Base Metals & Iron Ore
We continue to expect copper prices to increase in the near term, as China’s credit cycle bottoms and DM central banks soften their monetary-policy stance. Fiscal and monetary stimulus in China also will be supportive of base metals prices going forward. The evolution of the Sino - U.S. trade negotiations remains a risk to our view, given how important the outcome of these talks will be for investors’ expectations and sentiment. Markets appear to be discounting a positive outcome. Anything that scuppers these talks – or results in a no-deal outcome – will be a negative for base metals, copper in particular. Our tactical long copper position is up by 1.2% since we initiated it last week. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Russian oil companies are expected to keep production lower until July, when the current OPEC 2.0 production-cutting agreement now in place expires. We expect the deal will be extended to year-end.1 Separately, the risk of a complete shutdown in Venezuela’s oil industry rose significantly, as a power failure in most of the country all but eliminated potable water supplies and significantly reduced oil exports. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. High-grade iron-ore prices got a boost this week as Vale was ordered to temporarily suspend exports from its primary port at Guaiba Island terminal in Rio de Janeiro state, according to Metal Bulletin’s Fastmarkets.2 The price-reporting agency’s 62% Fe Iron Ore Index rose $1.46/MT at $85.25/MT Tuesday. Precious Metals: Neutral. Spot gold is back above $1,300/oz, on the back of monetary policy easing among important central banks. This also is supporting base metals globally (see below). Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grain markets continue to drift sideways, awaiting definitive news re Sino - U.S. trade talks, specifically when presidents Xi and Trump will meet to finalize a deal (see below). Separately, wheat and corn inventories are expected to rise on the back of higher supplies and lower exports, the USDA forecast in its latest world supply-demand estimates. Feature Recent data releases confirm our view that global growth will remain weak in 1Q19 and early 2Q19. This will continue to put downward pressure on cyclical commodities – chiefly base metals and oil (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGlobal Growth Slows In 1Q19 The persistence of the slowdown provoked major central banks to adopt a dovish stance in the short-term. This is easily seen in the recent actions by the U.S. Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Canada (BoC) and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), all of which have communicated a pause in their rate normalization policies.3 At the moment, the frail global growth is partly balanced by expectations of a positive outcome re the ongoing Sino - U.S. trade negotiations (Chart 2). In the coming months, we expect the effect of accommodative DM monetary policy combined with an expansion in China’s credit (more on this below) and fiscal stimulus – i.e., tax cuts announced earlier this month amounting to almost $300 billion (~ 2 trillion RMB) meant to support policymakers’ GDP growth targets – will go a long way toward reversing the earlier contraction. The effect of these policy decisions will be apparent in 2H19. Chart 2China Growth To Hook Higher China’s Credit Cycle Bottomed In December 2018 The evolution of China’s credit cycle remains a central pillar to our view commodity demand growth in 2H19 will surpass consensus expectations. The massive growth reported in China’s January credit statistics revived investors’ expectations that China’s banks will re-open the credit valves as they did in 2016.4 In our view, this number does signal a bottom in China’s credit cycle, and implies Chinese – and indirectly EM – growth will bottom sometime this year. However, we still are not expecting a complete blowout credit expansion this year. We continue to believe Chinese policymakers will focus on stabilizing credit in 1H19 with moderate increases in supply, and start increasing stimulus in 2H19 or 2020 in order to maximize its effect later in 2020 ahead of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2021. The soft February credit number released this week supports this argument.5 China’s Credit Cycle Matters For Base Metals Demand The relationship between China’s credit cycles and base metal prices endures and remains robust. We measure China’s aggregate credit using bank and non-bank claims on non-financial enterprises, households, local and central governments, and non-bank financial institutions. This corresponds to adding outstanding central and local government bonds to China’s Total Social Financing (TSF).6 The annual change in aggregate credit – or its impulses – do not perfectly capture the cycles in global base metal demand. These variables provide interesting signals about the direction and magnitude of movements in credit, however, they do not track base metals’ price cycles accurately and consistently (Chart 3). Chart 3Metals Price Cycles Don't Track Changed In China's Credit To decompose this variable into its trend and cycle, we use a proxy of the credit cycle constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott and Hamilton filters, and the standardized 12-month credit impulse (Chart 4).7 Chart 4China's Credit Cycle Proxy We find that our credit cycle proxy Granger causes base metal prices, import volume and industrial activity (Table 1).8 On average, it leads these variables by 4-6 months (Chart 5). Hence, we believe our credit cycle proxy provides valuable information about future commodity demand in China. Table 1China Credit Cycle Correlations In fact, when regressing copper prices and the LMEX against it, we found that 60% and 58% of the variation in copper prices and the LMEX, can be explained by the linear relationship with our China credit cycle proxy, respectively (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Credit Cycle and Metals Prices Given the leading property of China’s credit cycles with respect to industrial activity and metal prices, we included this new proxy in our Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index.9 This improves the correlation of our index with copper prices (Chart 7). Chart 7Credit Cycle Improves BCA's GIA Currently, our models suggest copper prices should increase in the coming months as China’s credit cycle bottoms and DM central banks soften their monetary policy stance. The evolution of the China-U.S. trade negotiations remains a risk to our view as the outcome will weigh on investors’ expectations and sentiment. China’s Vs. DMs’ Credit Cycles Between 2009 and 2014, China’s credit cycle lagged the U.S. and EU’s broad money cycles (Chart 8). This counter-cyclicality is partly explained by its elevated level of exports to the U.S. and of hard goods to Europe. When the global economic cycle works in China’s favor – i.e., when the Fed and ECB are accommodative or fiscal stimulus is deployed in either or both regions – China’s exports rise as U.S. and EU aggregate demand increases. This typically reduces the need for endogenous fiscal or monetary stimulus within China. Chart 8China's Credit Cycle Lags U.S., EU Money Cycles On the other hand, when the global economic cycle contracts and fiscal and monetary policy ex China becomes a headwind, Chinese policymakers typically need to deploy fiscal and monetary policy to keep growth going, or at least avoid a contraction in their economy. Between 2016 and 2017, DM and China credit cycles aligned and increased simultaneously. Taking into account the 4-to-6-month lag between the time credit supply is increased and commodity demand rises, this created bullish conditions for metals and oil from 2H16 to 1H18, pushing copper prices up by 60%. In 2018, both regions’ cycles rolled over. Base metals markets currently are experiencing the consequences of this contraction in credit availability and tightening of financial conditions generally. Going forward, we expect China will step in to raise domestic demand and offset the impact of the decline in credit availability elsewhere, which is affecting demand for its exports in the short-term. In the medium-term, the U.S. and EU, along with India, do not appear to be inclined to absorb Chinese exports to the extent they did in the past, which means the pivot to domestically generated growth through consumer- and services-led demand is the most viable alternative Chinese policymakers have to keep growth on target. Bottom Line: The dovish turn of major DM central banks combined with a bottoming of China’s credit cycle will support cyclical commodities at the margin in the coming months. During the second half of this year, we expect a more significant pick up in China’s credit, setting the stage for a year-end rally in base metal prices. As a consequence, the impact of China’s credit growth on base metals demand could diminish compared to previous stimulus targeting industrial demand. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Russia’s oil companies ready to cut output until July: TASS,” published by reuters.com March 12, 2019. 2 Please see Fastmarkets MB’s Daily Steel, March 12, 2019. 3 Please see “Pervasive Uncertainty, Persuasive Central Banks,” published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy March 12, 2019. It is available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “China Macro And Market Review,” published by BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy March 13, 2019. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 See footnote 4 above. 