Debt Trends
Highlights The FOMC statement reaffirmed that the Fed remains in hiking mode. If the Fed keeps raising rates in line with the "dots," monetary policy will move into restrictive territory by early 2019. By then, the unemployment rate will have fallen to a level where it has nowhere to go but up. Unfortunately, history suggests that once unemployment starts rising, it keeps rising. The good news is that today's economic imbalances are not as formidable as those that existed in the lead-up to the past few recessions. The bad news is that cracks are starting to form. We are especially worried about the health of the U.S. commercial real estate sector. Remain overweight global equities for now, but look to significantly pare back exposure next summer. Feature The U.S. Expansion Is Getting Long In The Tooth Chart 1How Low Can It Go? The current U.S. expansion has now reached eight years, making it the third longest in the post-war era. History teaches that expansions do not die of old age. Rather, they are usually murdered by some combination of Fed tightening and the unwinding of the imbalances that were built up during the boom years. Thinking about the present, there is good and bad news on both fronts. Let's start with the Fed. This week's FOMC statement reaffirmed that the Fed remains in hiking mode. The good news is that real rates are still very low by historic standards, suggesting that the economy is unlikely to stall out this year. The bad news is that the Fed has less scope to raise rates than in the past. Chart 1 shows estimates of the real neutral rate developed by Fed researchers Thomas Laubach and Kathryn Holston, along with John Williams, President of the San Francisco Fed and Janet Yellen's close confidante. Their calculations suggest that the real neutral rate has plummeted over the past decade in the U.S. and the euro area, with lesser declines recorded in Canada and the U.K. In the U.S., the real neutral rate currently stands at 0.4%. Assuming the Fed raises interest rates in line with the "dots," rates will move into restrictive territory in early 2019. Given that monetary policy affects the real economy with a lag of 12-to-18 months, the Fed may not realize that it has raised rates too much until it is too late. The Downside Of A Low Unemployment Rate One might argue that this justifies a "go-slow" approach to tightening monetary policy. There is certainly validity to this view, but it is not without its drawbacks. The unemployment rate has now fallen to 4.3%, 0.4 points below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. As Chart 2 illustrates, the odds of a recession rise when the unemployment rate reaches such low levels. Some commentators have argued that the headline unemployment rate understates the amount of economic slack. We are skeptical that this is the case. Table 1 compares a wide variety of measures of labor market slack with where they stood at the height of the business cycle in 2000 and 2007. The main message of the table is that the unemployment rate today is broadly where one would expect it to be based on these collaborating indicators. Taken together, these indicators suggest that slack is comparable to what it was in 2007, albeit still above the levels seen in 2000. Table 1Comparing Current Labor Market Slack With Past Cycles As we noted last week, the easing in U.S. financial conditions over the past six months is likely to boost growth in the second half of this year (Chart 3). If growth does accelerate, the unemployment rate - which is already 0.2 points below where the Fed thought it would be at the end of this year when it made its December 2016 projections - will fall below 4%. There is a high probability that this will fuel inflation, reversing the largely technically-driven decline in most core inflation measures over the past few months. Chart 3U.S.: Easy Financial Conditions Will Support Growth In H2 2017 The market is not pricing this in at all. In fact, 2-year breakeven inflation rates have tumbled by 87 basis points since March. A bit more inflation would be a welcome development. Not only have market-based projections of inflation fallen since the Great Recession, but long-term survey-based measures have dipped as well (Chart 4). Of course, one can have too much of a good thing. The experience of the 1960s is illustrative in that regard. Chart 5 shows that much like today, inflation in the first half of that decade was well anchored at just below 2%. However, once the unemployment rate fell below 4%, inflation soared. Core inflation rose from 1.5% in early 1966 to nearly 4% in early 1967, ultimately making its way to 6% by 1970. Chart 4Inflation Could Use A Boost Chart 5Inflation In The 1960s Took Off ##br##Once The Unemployment Rate Fell Below 4% If the Fed today wants to avoid