflation hedge. We find that the level of inflation is very important in determining which assets work best. When inflation is rising and high, or very high, the best inflation hedges at the asset class level are commodities and U.S. TIPS. When inflation is very high, gold is the best commodity to hold and defensive sectors will minimize losses in an equity portfolio. However, hedges have a cost. Allocating a large percentage of a portfolio to inflation hedges will be a drag on returns. Investors should opt for a low allocation to hedges now, and increase to a medium level when inflation rises further. Feature Some 38 years have passed since the last time the U.S. suffered from double-digit inflation. The Federal Reserve reform of 1979, championed by Paul Volcker, changed the way the Fed approached monetary policy by putting a focus on controlling money growth.1 The reform gave way to almost four decades of relatively controlled inflation, which persists today. But times are changing. While most of today’s investors have never experienced anything other than periods of tame inflation, BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.2 The main reasons behind this view are the following: 1. A rethink in the monetary policy framework: At its most recent meeting, the FOMC openly discussed the idea of a price-level target, implying that it would be open to the economy running hot to compensate for the past 10 years of below-target inflation (Chart II-1.1A, top panel). Chart II-1.1AStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Chart II-1.1BStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I)   2. Procyclical fiscal policy: The U.S. is conducting expansionary fiscal policy while the economy is at near-full employment (Chart II-1.1A, middle panel). The last time this happened in the U.S., during the 1960s, high inflation followed, as the fiscal boost made the economy run substantially above capacity. 3. Waning Fed independence: President Trump has openly questioned the hiking campaign undertaken by the Fed. Moreover, he has tried to nominate Fed governors with dovish tendencies. Historically around the world, a lack of central bank independence has often led to higher inflation rates (Chart II-1.1A, bottom panel). 4. Peak in globalization: Globalization accelerated significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, flooding the global economy with cheap labor (Chart II-1.1B, top panel). However, we believe that globalization has peaked. Instead, populism and protectionism will be the dominant paradigms for years to come, reducing the cheap pool of workers and goods previously available. 5. Demographics: The population in the U.S. is set to age in coming years (Chart II-1.1B, middle panel). As the percentage of U.S. retirees increases, the number of spenders relative to savers will begin to rise (Chart II-1.1B, bottom panel). Higher spending and lower savings in the economy should create upward pressure on inflation. If our view is correct, how should investors allocate their money? We attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of five major asset classes during periods when inflation was rising. Furthermore, we look into sub-asset class performance to determine how investors should position themselves within each asset class to take advantage of an inflationary environment. In our asset-class analysis, we use a data sample starting in 1973 and we limit ourselves to five publicly traded assets that have adequate history: global equities, U.S. Treasuries, U.S. real estate (REITs), U.S. inflation-linked bonds,3 and commodities. We compare asset classes according to their Sharpe ratios: average annualized excess returns divided by annualized volatilities.4  BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade. In our sub-asset class analysis, we analyze global equity sectors, international vs U.S. equities, and individual commodities. In some of the sections in our sub-asset class analysis, our sample is slightly reduced due to lack of historical data. Moreover, since in some instances all sectors have negative returns, we compare sub-asset classes according to their excess returns only. We base our analysis on the U.S. Consumer Price Index, given that most of the assets in our sample are U.S. based. We opt for this measure because it tends to track the living expenses for most U.S. citizens and it is the preferred measure to index defined-benefit payments. Finally, we decompose the periods of rising inflation into four quartiles in order to examine whether the level of inflation has any impact on the performance of each asset. Chart II-1.2 and Table II-1.1 show the different ranges we use for our analysis as well as a description of the typical economic and monetary policy environments in each of them. Summary Of Results Table II-1.2 shows the summary of our results. For a detailed explanation on how each asset class and sub-asset class behaves as inflation rises, please see the Asset Class section and the Sub-Asset Class section below. Which assets perform best when inflation is rising? Rising inflation affects assets very differently, and is especially dependent on how high inflation is. Global equities performed positively when inflation was rising and low or mild, but they were one of the worst-performing assets when inflation was rising and high or very high. Importantly, equities underperformed U.S. Treasuries in periods of both high and very high inflation. Commodities and U.S. TIPS were the best performers when inflation was high or very high. U.S. REITs were not a good inflation hedge. Which global equity sectors perform best when inflation is rising? Energy and materials outperformed when inflation was high. Every single sector had negative excess returns when inflation was very high, but defensive sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications5 minimized losses. Which commodities perform best when inflation is rising? With the exception of energy, most commodities had subpar excess returns when inflation was in the first two quartiles. Industrial metals outperformed when inflation was high. Gold and silver outperformed when inflation was very high. Additionally, gold had consistent returns and low volatility. What is the cost of inflation hedging? To answer this question, we construct four portfolios with different levels of inflation hedging: 1. Benchmark (no inflation hedging): 60% equities/40% bonds. 2. Low Inflation Hedging: 50% equities/40% bonds/5% TIPS/5% commodities 3. Medium Inflation Hedging: 40% equities/30% bonds/15% TIPS/15 % commodities 4. Pure Inflation Hedging: 50% TIPS/50% commodities. While increased inflation hedging provides better performance when inflation is high and rising, these hedges are costly to hold when inflation is at lower ranges or when it is falling (Chart II-1.3, panels 1 & 2). However, adding moderate inflation hedging (low or medium) to a portfolio achieved the right balance between cost and protection, and ultimately improved risk-adjusted returns over the whole sample (Chart II-1.3, panel 3). What about absolute returns? The benchmark outperformed over the whole sample. However, the low and medium inflation hedging did not lag far behind, while avoiding the big drawdowns of high inflation periods (Chart II-1.3, panel 4). Investment Implications High inflation may return to the U.S. over the next decade. Therefore, inflation hedging should be a key consideration when constructing a portfolio. Based on our results, our recommendations are the following: 1. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. 2.  However, these hedges are costly to hold as they will create a drag on returns in periods when inflation is not high or very high. Therefore, a low allocation to inflation hedges is warranted now. 3.   Inflation will probably start to pick up in the 2020s. A medium allocation to inflation hedges will then be appropriate. 4.   When inflation is high (3.3%-4.9%), investors should overweight energy and materials in their equity portfolios. Likewise, they should overweight industrial metals and energy within a commodity portfolio. 5.   When inflation is very high (4.9% or more), investors should overweight defensive sectors in their equity portfolio to minimize losses. Moreover, investors should overweight gold within a commodity portfolio. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. Asset Classes Global Equities The relationship between equity returns and rising inflation depends on how high inflation is, with outstanding performance when inflation is rising but low or mild, and poor performance as it gets higher (Chart II-2.1, top panel). This relationship can be explained by the interaction between interest rates, inflation, earnings, and valuations: Earnings growth was usually slightly negative when inflation was recovering from low levels. However, given that interest rates were very low in this environment and growth expectations were high, multiple expansion boosted equity returns (Chart II-2.1, bottom panel). When inflation was mild, the Fed typically started to raise rates, resulting in a declining multiple. However, equities had the best performance in this range thanks to very high earnings growth – a result of the economy growing strongly due to a healthy level of inflation. When inflation climbed into the high or very high range, earnings growth was usually positive but beginning to slow, as high inflation weighed on growth. Meanwhile the multiple started to decline rapidly due to rising interest rates and declining growth expectations. With the exception of the mild inflation range, the return profile of equities during inflationary periods was similar to its normal profile: negative skew and excess kurtosis (Table II-2.1). However, the consistency of returns decreased at higher levels of inflation, with only 45% of months with positive returns when inflation was rising and in its highest quartile. U.S. Treasuries U.S. Treasuries reacted in a similar fashion to equities when inflation was rising (Chart II-2.2). However, while Treasuries underperformed equities when inflation was low or mild, they actually outperformed equities when inflation was high or very high. This was in part due to the fact that at higher inflation ranges, U.S. Treasuries offer a higher coupon return when rates are high, at least partially counteracting losses from falling prices. The steady stream of cash flows from the coupons helped Treasuries achieve positive returns roughly two-thirds of the time at the highest levels of inflation (Table II-2.2). However, this consistency in returns came at a cost: very high inflation resulted in negative skew and high excess kurtosis. Therefore, while Treasuries provided frequent positive returns when inflation was very high, they were prone to violent selloffs. U.S. REITs While REITs had high risk-adjusted returns when inflation was rising but mild, much like equities they had subpar performance in every other quartile and particularly poor performance when inflation was high or very high (Chart II-2.3). These results confirm our previous research showing that REITs performance is very similar to that of equities.6 The return consistency for REITs was generally poor in inflationary periods, with the second-lowest percentage of positive return of any asset class (Table II-2.3). Moreover, REIT returns had excess kurtosis and negative skew throughout all inflation quartiles. Commodity Futures