6 For more details please see “EM: A Sustainable Rally Or A False Start?” published by BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy March 7, 2019. It is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 Hamilton notes the HP filter can be problematic. In general, we agree with critics of the filter (i.e. it results in spurious dynamics that are unrelated with the true data-generating process, it has an end-point bias which affects its real-time properties, and it is highly dependent on the parameter selection). However, there are some arguments in support of using the HP filter to proxy the credit cycle. First, as long as there are no clear theoretical foundation for an accurate measurement of the credit cycle, empirical validation should remain the number one criteria by which one selects its proxy. Second, credit cycles vary in duration and this weakens the ability to construct a reliable proxy. The usual parameter used with the HP filter favors short-term cycles (i.e. ~ 2 years) while the Hamilton filter focuses on medium-term cycles (i.e. ~ 5 years). Therefore, both can convey useful information. Third, China’s aggregate credit variable in level has a quasi-linear trend and is roughly approximated by a trend-stationary process with breaks in the trend and constant. Such a process should converge in limit when decomposed using the HP filter. Please see James D. Hamilton (2018), “Why You Should Never Use the Hodrick-Prescott Filter,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 100(5), pages 831-843. and Phillips, Peter C. B. and Jin, Sainan (2015), “Business Cycles, Trend Elimination, and the HP filter,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2005. 8 Granger causality refers to a statistical technique developed by Clive Granger, the 2003 Nobel Laureate in Economics, which is used to determine whether one variable can be said to have caused (or predicted) another variable, given the past performance of each. Using standard econometric techniques, Granger showed one variable can be shown to have “caused” another, and that two-way causality also can be demonstrated (i.e., a feedback loop between the variables can exist based on the historical performance of each). 9 Please see “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 14, 2019. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades
On Monday Chinese A-shares surged by nearly 6%, their best daily performance in three years. In many corners of the investment community, EM assets and China related assets have interpreted these developments as a positive omen. Nobody can deny that not…
The index is divided into four main components. The GIA index’s Trade Component combines EM import volumes and an estimate of global dry bulk shipping rates to gauge demand. The Currency Component uses a basket of currencies that are sensitive to global…
Trepidation engulfs commodity markets like a fog weaving through half-deserted streets. Central bankers huddle in muttering retreats, growing more cautious by the day. EM growth concerns – particularly slowing trade volumes, and the drama surrounding Sino – U.S. trade negotiations – contribute to this. Europe’s slowdown as Brexit approaches, and a U.S. government that seems forever at loggerheads also sap investor confidence. Nonetheless, the level of industrial commodity demand – oil and copper in particular – continues to hold up. By our reckoning, EM growth still is positive y/y. And central bank caution – along with less-restrictive policies – provides a supportive backdrop for industrial commodities down the road. The production discipline we expect from OPEC 2.0 this year sets the stage for a continued rally in oil prices. Given our view on EM growth, we continue to favor staying long oil exposure, and remaining exposed to industrial commodities generally via the S&P GSCI position we recommended on December 7, 2017. Highlights Energy: Overweight. We are closing our open long call spreads in 2019 Brent, having lost the ~ $1/bbl premium in each. We are opening a new set of similar positions in anticipation of the next up-leg in Brent. At tonight’s close of trading, we will go long Brent $70 Calls vs. short $75 Calls in June, July and August 2019. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Metal Bulletin’s benchmark iron ore price index for China traded through $90/MT earlier this week, as supply concerns continue to weigh on markets in the wake of evacuations from areas close to tailings dams used by miners.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Bullion broker Sharps Pixley reported the PBOC’s gold reserves total almost 60mm ounces, up 380k ounces from end-2018 levels. Russia’s state media outlet RT proclaimed: “China on gold-buying spree amid global push to end US dollar dominance” on Tuesday. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Last week’s USDA WASDE report estimates world ending stocks for grains will be up slightly for the 2018-19 crop year at 772.2mm MT vs 766.6mm MT previously estimated in December. A January report was not issued due to the U.S. government shutdown. Feature In discussions with clients in the Middle East last week, few contested the assertion OPEC 2.0 is determined to keep supply below demand this year, in order to draw down global oil and refined product inventories.2 This strategy worked well for the coalition after it was stood up in November 2016. Back then, production cutbacks, an unexpected collapse of Venezuelan output, and random outages in Libya and elsewhere combined with above-average global demand to keep consumption above production. This led to a drawdown in OECD inventories of 260mm barrels between January 2017 and June 2018. OPEC 2.0 is off to a strong start on its renewed effort to rein in production and draw down inventories. OPEC (the old Cartel) cut nearly 800k b/d of production in January m/m, bringing members’ total crude output to 30.8mm b/d.3 The largest cut once again came from KSA, which reported it reduced output by just over 400k b/d m/m in January. This follows a 450k b/d reduction in December 2018 reported by the Kingdom in last month’s OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report. For March, KSA already is indicating it plans to drop production to 9.8mm b/d – 1.3mm b/d less than it was pumping in November 2018. There are some signs of discord within OPEC 2.0. Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin once again is arguing against the coalition’s production-cutting strategy, this time in a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin.4 This is not the first time such disagreements were aired: In November 2017, leaders of Russia’s oil industry walked out of a meeting with Energy Minister Alexander Novak following a disagreement with the government on extending OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal launched at the beginning of the year. In the end, the deal was extended after President Putin weighed in.5 A Deeper Look At Demand Uncertainty These supply-side issues are not trivial, and pose significant risks to our price view. All the same, Russia does benefit from higher oil prices, in that inelastic global demand in the short-to-medium term produces a non-linear price increase when supply is reduced. Russia’s OPEC 2.0 quota calls for production to fall from 11.4mm b/d production basis its October 2018 reference level (11.6mm b/d at present) to 11.2mm b/d in 2019. As long as Russia’s participation in the OPEC 2.0 coalition advances its economic and geopolitical interests – i.e., higher revenues than could be expected without having a direct role in global production management, and in deepening its ties with KSA – we expect it to remain a member in good standing in OPEC 2.0. At the moment, the bigger issues center on the state of global demand for industrial commodities. Unlike the situation that prevailed during the first round of OPEC 2.0 cuts, global markets no longer are seeing a synchronized global recovery in aggregate demand. Rather, EM commodity demand growth – the engine of global growth – has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018. This is not news: It shows up in our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index, and we’ve been writing about it and accounting for it in our metals and oil demand projections for months (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekCommodity Demand May Be Bottoming BCA’s GIA index is heavily weighted to EM commodity demand. Based on our estimates, it appears to be close to or in a bottoming phase and ready to turn up within the next quarter. It is worthwhile pointing out that even with the slowdown over the past year or so, BCA’s GIA index still stands significantly higher than the level registered during the manufacturing downturn of 2015-16. This also adds color as to why the OPEC market-share war launched in November 2014 was so devastating to prices – demand was contracting while supplies were surging from OPEC 2.0 states and from U.S. shale-oil producers. Pessimism Is Overdone We have maintained for some time commodity markets are overly pessimistic on the global growth outlook, mainly because of their gloomy view on the Chinese economy, and anticipated knock-on effects for EM growth arising from this view. Our colleagues at BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy succinctly capture the current mood pervading global markets: “… this current soft patch for the global economy is occurring alongside an extreme divergence between plunging growth expectations and more stable readings on current economic conditions. The fall in expectations is visible in the most countries, according to data series that measure confidence for businesses, consumers and investors.”6 We continue to expect the slowdown in EM to persist in 1H19 based on our modeling and actual consumption data. Part – not all – of this is due to the slowdown in China, where policymakers are moving to reverse earlier financial tightening with modest fiscal and monetary stimulus in 1H19. We continue to expect the Communist Party leadership in China will want to start increasing stimulus later this year or in 1H20, so that it hits the economy full force in 2021 in time for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. Such stimulus will bolster industrial commodity demand. Still, this is