the same fate, it will have to take steps to lift the unemployment rate back up to NAIRU. Unfortunately, history suggests that it is difficult to raise the unemployment rate a little bit without inadvertently raising it by a lot. Once unemployment starts to rise, a vicious circle tends to erupt where increasing joblessness leads to slower income growth, falling confidence, and ultimately, less spending and higher unemployment. In fact, there has never been a case in the post-war era where the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 6). Chart 6Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Imbalances Are Growing The vicious circle described above tends to be amplified when there are large imbalances in the economy. The good news is that today's imbalances are not as formidable as those that existed in the lead-up to the past few recessions. The bad news is that cracks are starting to form. The ratio of household debt-to-disposable income is still close to post-recession lows, but this is largely because mortgage debt continues to be weighed down by a depressed homeownership rate (Chart 7). In contrast, consumer credit is rebounding: Student debt is going through the roof and auto loans are nearly back to pre-recession levels as a share of disposable income (Chart 8). Not surprisingly, this is starting to translate into higher default rates (Chart 9). The fact that this is happening at a time when the unemployment rate is at the lowest level in 16 years is a cause for concern. Chart 7Low Homeownership Rate Keeping A Lid On Mortgage Debt Chart 8Consumer Credit: Making A Comeback... Chart 9...With Defaults Starting To Rise In Some Categories Meanwhile, the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has risen above 2000 levels and is closing in on its 2007 peak (Chart 10). Contrary to the widespread notion that "wages aren't rising," real wages are increasing more quickly than corporate productivity (Chart 11). As the labor market continues to tighten, corporate profitability could suffer, setting the stage for rising defaults and increasing layoffs. Chart 10U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit Chart 11Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Worries About Commercial Real Estate We are particularly worried about the health of the commercial real estate (CRE) market. CRE prices currently stand 7% above pre-recession levels in real terms, having risen by a staggering 82% since the start of 2010 (Chart 12). Financial institutions hold $3.8 trillion in CRE loans, $2 trillion of which are held by banks. As a share of GDP, the outstanding stock of CRE bank loans in most categories is near pre-recession levels (Chart 13). Chart 12Commercial Real Estate Prices Have ##br##Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 13CRE Debt Is Rising Going forward, the fundamental underpinnings for the CRE market are likely to soften. The retail sector is already under intense pressure due to the shift in buying habits towards eCommerce. CMBX spreads in this space are rising. Vacancy rates in the apartment sector have started to tick higher and rent growth has slowed (Chart 14 and Chart 15). The number of apartment units under construction stands at a four-decade high according to Census data, despite a structurally subdued pace of household formation (Chart 16). Most of these units are likely to hit the market in 2018, which will result in a further increase in vacancy rates. Chart 14Vacancy Rates Are Bottoming Outside The Industrial Sector... Chart 15...While Rent Growth Is Losing Steam Chart 16Apartment Supply Is Surging, But Will There Be Enough Demand? There are fewer signs of overbuilding in the office sector. Nevertheless, vacancy rates are likely to rise, given the recent increase in the number of new projects in the pipeline. On the flipside, demand growth for new office space is set to weaken, as a tighter labor market leads to slower payroll gains. The Fed estimates that the U.S. needs to add only 80,000 workers to payrolls every month to keep up with a growing labor force, down from about 150,000 in the two decades preceding the Great Recession.1 The secular shift towards increased office density and teleworking will only further depress office demand over time. Chart 17Tighter Lending Standards Could Lead To Lower CRE Prices The one bright spot is industrial real estate. Thanks to a revival in U.S. manufacturing, vacancy rates remain low and rent growth is rising. However, if the U.S. economy does accelerate over the remainder of the year, the dollar is likely to strengthen, putting a dent in the profitability of U.S. manufacturing companies. Standing back, how worried should investors be about the CRE sector? For now, there is limited cause for concern. U.S. financial institutions have been tightening