Commodities performed positively in every quartile, and did particularly well when inflation was mild (Chart II-2.4, top panel). However, total return and price return were very different due to the behavior of the roll and collateral return: Total risk-adjusted returns were lower than spot risk-adjusted returns when inflation was low and rising. This happened because during these periods, commodity supply was high relative to demand, as the economy was recovering from a deflationary shock. Thus, there was an incentive for producers to conserve inventories, making the futures curve upward-sloping (contango). Thus, roll return was negative (Chart II-2.4, bottom panel). When inflation was in the upper two quartiles, total risk-adjusted returns were much higher than risk-adjusted spot returns. This was because high inflation was the product of supply shocks. These supply shocks resulted in a downward-sloping futures curve (backwardation), which, in turn, resulted in a positive roll return. Additionally, high rates during these regimes contributed to a high collateral return. Commodities provided good return consistency during inflationary periods, with roughly 60% of positive return months in the upper two inflation quartiles (Table II-2.4). The skew of returns was neutral or positive in the top two quartiles. This means that although volatility was high for commodities, extreme return movements were normally positive. U.S. Inflation-Protected Bonds While inflation-protected bonds provided meager returns when inflation was rising but in the mild range, they provided excellent performance at the highest levels of inflation (Chart II-2.5). Moreover, this high Sharpe ratio was not just simply the result of low volatility, since U.S. TIPS had excess returns of 4.6% when inflation was high and 5.7% when inflation was very high.7 The return profile of inflation-protected bonds during inflationary periods was also attractive in our testing period. Average skew was positive, while kurtosis was relatively low (Table II-2.5). The percentage of positive months across all quartiles was also the highest of all asset classes, with a particularly high share of positive returns in the periods of highest inflation. Sub-Asset Classes Global Equity Sectors For the sector analysis, we looked at information technology, financials, energy, materials, utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications. We excluded industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples given that they do not have adequate back data. Once again, we separate rising inflation periods into four quartiles, arriving at the following results: When inflation was low, information technology had the best excess returns while utilities had the worst (Chart II-3.1, panel 1). This matches our observations at the asset class level, as IT is highly responsive to changes in the valuation multiple. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance, followed by information technology (Chart II-3.1, panel 2). Meanwhile, financials had the worst performance, as rates were normally rising in these periods. When inflation was high, sectors highly correlated with commodity prices such as energy and materials outperformed. Meanwhile, IT was the worst performer (Chart II-3.1, panel 3). When inflation was very high, every sector had negative excess returns. Overall, investing in energy minimized losses (Chart II-3.1, panel 4). However, this performance was in part attributable to the oil spikes of the 1970s. Alternatively, defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, and healthcare also minimized losses. International vs U.S. Equities How do equities outside of the U.S. behave when inflation is rising? While the high share of U.S. equities in the global index causes U.S. equities to be the main driver of global stock prices, is it possible to improve returns in inflationary environments by overweighting international equities? The answer once again depends on the level of inflation. When inflation was rising but low, U.S. stocks outperformed global ex-U.S. equities in both common currency and local currency terms (Chart II-3.2, panel 1). This was in part due to the inherent tech bias in U.S. stocks. Additionally, the low level of inflation was often accompanied by slowing global growth in our sample, helping the U.S. dollar. When inflation was mild, U.S. stocks once again outperformed international stocks in both local and common currency terms, though to a lesser degree (Chart II-3.2, panel 2). The dollar was roughly flat in this environment. U.S. stocks started to have negative excess returns when inflation was high (Chart II-3.2, panel 3). On the other hand international equities had positive excess returns in dollar terms, partly because of their energy and material bias and partly because the dollar was generally weak in this period. U.S. equities outperformed global ex-U.S. equities by a small margin when inflation was very high, given that defensive sectors such as telecommunication were over-represented in the U.S. index (Chart II-3.2, panel 4). The dollar was roughly flat in this period. Individual Commodities Our analysis above confirmed that commodities were one of the best assets to hold when inflation was rising. However, which commodity performed best?8 Total return for every commodity was lower than spot return when inflation was low (Chart II-3.3, panel 1). This was due to the upward-sloping term structure of the futures curve (contango), resulting in a negative roll yield. In this range, energy had the best performance, followed by industrial metals. Precious metals had negative excess returns. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance of any commodity by far (Chart II-3.3, panel 2). Precious and industrial metals had low but positive excess returns in this period. When inflation was high, industrial metals had the highest excess returns, followed by energy (Chart II-3.3, panel 3). We omit energy for the last quartile since there is not enough data available. Overall, when inflation was very high, both gold and silver had the highest excess returns (Chart II-3.3, panel 4). However, gold’s return volatility was much lower, while it also had positive returns 64% of the time compared to 52% for silver. Other Assets U.S. Direct Real Estate Our asset-class analysis confirmed that public real estate (REITs) as an asset class offered poor risk-adjusted returns during inflationary periods. But how did direct real estate perform? We analyzed direct real estate separately from all other assets because of a couple of issues: Our return dataset is available only on a quarterly basis, versus a monthly basis for the rest of the assets in our sample. Even when annualized, volatility is not directly comparable when using data with different frequencies. The NCREIF Real Estate Index that we used is a broad aggregate, which is not investable. Individual property prices might differ from this aggregate. Finally, real estate returns are measured on an appraisal basis. Appraisal-based indices are not reflective of real transactions. Moreover, prices tend to be sticky. To attenuate this issue we unsmoothed the capital returns by removing return autocorrelation. Overall, the Sharpe ratio of direct real estate was solid throughout the first three quartiles of rising inflation (Chart II-4.1, top panel). There is not enough data available for the fourth quartile. However, judging by the performance of U.S. housing in the 1970s from OECD, risk-adjusted returns when inflation was very high was likely positive (Chart II-4.1, bottom panel).   Cash Cash (investing in a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill) outperformed inflation over our sample (Chart II-4.2, top panel). Moreover, cash provided positive real returns when inflation was mild, or high, or when it was decreasing (Chart II-4.2, bottom panel). However, cash was not a good inflation hedge at the highest inflation quartile, with an average annualized real loss of almost 2%. Juan Manuel Correa Ossa Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation Footnotes 1       Please see Carl E. Walsh, “October 6, 1979,” FRSBF Economic Letter, 2004:35, (December 3, 2004). 2       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 1), ” dated August 10, 2018, and “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3       We use a synthetic TIPS series for data prior to 1997. For details on the methodology, please see: Kothari, S.P. and Shanken, Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004. 4       Excess returns are defined as asset return relative to a 3-month Treasury bill. 5       Sector classification does not take into account GICS changes prior to December 2018.  6       Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report "REITS Vs Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 7       It is important to note that the synthetic TIPS series does not completely match actual TIPS series for the periods where they overlap. Specifically, volatility is significantly higher in the synthetic series. Thus, results should be taken as approximations. 8       We decompose the returns into the same 4 quartiles to answer this question. However, due to lower data availability, we start our sample in 1978 instead of 1973. Moreover, our sample for energy is smaller beginning in 1983. This mainly reduces the amount of data available at the upper quartile.

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance is slightly accommodative for the U.S., but it is too tight for the rest of the world. Inflation is likely to slow further before making a durable bottom toward year-end. The Fed will remain on an extended pause, maybe all the way through to December 2020. The trade war is not going away, and investors should not be complacent. However, it also guarantees that Chinese policymakers will redouble on their reflationary efforts. As a result, global growth is still set to improve in the second half of 2019. The dollar rally is in its last innings; the greenback will depreciate in the second half of this year. Treasury yields have limited downside and their recent breakdown is likely to be a fake-out. Use any strength in bond prices to further curtail portfolio duration. The correction in stocks is not over. However, the cycle’s highs still lie ahead. Feature Ongoing Sino-U.S. tensions and weakness in global growth are taking their toll. The S&P 500 has broken below its crucial 2,800 level, EM equities are quickly approaching their fourth-quarter 2018 lows, U.S. bond yields have fallen to their lowest readings since 2017, copper has erased all of its 2019 gains and the dollar is attempting to break out. In response, futures markets are now pricing in interest rate cuts by the Fed of 54 bps and 64 bps, over the next 12 and 24 months, respectively. Will the Fed ratify these expectations? Last week’s release of the most recent Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee meeting minutes, as well as comments from FOMC members ranging from Jerome Powell to Richard Clarida, are all adamantly clear: U.S. monetary policy is appropriate, and a rate cut is not on the table for now. However, the avowed data-dependency of the Fed implies that if economic conditions warrant, the FOMC will capitulate and cut rates. Even as U.S. inflation slows, a recession is unlikely. Moreover, the Sino-U.S. trade war will catalyze additional reflationary policy from China, putting a floor under global growth. In this context, the Fed is likely to stay put for an extended period, but will not cut rates. While the S&P 500 is likely to fall toward 2,600, the high for the cycle is still ahead. We therefore maintain our positive cyclical equity view, especially relative to government bonds, but we are hedging tactical risk. Fed Policy Is Neutral For The U.S…. If the fed funds rate was above the neutral rate – the so-called R-star – we would be more inclined to agree with interest rate markets and bet on a lower fed funds rate this year. However, it is not clear that this is the case. Chart I-1Mixed Message From The R-Star Indicator Admittedly, the inversion of the 10-year/3-month yield curve is worrisome, but other key variables are not validating this message. Currently, our R-star indicator, based on M1, bank liquidity, consumer credit, and the BCA Fed monitor, is only in neutral territory (Chart I-1). Moreover, we built a model based on the behavior of the dollar, yield curve, S&P homebuilding relative to the broad market and initial UI claims that gauges the probability that the fed funds rate is above R-star. Currently, the model gives a roughly 40% chance that U.S. monetary policy is tight (Chart I-2). Historically, such a reading was consistent with a neutral policy stance.   