difficult to call, particularly the form stimulus will take. President Xi appears committed rebalancing China’s economy – i.e., supporting consumer-led growth – and may want to keep policy powder dry, so to speak, to counter a recession in 2020 or thereafter. Stimulating the consumer economy in China could boost consumption of gasoline, and demand for white goods like household appliances at the expense of heavy industrial demand. Oil and base metals used in stainless steel would benefit in such an environment. Timing this rebound remains difficult. It appears to us that oil and, to a lesser extent, base metals have undershot their fair-value levels (based on our modeling) on the back of negative expectations and sentiment. If we are correct in this assessment, this should limit the negative surprises going forward and open upside opportunities for commodity prices (Chart 2). Chart 2Technically, Oil's Oversold Under The Hood Of BCA’s Newest Model Because demand is so difficult to capture, we continually are looking for different gauges to measure it and cross-check against each other. We developed our Global Industrial Activity index to target the actual performance of commodity-intensive activities globally. Each component is selected based on its sensitivity to the cycle in global industrial activity, hence on the cycle of global commodity demand. This is different from the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI), which uses a GDP-weighted average of 23 countries’ LEI. By relying on GDP, the LEI weights in the indicator favor DM countries and do not account for the growing share of the service sector in these economies (Chart 3).7 Chart 3GIA Captures Commodity Demand Our GIA index focuses on commodity demand, which is fundamentally different from proxies of global real GDP growth or global economic activity. Nonetheless, we included the BCA global LEI with a small weight (~ 10%) in our index to capture DM economies. This inclusion does add information to our new gauge. Our GIA index correlates with Emerging Markets’ GDP, copper and oil prices with lags of one to three months. This index is designed to measure the strength of the underlying demand for commodities. It does not account for the supply side and other idiosyncratic shocks that affects each commodity. For instance, our index captures ~ 55% of the variation in the y/y movement in oil prices; adding our oil market supply and sentiment indicators on top of the demand variable raises this to more than 80% (Chart 4). Chart 4Combined Indicators Work Best The index is divided into four main components, which gauge the demand-side impacts of (1) trade; (2) currency movements; (3) manufacturing demand; and (4) the Chinese economy, given its importance to overall commodity demand. The GIA index’s Trade Component combines EM import volumes and an estimate of global dry bulk shipping rates to gauge demand. Readers of the Commodity & Energy Strategy are familiar with our use of EM trade volumes as a proxy for EM income.8 This week, we introduce a new proxy for shipping rates using the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) as a proxy of global economic activity. Our methodology is based on the approaches taken by James D. Hamilton and Lutz Kilian in their respective models that use the BDI to proxy global growth.9 We created two alternative measures based on each of their approaches and average them to come up with our own proxy of the cyclical factor of global shipping rates driven by demand. Both of our alternative measures use a rebased version of the real BDI, which uses the U.S. CPI to deflate the nominal value. Because it picks up the surge in shipping activity in 2H18 resulting from the front-running of tariffs in the Sino – U.S. trade war, the Trade Component of our GIA index gives the most positive readings of all the components (Chart 5, panel 1). By the end of this month, we expect the effects of this front-running to avoid tariffs will wash through the gauge, and we will have greater clarity on the state of global trade. Chart 5Performance Of GIA Components The Currency Component uses a basket of currencies that are sensitive to global growth – i.e., the currencies of countries heavily engaged in trade – and the Risky vs. Safe-haven currency ratio built by BCA’s Emerging Market Strategy.10 This allows us to capture the information regarding the state of global economic activity contained in the highly efficient and forward-looking currency markets. This component collapsed in March 2018, but seems to have bottomed recently (Chart 5, panel 2). The Manufacturing Component looks at the PMIs and various business conditions and expectations surveys for countries that have large industrial exposures to the economic health of EM.11 Currently, this component signals a continuation of the downward trend first observed at the beginning of 2018 (Chart 5, panel 3). Lastly, the Chinese Economy Component uses two indicators of the country’s industrial output: the Li Keqiang Index, and our China Construction Indicator. Despite the fact that the slowdown in China is at the center of investor pessimism re global demand, this component is still holding well (Chart 5, panel 4). It has a moderate negative trend, but is not alarming for commodity demand. Moreover, we expect some stimulus in the second half of the year, which should keep this component supportive for commodity prices. Industrial Commodity Demand Still Holding Up Our GIA index proxies demand for industrial commodities, which is closely aligned with EM GDP – as GDP grows, demand for industrial commodities grows (Chart 6, panel 1). The GIA index is more correlated with copper prices than with oil prices, but it still provides an excellent snapshot of the state of demand for these commodities (Chart 4). Chart 6GIA, Meet Dr. Copper Also, it is interesting to note there appears to be only one large specific supply shock that affected the copper market’s relationship with global demand (Chart 6, panel 2). Our new index supports the Market’s “Dr. Copper” argument, in the sense that copper prices are pretty much always aligned with global industrial activity. We also note that the recent Sino – U.S. trade tensions have pushed copper below the value that is explained by our demand proxy. Bottom Line: The resolve of OPEC 2.0 to reduce production is not in doubt. OPEC (the old Cartel) reported this week its member states cut nearly 800k b/d of production in January m/m, bringing members’ total crude output to 30.8mm b/d. On the demand side, new GIA index indicates things are not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate. If anything, we expect the combination of OPEC 2.0’s resolve and rising demand for industrial commodities – oil and copper in particular – to lift prices as the year progresses. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Brazil evacuates towns near Vale, ArcelorMittal dams on fears of collapse,” published by reuters.com on February 8, 2019. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states, led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. 3 Please see the February 2019 issue of OPEC’s Monthly Oil Market Report, which is available at opec.org. 4 Please see “Exclusive: Russia’s Sechin raises pressure on Putin to end OPEC deal,” published by uk.reuters.com February 8, 2019. 5 Please see “Russian oil unsettled by talk of longer production cuts,” published by ft.com November 15, 2017. 6 Please see “A Crisis Of Confidence?” published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy, published February 12, 2019. It is available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 7 The components of the global LEI are also different from our GIA index, and more market-oriented. For details on each series included in the LEI, please see “OECD Composite Leading Indicators: Turning Points of References Series and Component Series,” published February 2019. It is available at oecd.org. 8 Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk,” where we discussed the relationship between EM imports volume, EM income and commodity prices, published August 23, 2018, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 The best approach is still debated in the literature. For more details on Hamilton and Kilian’s measurements, please see James D Hamilton, “Measuring Global Economic Activity,” Working paper, August 20, 2018 and Lutz Kilian, “Measuring Global Real Economic Activity: Do Recent Critiques Hold Up To Scrutiny?” Working paper, January 12, 2019. By selecting EM only import volumes and our proxy shipping rate based on the BDI, we narrow our Trade Component to factors that are mainly linked to industrial activity and commodity-intensive sectors. 10 Our basket of currencies includes Korea, Sweden, Chile, Thailand, Malaysia and Peru. The risky vs. safe-haven currency ratio average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP & ZAR total return indices relative to average of JPY & CHF total returns (including carry). 11 This includes Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Germany, Japan, China and Australia. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018