lending standards on CRE loans for seven straight quarters. Consequently, the average loan-to-value ratio for newly securitized loans has fallen about four points to 60% since 2015, and is now down eight points compared to 2007. However, if vacancy rates keep rising, real estate prices will fall, leading to a decline in the value of the collateral backing CRE loans. This could prompt lenders to pull back credit, causing prices to fall further (Chart 17). Seasoned real estate investors are no strangers to such vicious cycles, and if the next one begins at a time when growth is slowing because the economy is running out of spare capacity and financial conditions are tightening, it could easily trigger a recession. Fiscal Policy To The Rescue? Could looser fiscal policy delay the day of reckoning? The answer is yes, but much will depend on when the stimulus arrives and what form it takes. The best-case scenario is that fiscal policy is eased just as the economy is beginning to slow of its own accord. A burst of stimulus that arrives on the scene too early would be less desirable, although not necessarily counterproductive, since it would allow the Fed to step up the pace of rate hikes, thereby giving it more scope to cut rates later in response to slower growth. In practice, however, calibrating the amount of monetary tightening that is necessary to offset a given amount of fiscal loosening is difficult to achieve. This is especially the case in today's environment where another fight over the debt ceiling looms large, a new health care bill is making its way through the Senate, and Trump's tax agenda remains heavy on promises but short on specifics. Our expectation is that Congress will pass a "balanced" budget which equates revenues with expenditures over the 10-year budget horizon. How this affects growth is hard to predict with any certainty. On the one hand, spending cuts tend to depress aggregate demand more than tax cuts raise demand. In economic parlance, the fiscal multiplier for government spending is larger than for taxes. On the other hand, the tax cuts are likely to be front-loaded, while the spending cuts will be back-dated. If history is any guide, this means that the latter will never see the light of day. In addition, some of the budgetary impact from cutting statutory tax rates will be paid for through dynamic scoring, the questionable practice of assuming that lower personal and corporate tax rates will significantly spur growth. On balance, we expect fiscal policy to turn modestly stimulative over the next few years. However, given the uncertainty involved, there is a risk that the Fed either raises rates too much - thereby choking off growth - or by not enough, causing the unemployment rate to fall to a level where it has nowhere to go but up. Both outcomes could trigger a recession. Investment Conclusions Right now, our recession timing model, as well as the models maintained by various regional Fed banks, assign a low probability of a severe slowdown in the coming months (See Box 1 for details). These models, however, tend to send reliable signals only over a fairly short horizon. Looking further ahead, we see a heightened probability of weaker growth in the second half of 2018, which could set the stage for a recession in 2019. The good news is that today's economic imbalances are not as daunting as they were in the late innings of many past economic expansions. Thus, the 2019 recession is not likely to be especially severe. The bad news is that valuations across most markets are quite stretched. Thus, like the 2001 recession, the financial market impact could be disproportionally large compared to the economic impact. We are still overweight global equities, but will be looking to significantly reduce exposure by next summer. Once the equity bear market begins - most likely late next year - a 20%-to-30% retracement in U.S. stocks is probable. Given that correlations across stock markets tend to rise when risk sentiment is deteriorating, it is likely that other global bourses will also suffer if U.S. stocks weaken. Indeed, considering that most stock markets have a beta to the S&P 500 that exceeds one, other regions could suffer even more than the U.S. As the U.S. economy falls into recession, the Fed will stop raising rates. This will cause the dollar to weaken, although not before it has appreciated by about 10% in trade-weighted terms from current levels. Thus, while we remain bullish on the dollar over the next 12 months, we are much less sanguine about the greenback over the long haul. As the dollar weakens, the yen and euro will strengthen, imparting deflationary pressures on those economies. If our timing for the next recession proves correct, neither the ECB nor the BoJ will hike rates for the remainder of the decade. The