Chart I-2Today, Fed Policy Is At Neutral Models can be deceiving, so it is important to ensure that facts on the ground match their insights. Historically, housing is the sector most sensitive to monetary policy.1 Key forward-looking activity measures are not showing signs of stress: mortgage applications for purchases have jumped to new cyclical highs, and the NAHB homebuilders confidence index has smartly rebounded after weakening last year (Chart I-3). Also, homebuilder stocks have been in a steady uptrend relative to the S&P 500 since last October (Chart I-3, bottom panel). These three developments are not consistent with tight monetary policy. Chart I-3This Would Not Happen If Policy Were Tight The corporate sector confirms the message from the housing sector. While capex intentions have weakened, they remain at elevated levels, despite slowing profit growth and elevated global uncertainty. Moreover, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that banks have again eased credit standards for commercial and industrial loans. Netting out all these factors, we are inclined to agree with the Fed that monetary policy in the U.S. is broadly neutral. If anything, the rebound in leading indicators of residential activity would argue that policy is even slightly accommodative. … But Not For The Rest Of The World Congress gave the Fed a U.S.-only mandate, but the U.S. dollar is the global reserve currency. Because the dollar is the keystone of the global financial architecture, between US$12 trillion and US$14 trillion of foreign-currency debt is issued in USDs, and the greenback is used as a medium of exchange in roughly US$800 trillion worth of transaction per year.2 Therefore, the Fed may target U.S. monetary conditions, but it sets the cost of money for the entire world. While U.S. monetary conditions may be appropriate for the U.S., they are not entirely appropriate for the world as a whole. Indeed, the green shoots of growth we highlighted two months ago are rapidly turning brown: Korean and Taiwanese exports, which are highly sensitive to the global and Asian business cycles, are still contracting at a brisk pace (Chart I-4, top panel). Japan, an economy whose variance in GDP mostly reflects global gyrations, is weakening. Exports are contracting at a 4.3% yearly pace, machine tool orders are plunging at a 33% annual rate and the coincident indicator is below 100 – a sign of shrinking activity. The semiconductor space is plunging (Chart I-4, second panel). Our EM Asia diffusion index, which tallies 23 variables, is near record lows (Chart I-4, third panel). Europe too is feeling the pain, led by Germany, another economy deeply dependent on global activity. The flash estimate for the euro area manufacturing PMI fell to 47.7 and plunged to 44.3 in Germany, its lowest level since July 2012 (Chart I-4, bottom panel). These developments show that the world economy remains weak, in part because the Chinese economy has yet to meaningfully regain any traction. The rebound in Chinese PMI in March proved short lived; in April, both the NBS and Caixin measures fell back to near the 50 boom/bust line. Since inflation lags real activity and global growth has yet to bottom, it could take some time before inflation finds a floor. A strong dollar is a natural consequence of an outperforming U.S. economy, especially when global growth weakens. Thus, the rally in the Fed’s nominal trade-weighted dollar to its highest level since March 2002 is unsurprising (Chart I-5). A strong Greenback will have implications for inflation, and thus the Fed. Chart I-4Global Growth: No Green Shoots Here Chart I-5A Strong Dollar Is A Natural Consequence Of Weak Growth   Transitory Inflation Weakness Is Not Over The Fed believes the current inflation slowdown is transitory. We agree. With a tight labor market and rising wages, the question is not if inflation will rise, but when. In the current context, it could take some time. As Chart I-6 shows, inflation has been stable for more than 20 years. From 1996 to today, core PCE has oscillated between 0.9% and 2.6%, while core CPI has hovered between 0.6% and 2.9%, with the peaks and troughs determined by the ebbs and flows of global growth. Since inflation lags real activity and global growth has yet to bottom, it could take some time before inflation finds a floor, likely around 1.3% and 1.5% for core PCE and core CPI, respectively. Chart I-6Stable U.S. Inflation Since 1996 A few dynamics strengthen this judgment: The strength in the dollar is deflationary (Chart I-7, top panel). Not only does an appreciating greenback depress import prices, it tightens U.S. and global financial conditions. It also undermines dollar-based liquidity, especially if EM central banks try to fight weakness in their own currencies. All these forces harm growth, commodity prices and ultimately, inflation. Chart I-7More Downside Ahead In Inflation For Now After adjusting for their disparate variance, the performance of EM stocks relative to EM bonds is an excellent leading indicator of global core inflation (Chart I-7, second panel). This ratio is impacted by EM financial conditions, explaining its forecasting power for prices. Since goods inflation – which disproportionally contributes to overall variations in core CPI – is globally determined, U.S. inflation will suffer as well. U.S. capacity utilization is declining (Chart I-7, third panel). The U.S. just underwent a mini inventory cycle. The 12-month moving averages of the Philadelphia Fed and Empire State surveys’ inventory indexes still stand above their long-term averages. U.S. firms will likely use discounts to entice customers, especially as a strong dollar and weak global growth point to limited foreign outlets for this excess capacity. Finally, the growth in U.S. unit labor costs is slowing sharply, which normally leads inflation lower (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Average hourly earnings may now be growing at a 3.2% annual pace, but productivity rebounded to a 2.4% year-on-year rate in the first quarter, damping the impact of higher salaries on costs. If global growth is weak and U.S. inflation decelerates further, the Fed is unlikely to raise interest rates anytime soon. As the Fed policy remains modestly accommodative and the labor market is at full employment, the balance of probability favors an extended pause over a cut. But keep in mind, next year’s elections may mean this pause could last all the way to December 2020. How Does The Trade War Fit In? An additional irritant has been added to the mix: the growing trade tensions between the U.S. and China. The trade war has resurrected fears of a repeat of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs, which prompted a wave of retaliatory actions, worsening the massive economic contraction of the Great Depression. There is indeed plenty to worry about. Today, global trade represents 25% of global GDP, compared to 12% in the late 1920s. Global growth would be highly vulnerable to a freeze in world trade. Besides, global supply chains are extremely integrated, with intra-company exports having grown from 7% of global GDP to 16% between 1993 and 2013. If a full-blown trade war were to flare up, much of the capital invested abroad by large multinationals might become uneconomic. As markets price in this probability, stock prices would be dragged down. Chart I-8Trade Uncertainty Alone Will Delay The Recovery The fear of a full-fledged trade war is already affecting the global economy. The fall in asset prices to reflect the risk of stranded capital is tightening financial conditions and hurting growth. Moreover, the rise in U.S. and global economic uncertainty is depressing capex intentions (Chart I-8). Since capex intentions are a leading variable for actual capex, global exports and manufacturing activity, the trade war is deepening and lengthening the current soft patch. Markets need to be wary of pricing in a quick end to the Sino-U.S. trade conflict. Table I-1 presents BCA’s Geopolitical Strategist Matt Gertken’s odds of various outcomes to the trade negotiations and their implications for stocks. Matt assigns only a 5% probability to a grand compromise between the U.S. and China on trade and tech. He also foresees a 35% chance that a deal on trade excluding an agreement on tech will be reached this year. This leaves 10% odds that the two sides agree to extend the negotiation deadline beyond June, 20% odds of no deal at all and a minor escalation, and 30% odds of a major escalation. In other words, BCA is currently assigning 60% odds of a market-unfriendly outcome, and only a 40% chance of a genuinely market-friendly one.3 Why the gloom? The U.S. and China are geopolitical rivals in a deadlock. Moreover, both parties are feeling increasingly emboldened to play hardball. On the U.S. side, President Donald Trump has threatened to expand his tariffs to all of China’s exports to the U.S., which would represent a major escalation in both the conflict and its cost (Chart I-9). However, despite the scale of the threat, even if it were fully borne by U.S. households, its impact should be kept in perspective. Imports of consumer goods from China only represent 2% of total household spending (Chart I-10, top panel). Moreover, households are not currently overly concerned with inflation, as goods prices are already muted (Chart I-10, middle panel) and family income is still growing (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Finally, a weak deal could easily be decried as a failure in the 2020 election. On the Chinese side, the 9.5% fall in the yuan is already absorbing some of the costs of the tariffs, and the RMB will depreciate further if the trade war escalates. Additionally, Chinese exports to the U.S. represent 3.4% of GDP, while household and capital spending equals 81% of output. China can support its domestic economy via fiscal and credit policy, greatly mitigating the blow from the trade war. The outlook for Chinese reflationary efforts is therefore paramount. In sharp contrast to its limited upside, the dollar’s downside will be much more significant once global growth improves. Not