As the world’s second most populous country with an economy projected to grow over 7% annually, India’s potential as a commodity consumer is massive. However, years of distortionary and unfriendly policies have held back the Indian manufacturing sector – the prime consumer of commodities. This has translated into weak “consumption intensity” of industrial commodities. The past four years have witnessed a shift to more business-friendly policies. These policies and an eventual expansion of the manufacturing base will support steeper demand for industrial commodities over the longer term. India’s economic model stands in stark contrast with China’s, which became a voracious consumer of commodities as it industrialized. It is not “the next China” when it comes to metals demand, but it will play an important and growing global role. In terms of agricultural commodities, favorable demographic trends will raise aggregate demand, regardless of the success of India’s industrialization. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Russia’s production was down 42k b/d in January, a trifle compared to the ~ 450k b/d reduction by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in December. Officials indicate Russia will cut production by 228k b/d in 1Q19. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Indian steelmakers are seeking relief from increasing imports in the form of higher duties, as slowing Asian demand leads to higher shipments from China, Korea, and Japan, according to Reuters.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold markets appear more confident in the Fed’s capitulation on its rates-normalization policy, at least in 1H19, as prices rallied above USD 1,320/oz in end-January. Gold traded slightly lower this week. We remain long as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA releases its WASDE report tomorrow. Feature The impact of China’s rapid industrialization since 2000 on commodity markets is well known. Its share of global consumption of copper and crude oil rose from a modest 10.9% and 6.0% in 2000 to 51.1% and 13.5%, respectively (Chart of the Week). As such, China fueled global demand growth over this period (Chart 2) and, in large part, is responsible for the commodity price boom that ensued. Chart of the WeekChina Now Dominates Industrial Commodity Demand With such a large chunk of demand originating in China, its economic health remains a dominant variable in accurately predicting the path of industrial commodity prices globally. However, with economic priorities shifting from the industrial sector to consumer-driven services, the era of insatiable Chinese commodity demand growth looks to be nearing its end. In search of a replacement to take up the slack, India has often been singled out as a potential leading source of commodity demand growth going forward, and for good reason: India is massive. In terms of population, it is roughly on par with China, boasting a population of 1.3 billion people. And while its share of global wealth is dwarfed by China’s, India’s economy is growing at a rapid pace. According to the most recent IMF projections, its GDP will expand at a 7.5%, and 7.7% clip this year and next – faster than China’s projected 6.2% for both years. Typically, as low income economies develop, their manufacturing sector outpaces economy-wide growth, raising the contribution of industry to overall GDP. Stronger activity in this sector correlates well with industrial commodity demand, which rises accordingly. Meanwhile ag demand is determined by both population and income growth. India, however, has missed the boat (Table 1). Its share of global demand is disproportionate to its current size and its future potential. Table 1India’s Consumption Of Industrial Metals Stands Out As Disproportionately Low In fact, the intensity of commodity usage per dollar of GDP is low even relative to countries at similar income levels (Chart 3). This is most clear in the case of metals. It can be put down to the relatively small role of manufacturing in India’s economy. India did not follow the traditional path of growing its manufacturing base first before re-orienting its economy towards services. Rather, the manufacturing sector has been held back by poor infrastructure and distortionary policies. In fact, services – such as financial services, business services, and telecom – already dominate India’s economy, accounting for 53.9% of GDP, compared to 16.7% in the case of manufacturing (Chart 4). This is in stark contrast with other economies such as China, Korea, and Thailand, in which manufacturing accounts for 29%, 28%, and 27%, respectively (Chart 5). Chart 5No Pickup In Manufacturing Yet Given that the services sector is relatively less metals- and energy-intensive, India’s contribution to global demand for industrial commodities has been disproportionately low. Bottom Line: India’s growth model to date is oriented toward the services sector. As a result, the intensity of industrial commodity demand there – measured as consumption per dollar of GDP – is significantly lower than its peers. This has prevented India from playing a larger role in global commodity markets. The Case For Greater Commodity Demand: Theories And Evidence Economist Walt Whitman Rostow postulated that economies develop through five distinct phases: Traditional society: subsistence agriculture, low level of technology, labor-intensive Preconditions to takeoff: regional trade, the development of manufacturing Take off: the beginning of industrialization Drive to maturity: rising living standards, economic diversification, strong use of technology High mass consumption: mass production and consumerism Along this path, economies in phases (2), (3), and (4) are the most notable in terms of rising appetite for industrial commodities. During these stages, the industrialization and urbanization processes require an expansion of electricity grids, infrastructure and housing. As such, these stages are characterized by high base metals demand. Yet as illustrated by the sigmoid, or S curve, the period of exponential growth in commodity demand eventually slows down and in many cases falls after the country reaches a certain level of GDP per capita (Chart 6). Evidence from metals and oil corroborate this theory. In fact, if we single out the commodity intensity path of DM economies as their incomes were rising, we find that commodity intensity there has already started to decline (Chart 7). This S-curve is also evident in the commodity intensity of emerging economies (Chart 8). China’s path to development stands out as an extreme case of high consumption usage. While not all economies follow China, the paths are similar. In the case of oil, it appears that the consumption intensity of countries that have developed more recently peaked at both a lower income level and a lower oil usage level than countries that developed earlier. This is clearly the case for Korea and Malaysia, and suggests that technology has raised the efficiency of oil. On this basis, we do not expect India’s commodity intensity to reach the same peaks as its more wealthy peers. However, India’s usage has remained stagnant and in some cases fallen. This highlights the relatively muted role of manufacturing in India’s economy. As India’s economy grows and evolves, this should change. We project India’s commodity intensity path as it grows its manufacturing base (Chart 9). Based on this exercise, we find that by the year 2040, India’s consumption of refined copper will account for 12% of global consumption -- up from 2% today. The impact is more muted in the oil sector -- we expect it will account for almost 12% of global crude oil demand, from the current 5%. This trajectory reveals that the scope for rising demand is greater for metals than for the oil sector, implying that industrial commodities are set to benefit in the case of a boom in Indian manufacturing. Bottom Line: Both theory and evidence suggests that the intensity of India’s commodity usage is set to rise over time as its manufacturing sector expands. This is especially true in the case of metals. Even in our most conservative projection, India’s copper consumption is set to rise more than 10-fold by 2040. The Path Forward: “Make In India” While the Rostow model is instructive in framing our thinking on the path to development, it is a crude theory – not all countries will necessarily follow the same path to development. These are the lessons from economist Alexander Gerschenkron’s theory of economic backwardness, which highlights that countries’ growth paths may not be identical or replicable due to cross-country differences, and differences in the state of technology available at varying points of time. Applying these ideas to India means that while India is able to access current technology, which supports a more rapid industrialization process, its economic model is also very different. The China model rested on a powerful single-party state, with privileged access to the American market, that used its control of the financial system to funnel a swell of national savings into an aggressive industrialization effort. On the other hand, the India model required the government to move forward incrementally. Indian leaders had to pursue industrialization while grappling for democratic consensus in the context of extreme social diversity and a more restrictive trade environment. Thus, India is likely to mimic the circuitous path of emerging markets like Brazil or Mexico. Over the past four years, Indian policymakers have tried to unwind unfavorable business policies and spur growth in the manufacturing sector. The “Make in India” initiative of Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeks to encourage both foreign and domestic investment, and to raise the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP to 25% by the year 2025. In the process it aims to create 100 million jobs. This target is unrealistic. In fact, the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP has come down slightly, with economists blaming the demonetization drive and the chaotic, complicated and unclear roll out of the new Goods and Services Tax. Modi also faces tough elections this spring, which could put his initiative on ice. Nevertheless, there is a positive omen in the automobile industry. According to figures from the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, roughly 4 million cars were manufactured last year – up from 3.2 million just five years ago (Chart 10). This is in line with India’s Automotive Mission Plan 2026, which aims for the auto industry to become one of the top three, accounting for 40% of the manufacturing sector and contributing 12% to India’s GDP by 2026. Chart 10An Encouraging Trend For Manufacturing Moreover, Modi’s impact has been a net