Bank of England is a tougher call. The neutral rate of interest is higher in the U.K. than in continental Europe. Last week's election results represented a clear rejection of fiscal austerity. A more expansionary fiscal stance would give the BoE some scope to raise rates. A weaker pound has also given the economy a much needed competitive boost. With inflation picking up, it is not surprising that the BoE struck a more hawkish tone this week. Nevertheless, Brexit negotiations are liable to drag on for some time, which will constrain the ability of the BoE to tighten monetary policy. Stay long GBP/EUR and GBP/JPY over the next 12 months, but remain short GBP/USD. Housekeeping Note: Closing Our Tactical S&P 500 Short Hedge As noted above, we remain cyclically overweight global equities over a 12-month horizon. However, on occasion, we have put on a tactical hedge whenever equities appeared to be technically overbought. Such a situation arose six weeks ago. While the stock market did dip briefly shortly after we initiated the trade, it subsequently rallied back. At the time of initiation, we indicated that the trade would have a lifespan of six weeks. The clock has now run out, and we are closing the trade for a loss of 2%. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Rhys Bidder, Tim Mahedy, and Rob Valletta, "Trend Job Growth: Where's Normal?" FRBSF Economic Letter, 2016-32, Federal Reserve Bank Of San Francisco (October 24,2016), and Daniel Aaronson, "Estimating The Trend In Employment Growth," Chicago Fed Letter, No. 312, Federal Reserve Bank Of Chicago (July 2013). BOX 1 The Message From Our Recession Timing Model Chart Box 18Near-Term Recession Risk Remains Low Our recession timing model is based on eight variables: The Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicator, the Coincident Economic Indicator, the fed funds rate, inflation expectations, the unemployment rate, oil prices, credit spreads, and the yield curve. We use a logistic regression framework to model the probability of a recession. Currently, our model shows that the odds of a recession are low (Chart Box 18, panel 1). Only one of the components, namely, a rising fed funds rate, is signaling a risk of a recession. The various models developed by regional Federal Reserve banks also show very low near-term odds of a recession (panels 2 and 3). Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights EM EPS has recovered, supporting the current rally. However, forward-looking indicators portend a reversal and potential renewed contraction in EM EPS. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team has a more pessimistic outlook than the BCA house view, which is upbeat on the prospects for China's capex growth and commodity prices. The ongoing liquidity tightening in China amid lingering credit excesses is bound to produce major negative growth surprises. The authorities will reverse the ongoing monetary tightening only if the pain on the ground becomes visible or the economic data deteriorates significantly. Financial markets will sell off considerably in advance. In Chile, take profits on the receiving 3-year swap rate trade; stay neutral on this bourse within an EM equity portfolio. Feature EM Profit Recovery: How Enduring? EM equities have not only advanced in absolute terms but have also outperformed developed market (DM) share prices considerably since early this year. This outperformance has been rationalized by a recovery in EM earnings per share (EPS). Indeed, EM EPS has revived briskly in recent months (Chart I-1A). Chart I-1AEM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (I) Chart I-1BEM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (II) For this rally to continue, EM EPS would need to continue to expand further. We do not expect this. On the contrary, our bet is that EM EPS growth will slow considerably later this year and most likely contract in early 2018. Our basis is that the growth (first derivative) and impulse (second derivative) of EM & Chinese narrow money (M1) has in the past led their respective profit cycle (Chart I-1A and Chart I-1B). If these relationships hold and EM EPS growth dwindles later this year, EM share prices should begin to sense it now, and start falling back very soon. Interestingly, EM EPS net revisions have failed to rise above the zero line despite the recent rebound in profits (Chart I-2, top panel). This is in contrast to DM EPS net revisions, which have surged well above zero (Chart I-2, middle panel). As a result, recent EM relative outperformance against their DM peers has occurred despite the drop in relative net EPS revisions (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This presages EM equity analysts are not revising upward their forward estimates for EM EPS, despite the ongoing rally in