only do Chinese policymakers have the room to stimulate, they also have the will. In the first four months of 2019, Chinese total social financing flows have amounted to CNY 9.6 trillion, which compares favorably to the same period during the 2016 reflation campaign. Yet, the economy has not fully responded to the injection of credit and previously implemented tax cuts amounting to CNY 1.3 trillion or 1.4% of GDP. Consequently, GDP per capita is now lagging well behind the required path to hit the government’s 2020 development targets (Chart I-11). Moreover, Chinese policymakers’ recent comments have increasingly emphasized protecting employment. This combination raises the likelihood of additional stimulus in the months ahead. Chart I-10...But Do Not Overstate Trump's Constraints Chart I-11Chinese Stimulus: Scope And Willingness   Therein lies the paradox of the trade war. While its immediate effect on world growth is negative, it also increases the chance that Chinese authorities pull all the levers to support domestic growth. A greater reflationary push would thus address the strongest headwind shaking the global economy. It could take two to six more months before the Chinese economy fully responds and lifts global growth. Ultimately, it will. Hence, even as the trade war continues, we remain skeptical that the Fed will cut interest rates as the market is discounting. We are therefore sticking to our call that the Fed will not cut rates over the next 12 months and will instead stay on an extended pause. Investment Conclusions The Dollar So long as global growth remains soft, the dollar is likely to rally further. That being said, the pace of the decline in global growth is decelerating. As a corollary, the fastest pace of appreciation for the greenback is behind us (see Chart I-5 on page 6). The risk to this view is that the previous strength in the dollar has already unleashed a vicious cycle whereby global financial conditions have tightened enough to cause another precipitous fall in world growth. The dollar’s strong sensitivity to momentum would then kick in, fomenting additional dollar strength in response to the greater growth slowdown. In this environment, the Fed would have no choice but to cut interest rates. However, growing reflationary efforts around the world currently confine this scenario to being a risk, not a central case. Additional factors also limit how far the dollar can rally. Speculators have already aggressively bought the greenback (Chart I-12). The implication is that buyers have moved in to take advantage of the dollar-friendly fundamentals. When looking at the euro, which can be thought of as the anti-dollar, investors are imputing a large discount in euro area stocks relative to U.S. ones, pointing to elevated pessimism on non-U.S. growth (Chart I-13). It would therefore require a much graver outcome in global growth to cause investors to further downgrade the outlook for the rest of the world relative to the U.S. and bring in new buyers of greenbacks. Chart I-12USD: Supportive Fundamentals Are Already Reflected Chart I-13Plenty Of Pessimism In European Assets...   In sharp contrast to its limited upside, the dollar’s downside will be much more significant once global growth improves. The same factors that are currently putting the brakes on the dollar’s rise will fuel its eventual downturn. As global growth bounces, a liquidation of stale long-dollar bets will ensue. European growth will also rebound (Chart I-14), and euro pessimism will turn into positive surprises. European assets will be bought, and the euro will rise, deepening the dollar’s demise. We are closely following the Chinese and global manufacturing PMIs to gauge when global growth exits its funk. At this point, it will be time to sell the USD. Government Bonds Bonds are caught between strong crosscurrents. On the one hand, rising economic uncertainty caused by the trade war, slowing global economic activity and decelerating inflation are all bond-bullish. On the other hand, bond prices already reflect these tailwinds. The OIS curve is baking in 54 basis points of Fed cuts over the next 12 months, as well as a further 10 basis points over the following 12 months (Chart I-15, top panel). Meanwhile, term premia across many major bond markets are very negative (Chart I-15, middle panel). Finally, fixed-income investors have pushed their portfolio duration to extremely high levels relative to their benchmark (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Chart I-14...Creates Scope For Positive Surprises Chart I-15Fade The Treasury Rally   Last week, Treasury yields broke down below 2.34%. For this technical break to trigger a new down-leg in yields, investors must curtail their already-depressed expectations of the fed funds rate in 12-months’ time. However, the fed funds rate is not yet restrictive, and global growth should soon find a floor in response to expanding Chinese stimulus. Under these circumstances, the Fed is unlikely to cut rates, and will continue to telegraph its intentions not to do so. Hence, unless the S&P 500 or the ISM manufacturing fall below 2,500 and 50, respectively, any move lower in yields is likely to be transitory and shallow. Cyclically, yields should instead move higher. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service’s duration indicator has already turned the corner (Chart I-16). Moreover, in the post-war period, Treasury yields have, on average, bottomed a year before inflation. Expecting an inflation trough in late 2019 or even early 2020 is therefore consistent with higher yields by year-end. Finally, when the Fed does not cut interest rates as much as the markets had been anticipating 12-months’ prior, Treasurys underperform cash. This is exactly BCA’s current Fed forecast. Chart I-16Global Yields Now Have More Upside Than Downside While we expect the bond-bearish forces to emerge victorious, yields may only rise slowly. The list of aforementioned supports for Treasury prices is long, the equity market will remain volatile and has yet to trough, and the trade war is likely to linger. We continue to closely monitor the AUD, the SEK versus the EUR, and copper to gauge if our view is wrong. These three markets are tightly linked to Chinese growth. If China’s stimulus is working, these three variables will rebound, and our bond view will be validated. If these three variables fall much further, U.S. yields could experience significantly more downside. Equities Equities are at a difficult juncture. The trade war is a bigger problem for Wall Street than for Main Street, as 43.6% sales of the S&P 500’s are sourced abroad. Moreover, the main mechanism through which trade tensions impact the stock market is through the threat that capital will be stranded – and thus worthless. This is a direct hit to the S&P 500, especially as global growth has yet to clearly stabilize and the Chinese are only beginning to make clearer retaliatory threats. Oil could also hurt stocks. Energy prices have proven resilient, despite weaker global economic activity. OPEC and Russia have been laser-focused on curtailing global crude inventories; even after the U.S. declined to extend waivers on Iranian exports, the swing oil producers have not meaningfully increased supply. Problems in Venezuela, Libya, and potential Iranian adventurism in Iraq could easily send oil prices sharply higher, especially as the U.S. does not have the export capacity to fulfill foreign demand. Thus, the oil market could suddenly tighten and create a large drag on global growth. This backdrop also warrants remaining overweight the energy sector. Stocks remain technically vulnerable. Global and U.S. stock market breadth has deteriorated significantly, as shown by the number of countries and stocks above their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-17). Moreover, since March, the strength in the S&P 500 has been very narrow, as shown by the very poor performance of the Value Line Geometric Average Index (Chart I-18). Meanwhile, the poor relative performance of small-cap stocks in an environment where the dollar is strong, where U.S. growth is holding steady compared to the rest of the world and where multinationals have the most to lose from a trade war, is perplexing. Chart I-17Stocks Remain Technically Fragile Chart I-18Dangerous Internal Dynamics   The U.S. stock market has the most downside potential in the weeks ahead. Like last summer, U.S. equity prices remain near record highs while EM and European stocks, many commodities and bond yields have been very weak. Moreover, the broad tech sector, the U.S.’s largest overweight, has defied gravity, despite weakness in the semiconductor sector, the entire industry’s large exposure to foreign markets, and the consequential slowdown in our U.S. Equity Strategy service's EPS model (Chart I-19).4 Thus, any bad news on the trade front or any additional strength in the dollar could prove especially painful for tech. This would handicap U.S. equities more than their already beaten-up foreign counterparts. Chart I-19The Tech Sector Profit Outlook Remains Poor These forces mean that the global equity correction will last longer, and that U.S. equities could suffer more than other DM markets. However, we do not see the S&P falling much beyond the 2,700 to 2,600 zone. Again, the fed funds rate is slightly accommodative and a U.S. recession – a prerequisite for a bear market (Chart I-20) – is unlikely over the coming 12 months. Moreover, global growth should soon recover, especially if China’s reflationary push gathers force. Additionally, an end to the dollar’s rally would create another welcomed relief valve for stocks. Chart I-20The Absence Of A Recession Means This Is A Correction, Not A Bear Market In this context, we recommend investors keep a cyclical overweight stance on stocks. Balanced portfolios should also overweight stocks relative to government bonds. However, the near-term risks highlighted above remain significant. Consequently, we also recommend investors hedge tactical equity risks, a position implemented by BCA’s Global Investment Strategy service three weeks ago.5 As a corollary, if stocks correct sharply, the associated rise in implied volatility will also cause a violent but short-lived pick up in credit spreads. In Section II, we look beyond the short-term gyrations. One of BCA’s long-term views is that inflation is slowly embarking on a structural uptrend. An environment of rising long-term inflation is unfamiliar to the vast majority of investors. In this piece, Juan-Manuel Correa, of our Global Asset Allocation team, shows which assets offer the best inflation protection under various states of rising consumer and producer prices. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 30, 2019 Next Report: June 27, 2019 II. Investors’ Guide To Inflation Hedging: How To Invest When Inflation Rises U.S. inflation is on a structural uptrend. Monetary and fiscal policy, populism, and demographics will tend to push inflation higher over the coming decade. How can investors protect portfolios against inflation risk? We look at periods of rising inflation to determine which assets were the best inflation hedge. We find that the level of inflation is very important in determining which assets work best. When inflation is rising and high, or very high, the best inflation hedges at the asset class level are commodities and U.S. TIPS. When inflation is very high, gold is the best commodity to hold and defensive sectors will minimize losses in an equity portfolio. However, hedges have a cost. Allocating a large percentage of a portfolio to inflation hedges will be a drag on returns. Investors should opt for a low allocation to hedges now, and increase to a medium level when inflation rises further. Some 38 years have passed since the last time the U.S. suffered from double-digit inflation. The Federal Reserve reform of 1979, championed by Paul Volcker, changed the way the Fed approached monetary policy by putting a focus on controlling money growth.1 The reform gave way to almost four decades of relatively controlled inflation, which persists today. But times are changing. While most of today’s investors have never experienced anything other than periods of tame inflation, BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.2 The main reasons behind this view are the following: 1. A rethink in the monetary policy framework: At its most recent meeting, the FOMC openly discussed the idea of a price-level target, implying that it would be open to the economy running hot to compensate for the past 10 years of below-target inflation (Chart II-1.1A, top panel). Chart II-1.1AStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I) Chart II-1.1BStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I)   2. Procyclical fiscal policy: The U.S. is conducting expansionary fiscal policy while the economy is at near-full employment (Chart II-1.1A, middle panel). The last time this happened in the U.S., during the 1960s, high inflation followed, as the fiscal boost made the economy run substantially above capacity. 3. Waning Fed independence: President Trump has openly questioned the hiking campaign undertaken by the Fed. Moreover, he has tried to nominate Fed governors with dovish tendencies. Historically around the world, a lack of central bank independence has often led to higher inflation rates (Chart II-1.1A, bottom panel). 4. Peak in globalization: Globalization accelerated significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, flooding the global economy with cheap labor (Chart II-1.1B, top panel). However, we believe that globalization has peaked. Instead, populism and protectionism will be the dominant paradigms for years to come, reducing the cheap pool of workers and goods previously available. 5. Demographics: The population in the U.S. is set to age in coming years (Chart II-1.1B, middle panel). As the percentage of U.S. retirees increases, the number of spenders relative to savers will begin to rise (Chart II-1.1B, bottom panel). Higher spending and lower savings in the economy should create upward pressure on inflation. If our view is correct, how should investors allocate their money? We attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of five major asset classes during periods when inflation was rising. Furthermore, we look into sub-asset class performance to determine how investors should position themselves within each asset class to take advantage of an inflationary environment. In our asset-class analysis, we use a data sample starting in 1973 and we limit ourselves to five publicly traded assets that have adequate history: global equities, U.S. Treasuries, U.S. real estate (REITs), U.S. inflation-linked bonds,3 and commodities. We compare asset classes according to their Sharpe ratios: average annualized excess returns divided by annualized volatilities.4  BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade. In our sub-asset class analysis, we analyze global equity sectors, international vs U.S. equities, and individual commodities. In some of the sections in our sub-asset class analysis, our sample is slightly reduced due to lack of historical data. Moreover, since in some instances all sectors have negative returns, we compare sub-asset classes according to their excess returns only. We base our analysis on the U.S. Consumer Price Index, given that most of the assets in our sample are U.S. based. We opt for this measure because it tends to track the living expenses for most U.S. citizens and it is the preferred measure to index defined-benefit payments. Finally, we decompose the periods of rising inflation into four quartiles in order to examine whether the level of inflation has any impact on the performance of each asset. Chart II-1.2 and Table II-1.1 show the different ranges we use for our analysis as well as a description of the typical economic and monetary policy environments in each of them. Summary Of Results Table II-1.2 shows the summary of our results. For a detailed explanation on how each asset class and sub-asset class behaves as inflation rises, please see the Asset Class section and the Sub-Asset Class section below. Which assets perform best when inflation is rising? Rising inflation affects assets very differently, and is especially dependent on how high inflation is. Global equities performed positively when inflation was rising and low or mild, but they were one of the worst-performing assets when inflation was rising and high or very high. Importantly, equities underperformed U.S. Treasuries in periods of both high and very high inflation. Commodities and U.S. TIPS were the best performers when inflation was high or very high. U.S. REITs were not a good inflation hedge. Which global equity sectors perform best when inflation is rising? Energy and materials outperformed when inflation was high. Every single sector had negative excess returns when inflation was very high, but defensive sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications5 minimized losses. Which commodities perform best when inflation is rising? With the exception of energy, most commodities had subpar excess returns when inflation was in the first two quartiles. Industrial metals outperformed when inflation was high. Gold and silver outperformed when inflation was very high. Additionally, gold had consistent returns and low volatility. What is the cost of inflation hedging? To answer this question, we construct four portfolios with different levels of inflation hedging: 1. Benchmark (no inflation hedging): 60% equities/40% bonds. 2. Low Inflation Hedging: 50% equities/40% bonds/5% TIPS/5% commodities 3. Medium Inflation Hedging: 40% equities/30% bonds/15% TIPS/15 % commodities 4. Pure Inflation Hedging: 50% TIPS/50% commodities. While increased inflation hedging provides better performance when inflation is high and rising, these hedges are costly to hold when inflation is at lower ranges or when it is falling (Chart II-1.3, panels 1 & 2). However, adding moderate inflation hedging (low or medium) to a portfolio achieved the right balance between cost and protection, and ultimately improved risk-adjusted returns over the whole sample (Chart II-1.3, panel 3). What about absolute returns? The benchmark outperformed over the whole sample. However, the low and medium inflation hedging did not lag far behind, while avoiding the big drawdowns of high inflation periods (Chart II-1.3, panel 4). Investment Implications High inflation may return to the U.S. over the next decade. Therefore, inflation hedging should be a key consideration when constructing a portfolio. Based on our results, our recommendations are the following: 1. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. 2.  However, these hedges are costly to hold as they will create a drag on returns in periods when inflation is not high or very high. Therefore, a low allocation to inflation hedges is warranted now. 3.   Inflation will probably start to pick up in the 2020s. A medium allocation to inflation hedges will then be appropriate. 4.   When inflation is high (3.3%-4.9%), investors should overweight energy and materials in their equity portfolios. Likewise, they should overweight industrial metals and energy within a commodity portfolio. 5.   When inflation is very high (4.9% or more), investors should overweight defensive sectors in their equity portfolio to minimize losses. Moreover, investors should overweight gold within a commodity portfolio. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. Asset Classes Global Equities The relationship between equity returns and rising inflation depends on how high inflation is, with outstanding performance when inflation is rising but low or mild, and poor performance as it gets higher (Chart II-2.1, top panel). This relationship can be explained by the interaction between interest rates, inflation, earnings, and valuations: Earnings growth was usually slightly negative when inflation was recovering from low levels. However, given that interest rates were very low in this environment and growth expectations were high, multiple expansion boosted equity returns (Chart II-2.1, bottom panel). When inflation was mild, the Fed typically started to raise rates, resulting in a declining multiple. However, equities had the best performance in this range thanks to very high earnings growth – a result of the economy growing strongly due to a healthy level of inflation. When inflation climbed into the high or very high range, earnings growth was usually positive but beginning to slow, as high inflation weighed on growth. Meanwhile the multiple started to decline rapidly due to rising interest rates and declining growth expectations. With the exception of the mild inflation range, the return profile of equities during inflationary periods was similar to its normal profile: negative skew and excess kurtosis (Table II-2.1). However, the consistency of returns decreased at higher levels of inflation, with only 45% of months with positive returns when inflation was rising and in its highest quartile. U.S. Treasuries U.S. Treasuries reacted in a similar fashion to equities when inflation was rising (Chart II-2.2). However, while Treasuries underperformed equities when inflation was low or mild, they actually outperformed equities when inflation was high or very high. This was in part due to the fact that at higher inflation ranges, U.S. Treasuries offer a higher coupon return when rates are high, at least partially counteracting losses from falling prices. The steady stream of cash flows from the coupons helped Treasuries achieve positive returns roughly two-thirds of the time at the highest levels of inflation (Table II-2.2). However, this consistency in returns came at a cost: very high inflation resulted in negative skew and high excess kurtosis. Therefore, while Treasuries provided frequent positive returns when inflation was very high, they were prone to violent selloffs. U.S. REITs While REITs had high risk-adjusted returns when inflation was rising but mild, much like equities they had subpar performance in every other quartile and particularly poor performance when inflation was high or very high (Chart II-2.3). These results confirm our previous research showing that REITs performance is very similar to that of equities.6 The return consistency for REITs was generally poor in inflationary periods, with the second-lowest percentage of positive return of any asset class (Table II-2.3). Moreover, REIT returns had excess kurtosis and negative skew throughout all inflation quartiles. Commodity Futures Commodities performed positively in every quartile, and did particularly well when inflation was mild (Chart II-2.4, top panel). However, total return and price return were very different due to the behavior of the roll and collateral return: Total risk-adjusted returns were