positive in making India more welcoming for investment. While poor infrastructure, red tape, and restive labor laws are still constraining industry, measures of institutional performance are improving (Chart 11). This is a prerequisite for a brighter manufacturing future. As for the election, even if India’s opposition Congress Party should come to power, it will have learned from its five years in the political wilderness that Modi’s message of economic development resonates with the public. Their current stance on economic policy calls for import substitution, economic liberalization, and a faster pace of development – consistent with a growing manufacturing sector. Chart 11The Business Environment Is Improving The Business Environment Is Improving Bottom Line: While the “Make In India” campaign says as much about Modi’s flair for public relations as anything, India’s business environment is now more conducive to growth and investment. This bodes well for commodity demand going forward. Ags In The Age Of Manufacturing While a much-needed push in India’s manufacturing sector would clearly have a direct impact on its demand for industrial metals, the resulting improvement in the economy and employment would also raise incomes. In theory, this would support the consumption of agricultural commodities. Nonetheless, a couple of observations suggest that India is less of an opportunity for ags as it is for metals (Chart 12): In terms of the level of ag consumption per capita, rice usage is actually relatively high in India. While corn intensity levels are still quite low, wheat consumption per capita is near the level at which China plateaued. The differences across these grains likely reflects differences in preferred sources across countries and implies there is not as much room for catch up. Furthermore, ag consumption per capita generally plateaus at fairly low-income levels, in stark contrast to the industrial metals. A clear outlier is corn consumption in the United States, where high-usage patterns can be put down to the rising use of corn for ethanol production on the back of biodiesel mandates. We do not expect growth in ag consumption intensity on the back of rising incomes. Nevertheless, India’s population is projected to continue rising, in turn supporting aggregate food consumption there. That said, policies promoting India’s self-sufficiency in agriculture have generally prevented rising demand from spilling over into global markets. In fact, in terms of the trade balance, India is usually a net exporter of these grains, especially in the case of rice (Chart 13). This is a positive for India – in that it has so far avoided the risk of food shortage that occasionally rears its head – but it is a negative for global ag demand. Chart 13Self-Sufficiency Policies Insulate The Indian Ag Sector Bottom Line: Unlike industrial commodities, we do not anticipate a rise in per capita ag consumption in India. Nevertheless, a rapidly growing population will mean that aggregate demand for ags will grow briskly. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Exclusive: Indian steel firms seek higher duties on steel imports as prices drop,” published by Reuters.com on February 5, 2019. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary of Trades Closed in 2018
… quick’s the word and sharp’s the action. Jack Aubrey1 Idiosyncratic supply-demand adjustments – some induced by head-spinning reversals of policy (e.g., the U.S. about-face on Iran oil export sanctions) – and uncertainty regarding monetary policy and trade will keep volatility in oil, metals and grains elevated in 2019. We remain overweight energy – particularly oil – expecting OPEC 2.0 to maintain production discipline, and for demand to remain resilient.2 We remain neutral base metals and precious metals, seeing the former relatively balanced, and the latter somewhat buoyant, even as the Fed continues its rates-normalization policy. We remain underweight ags, although weather-induced supply stress has reduced the global inventories some. While we continue to favor being long the energy-heavy S&P GSCI on a strategic basis, tactical positioning will continue to dominate commodity investing in 2019. Highlights Energy: Overweight. OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm b/d of production cuts goes into effect in January vs. October levels, and should allow inventories to resume drawing. Base Metals: Neutral. Fundamentally, base metals are largely balanced, which is keeping us neutral going into 2019. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices will remain sensitive to Fed policy and policy expectations. Palladium prices have soared as a growing physical deficit noted earlier widens.3 If China cuts sales taxes on autos again, demand could soar. Ags/Softs: Underweight. A strong USD will weigh on ag markets, particularly grains, next year. An agreement on contentious Sino – U.S. trade issues could re-open Chinese markets to U.S. exports. However, the arrest of the CFO of China’s Huawei Technologies in Canada for possible extradition to the U.S. complicates negotiations. Feature Going into 2019, commodity markets once again are sending conflicting signals. While we continue to favor exposure to commodities as an asset class by being long the energy-heavy S&P GSCI index, which fell 6% this year on the back of the collapse in crude oil prices and flattening of the forward curves in Brent and WTI. Nonetheless, we believe investors will continue to be rewarded by taking tactical exposure on an opportunistic basis. Volatility remains the watchword, particularly in 1H19, for the primary industrial commodities – oil and base metals. While idiosyncratic supply-demand adjustments will drive prices in each market, Fed policy also will contribute to volatility, as the U.S. central bank likely remains the only systemically important monetary authority following through on rates-normalization. In line with our House view, we expect the Fed to deliver its fourth rate hike of 2018 at its December meeting next week, and four additional hikes next year. On the back of Fed policy, we expect the broad trade-weighted USD to rise another 3-5% in 2019, following a 6% increase in 2018 (Chart of the Week). This will supress demand ex-U.S. for commodities priced in USD, by raising the USD cost of these commodities. Chart of the WeekStronger USD Pressures Commodity Demand Below, we highlight the key themes we believe will dominate commodities in 2019. Oil Markets Still Re-Calibrating Fundamentals We continue to expect global oil demand to remain strong next year, despite the slight downgrading of global GDP growth earlier this year by the IMF. We expect EM import volumes – one of the key variables we track to proxy EM income levels – to hold up in 1H19, which supports our assessment commodity demand will grow, albeit at a slower rate than this year (Chart 2).4 Chart 2Slowing Trade Volumes Might Pre-sage Softer Commodity Demand In 2H19, we see the volume of EM imports dipping y/y from higher levels, then recovering toward year-end. This indicates the all-important level of EM income – hence commodity demand – will remain resilient, but the rate of growth in incomes will slow. This is confirmed by the behavior of the Global Leading Economic Indicators we use to cross check our EM income expectation via import volumes (Chart 3). Chart 3Global Leading Economic Indicators Lead EM Import Volume Changes There is a chance Sino – U.S. trade relations will thaw, which would remove a large uncertainty over the evolution of demand next year. This would be supportive for EM trade volumes generally, particularly imports. However, this is not a given, and we are not assuming any pick-up in demand in anticipation of such a development. We need to see concrete actions, followed by tangible trade improvement first. On the supply side, oil markets still are in the process of re-adjusting to an extraordinary policy reversal by the Trump administration on its Iranian oil-export sanctions last month – i.e., the last-minute granting of waivers to Iran’s largest oil importers. However, following OPEC 2.0’s decision last week to cut 1.2mm b/d of production to re-balance markets in 1H19, we continue to expect prices to recover. Indeed, going into the OPEC 2.0 meeting last week, we had already lowered our December 2018 production estimates for OPEC 2.0, and also reduced 2019 output estimates by ~ 1mm b/d, so the producer coalition’s action did not come as a surprise (Chart 4).5 Chart 4BCA's Global Oil Balances Anticipated OPEC 2.0 Cuts In addition to the cuts by OPEC 2.0, the Alberta, Canada, government mandated production cuts, which will become effective January 1, 2019, to clear a persistent supply overhang that was decimating producers’ revenues in the province. We estimate there is ~ 200k b/d of trapped Alberta supply – i.e., excess production over takeaway capacity (pipeline and rail) – along with ~ 35mm bbls of accumulated excess production in storage the government intends to draw over the course of 2019 at a rate of ~ 96k b/d. This will lower overall OECD inventories, even if the Canadian barrels are transferred south. Net, in addition to the 1.2mm b/d of cuts from OPEC 2.0, the ~ 300k b/d coming from Canada next year will mean close to 1.5 mm b/d of production, or ~1.4mm b/d of actual supply when accounting for the inventory release, is being cut or curtailed from these two sources. We cannot, at this point, forecast over-compliance with the OPEC 2.0 accord, which was one of the signal features of the deal in 2017 and 1H18. The Trump administration’s waivers for Iran’s eight largest oil importers expire May 2019. We view it as highly unlikely the Trump administration will re-impose export sanctions in full on Iranian exports following the expiration of waivers, and fully expect they will be extended at least for 90 days. This is because oil fundamentals will remain tight next year, despite the massive de-bottlenecking of the Permian Basin in