share prices. This is extremely puzzling (and rare) and may be a reflection of recent weakness in commodities prices - or the fact that expectations for EM EPS growth were already elevated. We do not place much emphasis on analysts' EPS revisions because the latter swing with stock prices - they have zero forecasting power for share prices. We highlight this fact simply to counter the common market narrative that EM corporate earnings growth expectations are improving, driving EM bourses higher. Bottom Line: EM EPS has recovered, supporting the current rally. However, forward-looking indicators portend a reversal and potential renewed contraction in EM EPS nine months ahead. Importantly, EM equity prices relative to DM shares are at a major technical juncture (Chart I-3). A decisive breakout would be a very bullish technical signal, whereas a failure to break out would be an important warning sign. We continue to bet on the latter. Chart I-2EPS Net Revisions: EM And DM Chart I-3Relative Equity Performance: EM Versus DM China's Credit Cycle And Commodities Redux Our overarching theme has been and remains that China is tightening liquidity amid a lingering credit bubble. This cannot end well for financial markets that are exposed China's growth. Here we revisit our rationale for a credit slowdown in China and its impact on EM. Chinese interest rates have risen dramatically since last November across the entire yield curve. The 3-month interbank rate and AA- on-shore corporate bond yields both have risen by about 200 basis points since November 1, 2016. Monetary policy works with a time lag, and higher interest rates warrant a slowdown in credit growth (Chart I-4). In turn, it takes only a deceleration in credit growth for the credit impulse - the second derivative of outstanding credit - to turn negative. The falling credit and fiscal impulse will consequently lead to a relapse in Chinese import volumes and EM EPS (Chart 5), in turn weighing on commodity prices and non-commodity producing countries like Korea and partially Taiwan. Mainland import volumes contracted mildly in the second half of 2015, as demonstrated in Chart I-5. De facto, from the perspective of the rest of the world, China was in mild recession in late 2015. Not surprisingly, global risk assets in general, and particularly those exposed to China, tumbled. Chart I-4China: Higher Rates Point To##br## Negative Credit Impulse Chart I-5China's Credit Impulse Heralds ##br##Slowdown In Its Imports We expect China import volumes to shrink again by the end of this year or early next. Some sort of replay of 2015 is a real possibility. The broad-based yet mild selloff in commodities since early this year (Chart I-6) amid weakness in the U.S. dollar exchange rate gives us confidence in our view. Chart I-6ABroad-Based Selloff In Commodities (I) Chart I-6BBroad-Based Selloff In Commodities (II) Our colleagues at BCA have attributed the selloff in commodities this year to deleveraging in China's shadow banking system, and to traders worldwide closing their long positions. They expect an improving commodities supply-demand balance to support prices going forward. It makes sense to us to explain the selloff in commodities as having been caused by deleveraging in China's shadow banking system. Yet to be consistent, we should also acknowledge that the rally in commodities last year was to a large extent driven by the same forces in reverse: non-commercial buyers (investors) buying commodities both in China and elsewhere. In short, this signifies there was little improvement in worldwide commodities demand last year. In 2016, rising commodities prices provided a significant boost to commodity-producing countries and underlying corporate profits - and ultimately EM risk assets. The drop in commodities prices this year, if sustained, should lead to the opposite dynamic: income/profits among commodities countries/companies will drop. As such, falling commodities prices amid diminishing investor demand for commodities is bearish for EM risk assets. Where we differ from the majority of our colleagues at BCA is that we expect Chinese credit growth to decelerate, thereby weighing on its capital spending and depressing demand for commodities (please refer to Chart I-5). We have written extensively1 on this topic and will not fully rehash our view that China's annual credit growth will decelerate from the current 12% to somewhere around 8% in the next 12-18 months. In short, China's corporate and household credit-to-GDP ratio cannot rise indefinitely from an already high level of 225% of GDP. Credit growth will likely downshift to a level of sustainable nominal GDP growth, which is probably around 8%. Our main disagreement with our colleagues on structural issues is as follows: we believe China's credit excesses