lower than spot risk-adjusted returns when inflation was low and rising. This happened because during these periods, commodity supply was high relative to demand, as the economy was recovering from a deflationary shock. Thus, there was an incentive for producers to conserve inventories, making the futures curve upward-sloping (contango). Thus, roll return was negative (Chart II-2.4, bottom panel). When inflation was in the upper two quartiles, total risk-adjusted returns were much higher than risk-adjusted spot returns. This was because high inflation was the product of supply shocks. These supply shocks resulted in a downward-sloping futures curve (backwardation), which, in turn, resulted in a positive roll return. Additionally, high rates during these regimes contributed to a high collateral return. Commodities provided good return consistency during inflationary periods, with roughly 60% of positive return months in the upper two inflation quartiles (Table II-2.4). The skew of returns was neutral or positive in the top two quartiles. This means that although volatility was high for commodities, extreme return movements were normally positive. U.S. Inflation-Protected Bonds While inflation-protected bonds provided meager returns when inflation was rising but in the mild range, they provided excellent performance at the highest levels of inflation (Chart II-2.5). Moreover, this high Sharpe ratio was not just simply the result of low volatility, since U.S. TIPS had excess returns of 4.6% when inflation was high and 5.7% when inflation was very high.7 The return profile of inflation-protected bonds during inflationary periods was also attractive in our testing period. Average skew was positive, while kurtosis was relatively low (Table II-2.5). The percentage of positive months across all quartiles was also the highest of all asset classes, with a particularly high share of positive returns in the periods of highest inflation. Sub-Asset Classes Global Equity Sectors For the sector analysis, we looked at information technology, financials, energy, materials, utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications. We excluded industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples given that they do not have adequate back data. Once again, we separate rising inflation periods into four quartiles, arriving at the following results: When inflation was low, information technology had the best excess returns while utilities had the worst (Chart II-3.1, panel 1). This matches our observations at the asset class level, as IT is highly responsive to changes in the valuation multiple. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance, followed by information technology (Chart II-3.1, panel 2). Meanwhile, financials had the worst performance, as rates were normally rising in these periods. When inflation was high, sectors highly correlated with commodity prices such as energy and materials outperformed. Meanwhile, IT was the worst performer (Chart II-3.1, panel 3). When inflation was very high, every sector had negative excess returns. Overall, investing in energy minimized losses (Chart II-3.1, panel 4). However, this performance was in part attributable to the oil spikes of the 1970s. Alternatively, defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, and healthcare also minimized losses. International vs U.S. Equities How do equities outside of the U.S. behave when inflation is rising? While the high share of U.S. equities in the global index causes U.S. equities to be the main driver of global stock prices, is it possible to improve returns in inflationary environments by overweighting international equities? The answer once again depends on the level of inflation. When inflation was rising but low, U.S. stocks outperformed global ex-U.S. equities in both common currency and local currency terms (Chart II-3.2, panel 1). This was in part due to the inherent tech bias in U.S. stocks. Additionally, the low level of inflation was often accompanied by slowing global growth in our sample, helping the U.S. dollar. When inflation was mild, U.S. stocks once again outperformed international stocks in both local and common currency terms, though to a lesser degree (Chart II-3.2, panel 2). The dollar was roughly flat in this environment. U.S. stocks started to have negative excess returns when inflation was high (Chart II-3.2, panel 3). On the other hand international equities had positive excess returns in dollar terms, partly because of their energy and material bias and partly because the dollar was generally weak in this period. U.S. equities outperformed global ex-U.S. equities by a small margin when inflation was very high, given that defensive sectors such as telecommunication were over-represented in the U.S. index (Chart II-3.2, panel 4). The dollar was roughly flat in this period. Individual Commodities Our analysis above confirmed that commodities were one of the best assets to hold when inflation was rising. However, which commodity performed best?8 Total return for every commodity was lower than spot return when inflation was low (Chart II-3.3, panel 1). This was due to the upward-sloping term structure of the futures curve (contango), resulting in a negative roll yield. In this range, energy had the best performance, followed by industrial metals. Precious metals had negative excess returns. When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance of any commodity by far (Chart II-3.3, panel 2). Precious and industrial metals had low but positive excess returns in this period. When inflation was high, industrial metals had the highest excess returns, followed by energy (Chart II-3.3, panel 3). We omit energy for the last quartile since there is not enough data available. Overall, when inflation was very high, both gold and silver had the highest excess returns (Chart II-3.3, panel 4). However, gold’s return volatility was much lower, while it also had positive returns 64% of the time compared to 52% for silver. Other Assets U.S. Direct Real Estate Our asset-class analysis confirmed that public real estate (REITs) as an asset class offered poor risk-adjusted returns during inflationary periods. But how did direct real estate perform? We analyzed direct real estate separately from all other assets because of a couple of issues: Our return dataset is available only on a quarterly basis, versus a monthly basis for the rest of the assets in our sample. Even when annualized, volatility is not directly comparable when using data with different frequencies. The NCREIF Real Estate Index that we used is a broad aggregate, which is not investable. Individual property prices might differ from this aggregate. Finally, real estate returns are measured on an appraisal basis. Appraisal-based indices are not reflective of real transactions. Moreover, prices tend to be sticky. To attenuate this issue we unsmoothed the capital returns by removing return autocorrelation. Overall, the Sharpe ratio of direct real estate was solid throughout the first three quartiles of rising inflation (Chart II-4.1, top panel). There is not enough data available for the fourth quartile. However, judging by the performance of U.S. housing in the 1970s from OECD, risk-adjusted returns when inflation was very high was likely positive (Chart II-4.1, bottom panel).   Cash Cash (investing in a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill) outperformed inflation over our sample (Chart II-4.2, top panel). Moreover, cash provided positive real returns when inflation was mild, or high, or when it was decreasing (Chart II-4.2, bottom panel). However, cash was not a good inflation hedge at the highest inflation quartile, with an average annualized real loss of almost 2%. Juan Manuel Correa Ossa Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation   III. Indicators And Reference Charts Last month, we argued that the S&P 500 would most likely enter a period of digestion after its furious gains from December to April. This corrective episode is now upon us as the S&P 500 is breaking below the crucial 2,800 level. Moreover, our short-term technical indicators are deteriorating, as the number of stocks above their 30-week and 10-week moving averages have rolled over after hitting elevated levels, but have yet to hit levels consistent with a durable trough. This vulnerability is especially worrisome in a context where pressure will continue to build, as Beijing is only beginning to retaliate to the U.S.’s trade belligerence. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is not flashing a buy signal either. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. It will require either cheaper valuations, a pick-up in global growth or further policy easing before stocks can resume their ascent. On the plus side, our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. and Japan continues to improve. However, it remains flat in Europe. The WTP indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The current readings in major advanced economies thus suggest that investors are still inclined to add to their stock holdings. Hence, stock weaknesses are likely to prompt buy-the-dip behaviors by investors. Therefore, the expected downdraft will remain a correction and stocks have more cyclical upside. Our Monetary Indicator remains in stimulative territory, supporting our cyclical constructive equity view. The Fed is firmly on hold and global central banks have been opening the monetary spigots, thus monetary conditions should stay supportive. The BCA Composite Valuation Indicator, an amalgamation of 11 measures, is in overvalued territory, but it is not high enough to negate the positive message of our Monetary Indicator, especially as our Composite Technical Indicator has moved back above its 9-month moving average. These dynamics confirm that despite the near-term downside, equities have more cyclical upside. According to our model, 10-year Treasurys are slightly expensive. Moreover, our technical indicator flags a similar picture. However, duration surveys show that investors have very elevated portfolio duration, and both the term premium and Fed expectations are very depressed. Taking this positioning into account, BCA’s economic view is consistent with limited yield downside in the short-run, and higher yields on a 6 to 12 month basis. On a PPP basis, the U.S. dollar is only getting ever more expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator is not only in overbought territory, it is also starting to diverge from prices. Normally, this technical action points to a possible trend reversal, especially when valuations are so demanding. However, this downside will only materialize once global growth shows greater signs of strength. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes   Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1       Edward E. Leamer, "Housing is the business cycle," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 149-233, 2007. 2       This includes both real and financial transactions. 3       Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “How Trump Became A War President,” dated May 17, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Stay Cyclically Overweight Global Equities, But Hedge Near-Term Downside Risks From An Escalation Of A Trade War,” dated May 10, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5       Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Trader's Paradise,” dated January 28, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 6       Please see Carl E. Walsh, “October 6, 1979,” FRSBF Economic Letter, 2004:35, (December 3, 2004). 7       Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 1), ” dated August 10, 2018, and “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8       We use a synthetic TIPS series for data prior to 1997. For details on the methodology, please see: Kothari, S.P. and Shanken, Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004. 9       Excess returns are defined as asset return relative to a 3-month Treasury bill. 10       Sector classification does not take into account GICS changes prior to December 2018.  11       Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report "REITS Vs Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 12       It is important to note that the synthetic TIPS series does not completely match actual TIPS series for the periods where they overlap. Specifically, volatility is significantly higher in the synthetic series. Thus, results should be taken as approximations. 13       We decompose the returns into the same 4 quartiles to answer this question. However, due to lower data availability, we start our sample in 1978 instead of 1973. Moreover, our sample for energy is smaller beginning in 1983. This mainly reduces the amount of data available at the upper quartile. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Special Report