West Texas. While an additional 2mm b/d of new takeaway capacity will be added to the region, it will not be fully operational until 4Q19. We have ~ 300k b/d of additional supply coming out of the Permian after the pipeline expansions are done in 2H19. Even as pipeline capacity is filled, the U.S. still needs to significantly increase its deep-water oil-export capacity to get this crude to market.6 Bottom Line: We expect the oil market to re-balance in 1H19, as production falls by ~ 1.4mm b/d – the combination of OPEC 2.0 and Canadian production cuts – and consumption grows by a similar amount. The USD will continue to appreciate next year, which, at the margin, will temper demand growth and prices. Gold: Remaining Long Equity And Inflation Risks Trump Higher Rates in 2019 As the U.S. economic cycle matures and advances into its final innings, we continue to recommend holding gold in a diversified portfolio. U.S. inflationary pressure will surprise to the upside in 2019, per our House view, which will offset the effects of somewhat less accommodative U.S. monetary policy in the U.S. The October equity correction is a reminder that, when rising UST yields drag stocks down in late-cycle markets, gold works as an effective hedge against equity risks, and can outperform bonds. In fact, both of the corrections we saw in 2018 likely were caused by a sharp increase in bond yields. This convexity on the upside and downside is what makes gold our preferred portfolio hedge. Easy Monetary Policy + Rising Rate = Bullish Gold Prices Despite being negatively correlated with interest rates, gold tends to perform well when the fed funds rate is below r-star – known as the “natural rate of interest” – and is rising (Chart 5, panel 1).7 When this happens, policy rates are below the so-called natural interest rate consistent with a fully employed economy, which, all else equal, is inflationary. In these late-cycle environments, gold’s ability to hedge against inflation and equity risks dominate its price formation, while its correlation with U.S. real rates diminishes. Chart 5Gold Will Stay in Trading Range In our view, gold will remain in an upward trading range until rates become restrictive enough to depress the inflation outlook (Chart 5, panel 2). Our U.S. strategists estimate the equilibrium fed funds rate is at ~ 3%, and project it will rise to ~ 3⅜% by end-2019. Therefore, despite our House view of four rate hikes next year, we expect the U.S. economy to remain in a below-r-star-and-rising phase for most of the year. Consistent with our House view, we believe U.S. inflation is likely to surprise to the upside next year, which will push gold prices higher (Chart 6, panel 1). The U.S. economy remains strong, particularly on the employment front. This means wage growth will work its way through inflation rates. Chart 6U.S. Inflation Likely to Surprise Admittedly, this is not the consensus view. Investors are not worried about significantly higher inflation (Chart 6, panel 2). However, our Bond strategists argue that long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation is stuck below historical levels because of this abnormally low fear of elevated inflation (i.e. > 2.5%). Once inflation starts drifting higher, there will be an upward shift in investors’ inflation expectations. Any short-term dip in inflation on the back of lower oil prices will be transitory, given our view that oil prices will recover next year. If such a transitory dip, or concerns about a global growth slowdown spilling back into the U.S. causes the Fed to pause, we would add to our precious metal view position, given our assessment that this would raise the probability of an inflation overshoot. Lastly, gold prices recently have been depressed by an abnormally high correlation with the U.S. dollar (Table 1). We put this down to speculative positioning: Net speculative positions are stretched for both the U.S. dollar and gold, Table 1Gold Vs. USD Correlations Running Higher Than Normal therefore, any change in expectations likely will be amplified by a reversal in positioning (Chart 7). In the medium-term, we expect the gold-dollar correlation to converge back to its average, which would mute the dollar’s impact on gold. This would, all else equal, raise inflation and equity risks factors. Chart 7Spec Positioning Stretched Bottom Line: We continue to recommend gold as a portfolio hedge for investors, given its convexity – it outperforms during equity downturns, and participates on the upside (albeit not as much). Given our out-of-consensus House view for inflation, we believe gold also will provide a hedge against this risk. Palladium: China Tax Policy Could Lift Price Palladium soared to dizzying heights this year, on the back of an expanding physical deficit (Chart 8). Were it not for the loss of an automobile-tax break in China, which reduced the rate of growth in sales there to unchanged y/y, this deficit likely would have been considerably wider, inventories would have drawn even harder, and palladium prices would have been higher (Chart 9). Chart 8Palladium's Physical Deficit Expanding Chart 9Palladium Inventories Collapse Palladium’s demand is mainly driven by its use in catalytic converters for gasoline-powered cars, which dominate sales in the U.S. and China, the world’s two largest car markets (Chart 10). U.S. sales growth has leveled off this year (Chart 11), as has China’s. However, the China Automobile Dealers Association (CADA) is pressing policymakers to reduce the 10% auto sales tax by half, which could keep palladium demand elevated relative to supply, should it happen.8 Chart 10Auto Catalyst Demand Dominates PalladiumChart 11China Car Sales Could Revive With Tax Cut Russian producers, led by Norilsk Nickel, supply ~ 40% of the world’s palladium. Markets have been fearful U.S. sanctions could be imposed on Norilsk and other Russian producers throughout the year by the U.S., most recently in re Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels in international waters, and over Russia’s response to the threatened withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by the U.S., which could be keeping a risk premium firmly embedded in palladium prices.9 With platinum trading below $800/oz, or ~ 65% of palladium’s value, autocatalyst makers could begin to switch out their catalysts (Chart 12). Chart 12Platinum Could Fill Palladium Supply Gap Base Metals: Trade Tensions, USD Cloud Outlook Base metals remain inextricably bound up with EM income growth. When EM incomes are growing, commodity demand – particularly for base metals – is growing, and vice versa. This typically shows up in EM GDP and import volume levels, which we use as explanatory variables in our base-metals price modeling (Chart 13). Chart 13Base Metals Demand Tied To EM Income, Trade Volumes There are, in our view, two significant risks to EM income growth over the short and medium terms: Sino – U.S. trade disputes, which erupted earlier this year. They carry the risk of spreading globally and unwinding supply chains that have taken decades to develop between DM and EM economies;10 Fed monetary policy, which is immediately reflected in USD levels. A strong dollar raises the local-currency costs of commodities for consumers ex-U.S., and debt-servicing costs in EM economies. In addition, it lowers the local-currency costs of producing commodities ex-U.S., which incentivizes producers to raise production to capture this arbitrage, since they are paid in USD. The trade-war risk remains, despite the agreement between presidents Trump and Xi at the G20 in Buenos Aires to work on a trade deal. Even so, the actual level of tariffs imposed by both sides is trivial relative to the level of global trade, which is in excess of $20 trillion p.a. – ~$17 trillion for goods, $5 trillion for services, according to the WTO (Chart 14). Chart 14Sino – U.S. Tariffs Remain Trivial Relative to Overall Global Trade Fed policy, on the other hand, is a threat of far greater moment to EM income growth, and, through this, import volumes, which we use to proxy that growth. The LMEX index, a gauge of base-metals prices traded on the LME, is extremely sensitive to changes in EM import volumes. This is not unexpected, given the income elasticity of trade for EM economies is greater than 1.0. Our modeling finds a 1% increase in EM import volumes translates to a 1.3% increase in the LMEX, which is consistent with the World Bank’s estimate of EM income elasticity of trade.11 Per our House view, we believe markets are too sanguine regarding the possibility of a Sino – U.S. trade deal. Such an event, should it occur, would immediately affect base metals markets, as China accounts for roughly half of base metals demand globally(Chart 15). Market participants’ default setting appears to be the U.S. and China will resolve their trade differences in short order – i.e., by the March 1, 2019, deadline agreed at the G20 meeting – resulting in a win-win for both countries and the world. We are hopeful this view is correct, but we would not take any positions in base metals in expectation of such an outcome. Instead, we think the substantive technological and strategic differences between the two countries, and underlying distrust, will result in a renewed escalation of tensions. Chart 15China Demand Remains Pivotal Base Metals Demand Could Wobble Bottom Line: We remain neutral base metals going into 2019. Fundamentally, most of the metals in the LME index are in balance, or can get there in short order. The Fed’s rates-normalization policy continues to represent a larger short-term risk to EM income growth than Sino – U.S. trade tensions, but, longer term, we continue to expect tension between the world’s dominant economies to escalate. Ags: Trade Tensions, USD Cloud Outlook That’s not a typo in the sub-head above; ags – particularly soybeans – are dealing with the same headwinds bedeviling base metals. The agreement to work on a trade agreement reached at the G20 summit between