are not a natural outcome of the nation's high savings rate but rather the outcome of a speculative credit boom driven by high-risk behavior among creditors and debtors.2 Tightening liquidity amid such speculative excesses creates a very bearish backdrop for risk assets exposed to China's credit cycle. The bullish camp on China has recently pointed to a strong recovery in mainland nominal GDP growth, which in their view suggests that double-digit credit growth in China is not excessive (Chart I-7). However, such a surge in nominal GDP growth has been due to the GDP deflator rising from zero in the fourth quarter of 2015 to 5% in the first quarter of this year. Importantly, the swings in the GDP deflator almost perfectly correlate with the fluctuation in commodities prices (Chart I-8). This proves how much China's economy is exposed to commodities cycles and how much of nominal GDP swings are stipulated by resource price swings. Chart I-7China: Credit And ##br##Nominal GDP Growth Chart I-8China's GDP Deflator Is Very Sensitive##br## To Commodities Prices As commodities prices decline, China's GDP deflator, producer prices and nominal GDP growth will all dwindle. Thereby, China's underlying steady state nominal GDP growth is probably around 8% at best (5.5-6% real growth), with inflation of 2-2.5% (assuming flat commodities prices). If this is indeed the case, corporate and household credit growth of 12% entails a further build-up of leverage and an escalating non-public credit-to-GDP ratio, which already stands at 225% of GDP: corporate debt is 180% and household debt is at 45% of GDP. Bank loans account for 70%, while shadow (non-bank) funding channels (corporate bonds, trust products, entrusted loans, and banker's acceptance) constitute 30% of outstanding non-public credit or 65% of GDP. Both are growing at an annual rate of 11-12.5% (Chart I-9). On the whole, the share of shadow banking is non-trivial and its current growth pace is unsustainable amid ongoing regulatory tightening and rising interest rates. Furthermore, banks are themselves exposed to shadow banking as their claims on non-depository financial institutions have risen exponentially from RMB 3 trillion to RMB 27 trillion over the past five years. In regard to non-standard credit assets,3 our estimates are that banks' off-balance-sheet exposure is RMB 10 trillion compared with RMB 18.3 trillion of their balance-sheet non-standard credit assets. The off-balance-sheet credit exposure to non-standard credit assets is much larger for medium and small banks than the largest five (Table I-1). We discussed these issues in greater detail in our June 15, 2016 Special Report titled "Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow". Chart I-9Bank Loans And Non-Bank (Shadow) Credit Growth With banks being forced by regulators to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, their capital adequacy ratios will drop and their ability to sustain double-digit credit growth will be curtailed. Chart I-10Stay With Short Small / Long Large ##br##Banks Equity Trade The risks to medium and small banks is greater than to the large five banks. That is why we reiterate our recommendation from October 26, 2016 to short small banks versus large ones (Chart I-10). As a final note, we are often asked whether the government will provide a bail out if things deteriorate. Yes, we concur that policymakers will step in and backstop a financial system to preclude a systemic crisis. However, they are tightening now, and like the rest of us have little visibility. The authorities will meaningfully reverse the ongoing monetary tightening only if the pain on ground becomes visible or economic data deteriorate considerably. Financial markets will sell off materially in advance. Bottom Line: Investors should not be long China-plays, commodities and EM risk assets when mainland policy tightening is occurring amid lingering speculative credit excesses. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategy For Chilean Markets We recommended receiving 3-year swap rates on November 2, 2016 and this position has panned out with rates dropping by 30 basis points. We now recommend booking profits. The following has led us to conclude that the risk-reward profile of this position is no longer attractive: The improvement in narrow money (M1) growth points in a bottom in the economic activity indicator (Chart II-1). Mining production plunged amid the strikes in the world's largest copper producer Codelco (Chart II-2, top panel) and manufacturing production has also been contracting (Chart II-2, bottom panel). A period of improvement in mining and manufacturing output from a very low base is likely. Chart II-1Book Profits On Receiving ##br##3-Year Swap Rate Position Chart II-2Chile: Money And Economic##br## Activity Are