HighlightsU.S. inflation is on a structural uptrend. Monetary and fiscal policy, populism, and demographics will tend to push inflation higher over the coming decade.How can investors protect portfolios against inflation risk? We look at periods of rising inflation to determine which assets were the best inflation hedge.We find that the level of inflation is very important in determining which assets work best.When inflation is rising and high, or very high, the best inflation hedges at the asset class level are commodities and U.S. TIPS.When inflation is very high, gold is the best commodity to hold and defensive sectors will minimize losses in an equity portfolio.However, hedges have a cost. Allocating a large percentage of a portfolio to inflation hedges will be a drag on returns. Investors should opt for a low allocation to hedges now, and increase to a medium level when inflation rises further.FeatureSome 38 years have passed since the last time the U.S. suffered from double-digit inflation. The Federal Reserve reform of 1979, championed by Paul Volcker, changed the way the Fed approached monetary policy by putting a focus on controlling money growth.1 The reform gave way to almost four decades of relatively controlled inflation, which persists today.But times are changing. While most of today’s investors have never experienced anything other than periods of tame inflation, BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.2 The main reasons behind this view are the following:A rethink in the monetary policy framework: At its most recent meeting, the FOMC openly discussed the idea of a price-level target, implying that it would be open to the economy running hot to compensate for the past 10 years of below-target inflation (Chart I-1A, top panel).Procyclical fiscal policy: The U.S. is conducting expansionary fiscal policy while the economy is at near-full employment (Chart I-1A, middle panel). The last time this happened in the U.S., during the 1960s, high inflation followed, as the fiscal boost made the economy run substantially above capacity.Waning Fed independence: President Trump has openly questioned the hiking campaign undertaken by the Fed. Moreover, he has tried to nominate Fed governors with dovish tendencies. Historically around the world, a lack of central bank independence has often led to higher inflation rates (Chart I-1A, bottom panel).Peak in globalization: Globalization accelerated significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, flooding the global economy with cheap labor (Chart I-1B, top panel). However, we believe that globalization has peaked. Instead, populism and protectionism will be the dominant paradigms for years to come, reducing the cheap pool of workers and goods previously available.Demographics: The population in the U.S. is set to age in coming years (Chart I-1B, middle panel). As the percentage of U.S. retirees increases, the number of spenders relative to savers will begin to rise (Chart I-1B, bottom panel). Higher spending and lower savings in the economy should create upward pressure on inflation. Chart I-1AStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (I)  Chart I-1BStructural Forces Point To Higher Inflation In The Coming Decade (II) If our view is correct, how should investors allocate their money?We attempt to answer this question by evaluating the performance of five major asset classes during periods when inflation was rising. Furthermore, we look into sub-asset class performance to determine how investors should position themselves within each asset class to take advantage of an inflationary environment.In our asset-class analysis, we use a data sample starting in 1973 and we limit ourselves to five publicly traded assets that have adequate history: global equities, U.S. Treasuries, U.S. real estate (REITs), U.S. inflation-linked bonds,3 and commodities. We compare asset classes according to their Sharpe ratios: average annualized excess returns divided by annualized volatilities.4 BCA expects that rising inflation will be a major driving force of asset returns over the coming decade.In our sub-asset class analysis, we analyze global equity sectors, international vs U.S. equities, and individual commodities. In some of the sections in our sub-asset class analysis, our sample is slightly reduced due to lack of historical data. Moreover, since in some instances all sectors have negative returns, we compare sub-asset classes according to their excess returns only.We base our analysis on the U.S. Consumer Price Index, given that most of the assets in our sample are U.S. based. We opt for this measure because it tends to track the living expenses for most U.S. citizens and it is the preferred measure to index defined-benefit payments.Finally, we decompose the periods of rising inflation into four quartiles in order to examine whether the level of inflation has any impact on the performance of each asset. Chart I-2 and Table I-1 show the different ranges we use for our analysis as well as a description of the typical economic and monetary policy environments in each of them.Summary Of ResultsTable I-2 shows the summary of our results. For a detailed explanation on how each asset class and sub-asset class behaves as inflation rises, please see the Asset Class section and the Sub-Asset Class section below.Which assets perform best when inflation is rising?Rising inflation affects assets very differently, and is especially dependent on how high inflation is.Global equities performed positively when inflation was rising and low or mild, but they were one of the worst-performing assets when inflation was rising and high or very high. Importantly, equities underperformed U.S. Treasuries in periods of both high and very high inflation.Commodities and U.S. TIPS were the best performers when inflation was high or very high.U.S. REITs were not a good inflation hedge.Which global equity sectors perform best when inflation is rising?Energy and materials outperformed when inflation was high.Every single sector had negative excess returns when inflation was very high, but defensive sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications5 minimized losses.Which commodities perform best when inflation is rising?With the exception of energy, most commodities had subpar excess returns when inflation was in the first two quartiles.Industrial metals outperformed when inflation was high.Gold and silver outperformed when inflation was very high. Additionally, gold had consistent returns and low volatility.What is the cost of inflation hedging?To answer this question, we construct four portfolios with different levels of inflation hedging:Benchmark (no inflation hedging): 60% equities / 40% bonds.Low Inflation Hedging: 50% equities / 40% bonds / 5% TIPS / 5% commoditiesMedium Inflation Hedging: 40% equities / 30% bonds / 15% TIPS / 15 % commoditiesPure Inflation Hedging: 50% TIPS / 50% commodities. At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation. Chart I-3Inflation Hedging Comes At A Cost While increased inflation hedging provides better performance when inflation is high and rising, these hedges are costly to hold when inflation is at lower ranges or when it is falling (Chart I-3, panels 1 & 2). However, adding moderate inflation hedging (low or medium) to a portfolio achieved the right balance between cost and protection, and ultimately improved risk-adjusted returns over the whole sample (Chart I-3, panel 3).What about absolute returns? The benchmark outperformed over the whole sample. However, the low and medium inflation hedging did not lag far behind, while avoiding the big drawdowns of high inflation periods (Chart I-3, panel 4).Investment ImplicationsHigh inflation may return to the U.S. over the next decade. Therefore, inflation hedging should be a key consideration when constructing a portfolio. Based on our results, our recommendations are the following:1.  At the asset-class level, investors should allocate to commodities and U.S. TIPS to hedge inflation.2.  However, these hedges are costly to hold as they will create a drag on returns in periods when inflation is not high or very high. Therefore, a low allocation to inflation hedges is warranted now.3.  Inflation will probably start to pick up in the 2020s. A medium allocation to inflation hedges will then be appropriate.4.  When inflation is high (3.3%-4.9%), investors should overweight energy and materials in their equity portfolios. Likewise, they should overweight industrial metals and energy within a commodity portfolio.5.  