the U.S. and China lifted grain markets, and supported the upward trend in grain and bean prices. All the same, Sino – U.S. trade relations are prone to go off the rails at any time. The Buenos Aries understanding, after all, only holds for 90 days. In addition to the hoped-for agreement to resolve trade-war issues, grain prices received support from the signing of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This helped align supply-demand fundamentals globally with prices. Focusing too much on China can obscure the fact that the USMCA, which replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), eliminated major uncertainties over the fate of U.S. grain exports to Mexico, the second-largest destination for U.S grains, beans and cotton. In fact, Mexico accounts for 13% of all U.S. ag exports (Chart 16).12 Chart 16Trade Negotiations Hit American Farmers Hard All the same, the Sino – U.S. trade war is hitting U.S. ags hard, particularly soybeans. The 25% tariff on China’s imports of U.S. grains created two parallel agriculture markets. In one market, China is scrambling to secure supplies, creating a deficit. In the other, U.S. farmers are struggling to market their produce overseas, suffering from storage shortages and in some cases left with no option but to leave their crops to rot. Close to 60% of U.S. bean exports historically went to China. The U.S. – China trade war caused a soybean shortage in Brazil, as demand from China for its crops soared, while a record 11% of American beans are projected to be left over after accounting for exports and domestic consumption (Chart 17). Chart 17Bean Shortage in Brazil, Supply Glut in the U.S. A successful resolution to the U.S. – China trade tensions is unlikely to reverse the over-supply of beans globally (Chart 18). In fact, we expect beans stocks-to-use (STU) ratios to build next year, unlike global corn and wheat stocks (Chart 19). This will set a record for the soybean STU ratios, pushing them above 30%. Chart 18Expect Another Bean Surplus Chart 19Bean STU Ratios Will Grow As is the case for metals, the USD will weigh on ag markets, which will make U.S. exports more expensive than their foreign competition (Chart 20). As is the case for all of the commodities we cover, a strong dollar will weigh on prices at the margin. Chart 20A Strong USD Will Make U.S. Exports Expensive Bottom Line: A thaw in the Sino – U.S. trade war should realign global grain markets, but will not keep soybeans from setting new global inventory records. A strong USD will be a headwind for ag markets, as it is for other commodity markets we cover. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 This is a fictional character in the movie Master and Commander, based on the novels of Patrick O’Brian. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the OPEC/non-OPEC coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. It was formed in November 2016 to manage oil production. 3 Please see “Silver, Platinum At Risk As Fed Tightens; Palladium Less So,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 15, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “The Role of Major Emerging Markets in Global Commodity Demand,” published as a Special Focus in the IMF’s Global Economic Prospects in June 2018 for a discussion of income elasticities for oil, base metals and other commodities in large EM economies. 5 In our current forecast for 2019, we expect Brent to average $82/bbl next year, and for WTI to trade $6/bbl below that. Please see “All Fall Down: Vertigo In the Oil Market … Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast to $82/bbl,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy November 15, 2018. We will be updating our supply-demand balances and price forecast next week. 6 At 11.7mm b/d and growing, the U.S. is the largest crude oil producer in the world, having recently eclipsed Russia’s total crude and liquids production of 11.4mm b/d, and the U.S. EIA’s projected 2019 output of 11.6mm b/d. U.S. crude oil exports hit 3.2mm b/d for the week ended November 30, 2018, an all-time high, according to EIA data. It is worthwhile recalling crude oil exports were illegal until December 2015. U.S. product exports totalled 5.8mm b/d for the week ended November 30, and 6.3mm b/d the week before that. Total U.S. crude and product exports are running ~ 9mm b/d at present, which placed them just above total imports of crude and products – i.e., the U.S. became a net exporter of crude and products at the end of November. 7 The San Francisco Fed defines r-star as the inflation-adjusted “natural” rate of interest consistent with a fully employed economy, with inflation close to the Fed’s target. r-star is used to guide interest-rate policy consistent with long-term macro goals set by the Fed. Please see “R-star, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy,” by Kevin J. Lansing, published in the FRBSF Economic Letter May 30, 2017. 8 Please see “Exclusive: Reverse gear - China car dealers push for tax cut as auto growth stalls,” published by reuters.com October 11, 2018. 9 Please see “Is Norilsk Nickel too big to sanction?” published by ft.com on April 19, 2018, and “U.S. to Tell Russia It Is Leaving Landmark I.N.F. Treaty,” published by nytimes.com October 19, 2018. 10 We discuss this in “Escalating Trade Disputes Pressuring Base Metals,” published July 12, 2018, in BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 11 For a discussion of the World Bank’s trade elasticities, please see “Trade Wars, China Credit Policy Will Roil Global Copper Markets” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy June 21, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 12 Canada makes up a smaller share of U.S. exports, at ~ 2%. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q18 Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Gold's performance during the "Red October" equities sell-off, coupled with that of the most widely followed gold ratios (copper- and oil-to-gold), indicates investors and commodity traders are not pricing in a sharp contraction in global growth. These ratios are, however, picking up divergent trends in EM and DM growth (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGold Ratios Lead Divergence Of Global Bond Yields In the oil markets, the Trump Administration appears to have blinked on its Iran oil-export sanctions. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days (Chart 2).1 The higher-than-expected number of waivers indicates the Trump Administration is aligned with our view that the global oil market is extremely tight, despite the recent production increases from OPEC 2.0 and the U.S.2 The U.S. State Department, in particular, apparently did not want to test the ability of OPEC spare capacity - mostly held by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) - to cover the combined losses of Iranian exports, Venezuela's collapse, and unplanned random production outages. No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Chart 2Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days Energy: Overweight. Iran's exports are reportedly down ~ 1mm b/d from April's pre-sanction levels of ~ 2.5mm b/d. We assume Iran's exports will fall 1.25mm b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Close to 45k MT of copper was delivered to LME warehouses last week, according to Metal Bulletin's Fastmarkets. This was the largest delivery into LME-approved warehouses since April 7, 1989. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is trading close to fair value, while the most widely followed gold ratios - copper- and oil-to-gold - indicate global demand is holding up. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's crop report shows the corn harvest accelerated at the start of November, reaching 76% vs. 68% a year ago. Feature Gold Ratios Suggest Continued Growth Gold is trading mostly in line with our fair-value model, based on estimates using the broad trade-weighted USD and U.S. real rates (Chart 3).3 Safe-haven demand - e.g., buying prompted by the fear of a global slowdown or a deepening of the global equity rout dubbed "Red October" in the press - does not appear to be driving gold's price away from fair value. Neither is rising volatility in the equity markets. Chart 3Gold Trading Close To Fair Value This assessment also is supported by the behavior of the widely followed gold ratios - copper-to-gold and oil-to-gold - which have become useful leading indicators of global bond yields and DM equity levels following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). From 1995 up to the GFC, the gold ratios tracked changes in the nominal yields of 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds fairly closely. During this period, bond yields led the ratios as they expanded and contracted with global growth, as seen in Chart 4. Post-GFC, this relationship has reversed, and the gold ratios now lead global bond yields. Chart 4Gold Ratios Followed Global 10-Year Yields Pre-GFC To understand this better, we construct two variables to isolate the common growth-related and idiosyncratic factors driving these ratios over the long term, particularly following the GFC.4 The common factor is labeled growth vs. safe-haven in the accompanying charts. It consistently tracks changes in global bond yields and DM equities, which also follow global GDP growth closely. If investors were fleeing economically sensitive assets and buying the safe haven of gold, the correlation between these variables would fall. As it happens, the strong correlation held up well following the "Red October" equities rout, indicating investors have not become overly risk-averse or fearful global growth is taking a downturn. When regressing our proxy for global 10-year yields and the U.S. 10-year yields on the growth vs. safe-haven factor, we found this factor explains a significantly larger part of the variation in global yields than U.S. bond yields alone (Chart 5).5 This common factor also is