Bottoming Out This will ameliorate overall business conditions and cause the central bank, at least for the time being, to halt the easing cycle. The pace of expansion in employment, wage growth, and consumer credit remains decent (Chart II-3). This will put a floor under household spending growth for now. Odds are that copper prices will decline meaningfully in the next nine months or so, which will cause the Chilean peso to depreciate. Although a depreciating currency will not to lead to materially higher interest rates in Chile, it will limit downside in local rate expectations. Finally, local 3-year swap rates and their spread over U.S. 3-year bond yields are extremely low from a historical perspective (Chart II-4). At this point, there is little value left in Chilean local rates. Chart II-3Chile's Mining And Manufacturing ##br##A Period Of Stabilization Ahead Chart II-4Chile: Consumer Spending##br## Is Holding Up Investment Conclusions Chart II-5Chilean Local Rates Spreads Over ##br##U.S. Treasurys: Not Much Value Left We do not expect the central bank to hike but the downside in local rates is limited for the time being. Take profits on the receiving 3-year swap rate trade. As to equities, the outlook for relative performance is balanced; we continue recommending a benchmark weight in Chile for dedicated EM equity portfolios. For absolute return investors, the risk-reward profile is not attractive because our profit margin proxy points to a relapse in corporate earnings (Chart II-5). Unit labor costs are rising faster than the core inflation rate, producing a profit margin squeeze (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Finally, we continue shorting the peso versus the U.S. dollar as a bet on lower copper prices. 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016 and "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings?", dated March 23, 2017, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016 and "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Non-standard credit assets are banks' claims on corporates that are not classified as loans. For more details please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow", dated June 15, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights There is little evidence of a major "credit bubble" in China. Rising debt is largely the consequence of the country's high saving rate. This has mixed implications for global bonds: On the one hand, an exaggerated fear of a hard landing in China has kept global bond yields below where they would otherwise be; on the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to weigh on real long-term yields. The real trade-weighted RMB will depreciate by a further 3%-to-5% over the next 12 months, with the bulk of the decline coming against the U.S. dollar. Chinese shares are still attractive at current valuation levels. Go long the H-share market versus the MSCI EM index. We are booking a loss of 10% on our NASDAQ hedge. Feature Indefatigable The global economy remains in recovery mode. As we discussed last week, leading indicators point to strong global growth and accelerating earnings over the next six months.1 This justifies a cyclically overweight tilt towards global equities. Still, we worry that equity markets have gotten ahead of themselves. We thought that the backup in yields late last year, along with Trump's protectionist rhetoric, would cause stocks to correct to the downside, at least temporarily. Instead, they ripped higher, causing our short NASDAQ hedge trade to briefly go through its 10% stop loss on Wednesday. Our technical indicators continue to point to heightened risks of a correction. Whether such a correction proves to be the proverbial "buying opportunity" - our baseline view - or morphs into something more ominous will depend on the durability of the economic backdrop. We discussed some of the risks around Europe and the U.S. last week. This week we turn to China. The China Question Recent Chinese economic data have been fairly solid and our China analysts expect that growth momentum will be sustained over the coming months.2 Nevertheless, there are plenty of clouds on the horizon. Direct fiscal spending has slowed sharply over the past 12 months. In addition, a crackdown on property speculation last year has led to a deceleration in home price inflation, which could adversely affect household spending and construction later this year. Then, of course, there is all that debt. There is no shortage of commentators who argue that China is experiencing a full-blown credit bubble. Others contend that rising debt in China is largely a manifestation of a chronic excess of domestic savings. Knowing which side is correct is critical for investors. If China is in the midst of a massive credit bubble, then it is natural