When inflation is very high (4.9% or more), investors should overweight defensive sectors in their equity portfolio to minimize losses. Moreover, investors should overweight gold within a commodity portfolio.Asset ClassesGlobal EquitiesThe relationship between equity returns and rising inflation depends on how high inflation is, with outstanding performance when inflation is rising but low or mild, and poor performance as it gets higher (Chart II-1, top panel).This relationship can be explained by the interaction between interest rates, inflation, earnings, and valuations:Earnings growth was usually slightly negative when inflation was recovering from low levels. However, given that interest rates were very low in this environment and growth expectations were high, multiple expansion boosted equity returns (Chart II-1, bottom panel).When inflation was mild, the Fed typically started to raise rates, resulting in a declining multiple. However, equities had the best performance in this range thanks to very high earnings growth – a result of the economy growing strongly due to a healthy level of inflation.When inflation climbed into the high or very high range, earnings growth was usually positive but beginning to slow, as high inflation weighed on growth. Meanwhile the multiple started to decline rapidly due to rising interest rates and declining growth expectations.With the exception of the mild inflation range, the return profile of equities during inflationary periods was similar to its normal profile: negative skew and excess kurtosis (Table II-1). However, the consistency of returns decreased at higher levels of inflation, with only 45% of months with positive returns when inflation was rising and in its highest quartile.U.S. TreasuriesU.S. Treasuries reacted in a similar fashion to equities when inflation was rising (Chart II-2). However, while Treasuries underperformed equities when inflation was low or mild, they actually outperformed equities when inflation was high or very high. This was in part due to the fact that at higher inflation ranges, U.S. Treasuries offer a higher coupon return when rates are high, at least partially counteracting losses from falling prices.The steady stream of cash flows from the coupons helped Treasuries achieve positive returns roughly two-thirds of the time at the highest levels of inflation (Table II-2). However, this consistency in returns came at a cost: very high inflation resulted in negative skew and high excess kurtosis. Therefore, while Treasuries provided frequent positive returns when inflation was very high, they were prone to violent selloffs.U.S. REITsWhile REITs had high risk-adjusted returns when inflation was rising but mild, much like equities they had subpar performance in every other quartile and particularly poor performance when inflation was high or very high (Chart II-3). These results confirm our previous research showing that REITs performance is very similar to that of equities.6The return consistency for REITs was generally poor in inflationary periods, with the second-lowest percentage of positive return of any asset class (Table II-3). Moreover, REIT returns had excess kurtosis and negative skew throughout all inflation quartiles.Commodity FuturesCommodities performed positively in every quartile, and did particularly well when inflation was mild (Chart II-4, top panel). However, total return and price return were very different due to the behavior of the roll and collateral return:Total risk-adjusted returns were lower than spot risk-adjusted returns when inflation was low and rising. This happened because during these periods, commodity supply was high relative to demand, as the economy was recovering from a deflationary shock. Thus, there was an incentive for producers to conserve inventories, making the futures curve upward-sloping (contango). Thus, roll return was negative (Chart II-4, bottom panel).When inflation was in the upper two quartiles, total risk-adjusted returns were much higher than risk-adjusted spot returns. This was because high inflation was the product of supply shocks. These supply shocks resulted in a downward-sloping futures curve (backwardation), which, in turn, resulted in a positive roll return. Additionally, high rates during these regimes contributed to a high collateral return.Commodities provided good return consistency during inflationary periods, with roughly 60% of positive return months in the upper two inflation quartiles (Table II-4). The skew of returns was neutral or positive in the top two quartiles. This means that although volatility was high for commodities, extreme return movements were normally positive.U.S. Inflation-Protected BondsWhile inflation-protected bonds provided meager returns when inflation was rising but in the mild range, they provided excellent performance at the highest levels of inflation (Chart II-5). Moreover, this high Sharpe ratio was not just simply the result of low volatility, since U.S. TIPS had excess returns of 4.6% when inflation was high and 5.7% when inflation was very high.7The return profile of inflation-protected bonds during inflationary periods was also attractive in our testing period. Average skew was positive, while kurtosis was relatively low (Table II-5). The percentage of positive months across all quartiles was also the highest of all asset classes, with a particularly high share of positive returns in the periods of highest inflation.Sub-Asset ClassesGlobal Equity SectorsFor the sector analysis, we looked at information technology, financials, energy, materials, utilities, healthcare, and telecommunications. We excluded industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples given that they do not have adequate back data.Once again, we separate rising inflation periods into four quartiles, arriving at the following results:When inflation was low, information technology had the best excess returns while utilities had the worst (Chart III-1, panel 1). This matches our observations at the asset class level, as IT is highly responsive to changes in the valuation multiple.When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance, followed by information technology (Chart III-1, panel 2). Meanwhile, financials had the worst performance, as rates were normally rising in these periods.When inflation was high, sectors highly correlated with commodity prices such as energy and materials outperformed. Meanwhile, IT was the worst performer (Chart III-1, panel 3).When inflation was very high, every sector had negative excess returns. Overall, investing in energy minimized losses (Chart III-1, panel 4). However, this performance was in part attributable to the oil spikes of the 1970s. Alternatively, defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, and healthcare also minimized losses. International vs U.S. EquitiesHow do equities outside of the U.S. behave when inflation is rising? While the high share of U.S. equities in the global index causes U.S. equities to be the main driver of global stock prices, is it possible to improve returns in inflationary environments by overweighting international equities?The answer once again depends on the level of inflation. When inflation was rising but low, U.S. stocks outperformed global ex-U.S. equities in both common currency and local currency terms (Chart III-2, panel 1). This was in part due to the inherent tech bias in U.S. stocks. Additionally, the low level of inflation was often accompanied by slowing global growth in our sample, helping the U.S. dollar.When inflation was mild, U.S. stocks once again outperformed international stocks in both local and common currency terms, though to a lesser degree (Chart III-2, panel 2). The dollar was roughly flat in this environmentU.S. stocks started to have negative excess returns when inflation was high (Chart III-2, panel 3). On the other hand international equities had positive excess returns in dollar terms, partly because of their energy and material bias and partly because the dollar was generally weak in this period.U.S. equities outperformed global ex-U.S. equities by a small margin when inflation was very high, given that defensive sectors such as telecommunication were over-represented in the U.S. index (Chart III-2, panel 4). The dollar was roughly flat in this period. Individual CommoditiesOur analysis above confirmed that commodities were one of the best assets to hold when inflation was rising. However, which commodity performed best?8Total return for every commodity was lower than spot return when inflation was low (Chart III-3, panel 1). This was due to the upward-sloping term structure of the futures curve (contango), resulting in a negative roll yield. In this range, energy had the best performance, followed by industrial metals. Precious metals had negative excess returns.When inflation was mild, energy had the best performance of any commodity by far (Chart III-3, panel 2). Precious and industrial metals had low but positive excess returns in this period.When inflation was high, industrial metals had the highest excess returns, followed by energy (Chart III-3, panel 3).We omit energy for the last quartile since there is not enough data available. Overall, when inflation was very high, both gold and silver had the highest excess returns (Chart III-3, panel 4). However, gold’s return volatility was much lower, while it also had positive returns  64% of the time compared to 52% for silver.Other AssetsU.S. Direct Real Estate Chart IV-1Direct Real Estate Is A Good Inflation Hedge Our asset-class analysis confirmed that public real estate (REITs) as an asset class offered poor risk-adjusted returns during inflationary periods. But how did direct real estate perform?We analyzed direct real estate separately from all other assets because of a couple of issues:Our return dataset is available only on a quarterly basis, versus a monthly basis for the rest of the assets in our sample. Even when annualized, volatility is not directly comparable when using data with different frequencies.The NCREIF Real Estate Index that we used is a broad aggregate, which is not investable. Individual property prices might differ from this aggregate.Finally, real estate returns are measured on an appraisal basis. Appraisal-based indices are not reflective of real transactions. Moreover, prices tend to be sticky. To attenuate this issue we unsmoothed the capital returns by removing return autocorrelation.Overall, the Sharpe ratio of direct real estate was solid throughout the first three quartiles of rising inflation (Chart IV-1, top panel). There is not enough data available for the fourth quartile. However, judging by the performance of U.S. housing in the 1970s from OECD, risk-adjusted returns when inflation was very high was likely positive (Chart IV-1, bottom panel). Cash Chart IV-2Very High Inflation Erodes The Value Of Cash Cash (investing in a 3-month U.S. Treasury bill) outperformed inflation over our sample. (Chart IV-2, top panel). Moreover, cash provided positive real returns when inflation was mild, or high, or when it was decreasing (Chart IV-2, bottom panel). However, cash was not a good inflation hedge at the highest inflation quartile, with an average annualized real loss of almost 2%. Juan Manuel Correa OssaSenior Analystjuanc@bcaresearch.com Footnotes1      Please see Carl E. Walsh, “October 6, 1979,” FRSBF Economic Letter, 2004:35, (December 3, 2004).2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 1), ” dated August 10, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “1970s-Style Inflation: Could it Happen Again? (Part 2),” dated August 24, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.3      We use a synthetic TIPS series for data prior to 1997. For details on the methodology, please see: Kothari, S.P. and Shanken, Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004. Jay A., “Asset Allocation with Inflation-Protected Bonds,” Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 54-70, January/February 2004.4      Excess returns are defined as asset return relative to a 3-month Treasury bill.5      Sector classification does not take into account GICS changes prior to December 2018. 6      Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report "REITS Vs Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com.7      It is important to note that the synthetic TIPS series does not completely match actual TIPS series for the periods where they overlap. Specifically, volatility is significantly higher in the synthetic series. Thus, results should be taken as approximations.8      We decompose the returns into the same 4 quartiles to answer this question. However, due to lower data availability, we start our sample in 1978 instead of 1973. Moreover, our sample for energy is smaller beginning in 1983. This mainly reduces the amount of data available at the upper quartile.