highly correlated with DM equity variability (Chart 6). Chart 5Gold Ratios' Common Factor Correlates With 10-Year Global Yields ... Chart 6... And DM Equities The second, or idiosyncratic, factor we constructed, captures the fundamental drivers that impact each of the gold ratios through supply-demand fundamentals in the copper and oil markets, and EM vs. DM economic performance. The latter is proxied using EM equity returns relative to DM returns.6 This analysis shows oil outperforms copper in periods of rising DM and slowing EM economic growth (Chart 7). Our analysis also indicates this idiosyncratic factor explains the divergence of the gold ratios seen in 2018: Copper demand is heavily influenced by EM demand, particularly China, which accounts for ~ 50% of global copper demand, but less than 15% of global oil demand. Oil demand - some 100mm b/d - is much more affected by the evolution of global GDP. Chart 7Relative DM Outperformance Drives Idiosyncratic Factors At the moment, this idiosyncratic factor is driving both ratios apart because of: Relative economic underperformance of EM vs. DM, which favors oil over copper; and Persistent fears of escalating Sino-U.S. trade tensions, which are weighing on copper. Price-supportive supply-shocks in the oil market (sanctions on Iranian oil exports, falling Venezuelan production) and still-strong demand continue to drive oil prices. These dynamics likely will remain in place for the foreseeable future (1H19), which will favor oil over copper. Gold Ratios As Leading Indicators To round out our analysis, we looked at causal relationships between the performance of financial assets - EM and DM stocks and bonds - and the gold ratios.7 From 1995 to 2008, the causality ran from stocks and bond yields to our growth vs. safe-haven factor for the gold ratios. However, since 2009, causality has gone from the common factor to bond yields (Table 1). Table 1Granger-Causality Results In our view, this suggests that the widely traded industrial commodities - copper and oil being the premier examples of such commodities - convey important economic information on the state of the global economy, as a result of their respective price-formation processes.8 It also suggests that in the post-GFC world, commodity markets assumed a larger role in discounting the impacts on the real economy of the numerous monetary experiments of central banks in the post-GFC era. Bottom Line: Our analysis of the factors driving the copper- and oil-to-gold ratios supports our view that demand for cyclical commodities - mainly oil and metals - is still strong. The behavior of our idiosyncratic factor leads us to favor oil over copper due to the rising EM vs. DM divergence, and the price-supportive supply dynamics in the oil market. Waivers On U.S. Sanctions Roil Oil Markets A week ago, we cautioned clients to "expect more volatility" on the back of news leaks the Trump administration was considering granting waivers to importers of Iranian crude oil, just before the sanctions kicked in this week. We certainly got it. Since hitting $86.1/bbl in early October, Brent crude oil prices have fallen $15.4/bbl (18%), as markets attempt to price in how much Iranian oil is covered by the sanctions and when importers can expect to see it arrive. On Monday, the U.S. granted waivers to eight "jurisdictions" - China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Taiwan - allowing them to continue to import Iranian oil for 180 days. This was a higher-than-expected number of waivers than we - and, given the volatility in prices - the market was expecting. This pushed down the elevated risk premium, which had been supporting prices over the past few months.9 The combined imports of these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d, according to Bloomberg estimates. The loss of these volumes in a market that was progressively tightening as OPEC 2.0 brought more of its spare capacity on line - while the USD continued to strengthen - likely would have driven the local-currency cost of fuel steadily higher (Chart 8). Because they are a de facto supply increase - albeit temporary, based on Trump Administration statements - they also will restrain price hikes in EM generally, barring an unplanned outage in 1H19 (Chart 9). Chart 8Waivers Will Contain Oil Price Rises In Local-Currency Terms\ Chart 9Oil Prices Rises In EM Economies No detail of volumes that will be allowed under these waivers was available as we went to press. Although it is obvious Iranian sales will recover some of the ~ 1mm b/d of exports lost in the run-up to the re-imposition of sanctions, it is not clear how much will be recovered. We believe the 180-day effective period for the waivers most likely was sought by KSA and Russia to give them time to bring on additional capacity to cover Iranian export losses. Markets will find out just how much spare capacity these states have in 1H19. By 2H19, additional production out of the U.S. from the Permian Basin will hit the market, as transportation bottlenecks are alleviated. This will allow U.S. exports to increase as well. However, it's not clear how much of this can get to export markets, given most of the dredging work needed to accommodate very large crude carriers (VLCCs) in the U.S. Gulf Coast has yet to be done. This could explain why the WTI - Cushing vs. WTI - Midland differentials are narrowing, while WTI spreads vs. Brent remain wide (Chart 10). Chart 10WTI Spreads Diverge It is important to note the market still is exposed to greater-than-expected declines in Venezuela's production, and to any unplanned outage anywhere in the world. OPEC spare capacity is 1.3mm b/d, according to the EIA and IEA, and most of that is in KSA. Russia probably has another 200k b/d or so it can bring on line. These production increases both are undertaking are cutting deeply into spare capacity, as the Paris-based International Energy Agency noted in its October 2018 Oil Market Report: Looking ahead, more supply might be forthcoming. Saudi Arabia has stated it already raised output to 10.7 mb/d in October, although at the cost of reducing spare capacity to 1.3 mb/d. Russia has also signaled it could increase production further if the market needs more oil. Their anticipated response, along with continued growth from the US, might be enough to meet demand in the fourth quarter. However, spare capacity would fall to extremely low levels as a percentage of global demand, leaving the oil market vulnerable to major disruptions elsewhere (p. 17). Bottom Line: We expected continued crude-oil price volatility, as markets sort out the U.S. waivers on Iranian oil imports. The supply side of the market remains tight, and spare capacity is being eroded by production increases. We believe OPEC 2.0 will use the 180 days contained in the waivers to mobilize additional production. How much of this becomes available is yet to be determined. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "As U.S. starts oil sanctions against Iran, major buyers get waivers," published by reuters.com November 5, 2018. 2 OPEC 2.0 is a name we coined for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia. Please see "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity" for our most recent supply-demand balances and price assessments, published October 25 by Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We use the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) and U.S. inflation-adjusted real rates as explanatory variables in these models. As Chart 3 indicates, actual gold prices are in line with these variables. 4 The first factor accounts for ~ 80% of the variation in the gold ratios. The second idiosyncratic factor, which captures (1) supply-demand fundamentals in the oil and copper markets, and (2) divergences in global growth using EM vs. DM equities as proxies, accounts for the remaining ~ 20% of the variation. 5 Throughout this report, we proxy global yield by summing the yield on the 10-year German Bunds, Japanese Government Bonds and U.S. Treasurys. Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "The 'Rule Of 4' For Equities And Bonds," dated August 2, 2018. Available at eis.bcaresearch.com. The adjusted R2 in the global yield model is 0.94 compared to 0.88 for the U.S. Treasury model. 6 Using MSCI Emerging Market Index and MSCI Word Index price index. 7 To conduct this analysis, we use a statistical technique developed by the 2003 Nobel laureate, Clive Granger. The eponymous Granger-causality test is used to see whether one variable (i.e., time series) can be said to precede the other in terms of occurrence in time. This test measures information in the variables, particularly the effect of information from the preceding variable on the following variable. Please see Granger, C.W.J. (1980). "Testing for Causality, Personal Viewpoint,"Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2 (pp. 329 - 352). 8 This assessment is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the literature on which is countably infinite at this point. Sewell notes: "A market is said to be efficient with respect to an information set if the price 'fully reflects' that information set (Fama, 1970), i.e. if the price would be unaffected by revealing the information set to all market participants (Malkiel, 1992). The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are efficient." The EMH has been debated and tested for decades. Please see Sewell, Martin (2011). "History of the Efficient Market Hypothesis," Research Note RN/11/04, published by University College London (UCL) Department of Computer Science. 9 Please see BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity," published October 25, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Chinese copper imports came in strong in September. While unwrought copper imports reached a 2.5-year high, ores and concentrates forged new record highs. Copper inventories at the three major global exchange warehouses have been declining steadily and…