to fear that this bubble will burst fairly soon. This could prove to be devastating to global financial markets. In contrast, if rising debt in China mainly reflects an overabundance of savings, then it is possible that debt will continue rising until those savings dissipate - something that may not happen for many years. We won't beat around the bush. Our view is that rising debt in China has largely been the result of excess savings. This implies that a financial crisis in China is unlikely anytime soon. That does not mean that China will cease being a source of occasional investor angst. But if another major global recession is coming, it will not be because of China. The Debt-Savings Tango Endless ink has been spilled on the question of whether savings create bank credit or bank credit creates savings. In reality, the answer is "both": Just like income can create spending and spending can create income, savings can create debt and vice versa. If an economy is operating at less than full employment, the decision by banks to extend new credit is likely to boost aggregate demand, leading to more hiring. This will raise household disposable income and potentially lift aggregate savings.3 On the flipside, if households decide to save a bit more, this will push down real interest rates. That, in turn, could entice firms to increase how much they borrow and invest. Debt creates savings, and savings create debt; it's a two-way street. Admittedly, thinking through the specific forces underlying the relationship between debt and savings is one of those things that can make your head spin. Thus, it is worthwhile to go through a few simple examples in order to elucidate the principles at work. With this knowledge in hand, we will be able to debunk many of the fallacies that investors routinely succumb to. Cuckoo For Coconuts: How To Think About Debt And Savings Imagine a small island economy consisting of 100 people, each of whom toils away producing 100 coconuts every year, resulting in annual GDP of 10,000 coconuts. Consider the following five examples, summarized in Table 1: Table 1Cuckoo For Coconuts: Debt Creates Savings, Savings Create Debt Example #1: Each person consumes 100 coconuts. As a result, a total of 10,000 coconuts are consumed. Total savings is zero, as is total investment. No debt is created. Example #2: Each person consumes only 75 coconuts, selling the other 25 coconuts to a nearby plantation. The plantation buys these coconuts with the help of a bank loan and plants them, resulting in 2,500 new coconut trees. Total consumption falls to 7,500. Savings and investment equals 2,500 coconuts. 2,500 coconuts worth of bank loans are created. Notice that higher savings have led to more debt. Example #3: Same as Example 2, but now instead of selling the excess coconuts to a nearby plantation, they are exported abroad. Savings equal 2,500 coconuts, investment is zero, and the current account surplus is 2,500. The island accumulates 2,500 coconuts worth of foreign assets. The lesson here is that if a country can export some of its excess savings abroad, debt may not need to rise by as much as if the savings had to be intermediated by the domestic financial system. Note also that this example reveals the famous economic identity: S-I=CA. Example #4: Each person consumes 125 coconuts, made possible by importing 25 coconuts per person. Consumption now equals 12,500 coconuts. Savings equal -2,500 coconuts, investment is zero, and the current account deficit is 2,500. The island takes on 2,500 coconuts worth of external debt. Example #5: Half the island's residents consume 75 coconuts each, while the other half consumes 125 coconuts each. Those who consume 75 coconuts sell their surplus nuts on the open market, placing the proceeds in a bank. The bank lends out these savings to the other half of the population. Net savings and investment is zero. However, 1,250 coconuts worth of new bank loans are created. Debt Puzzles The key idea stemming from these examples is that debt is often formed when there is a persistent divergence between spending and income.4 This is true for the economy as a whole, as well as for its individual constituents (households, firms, and the government). Understanding this point helps resolve a number of seeming puzzles. For instance, it is sometimes alleged that China's debt buildup cannot be the result of the country's high saving rate because U.S. debt also rose rapidly in the years leading up to the financial crisis, an era during which the U.S. national saving rate was very low. Our simple examples demonstrate why this is a misleading argument. Examples 2, 4, and 5 show that debt levels will rise regardless of whether income exceeds spending or spending exceeds income. It is the absolute difference between the two that matters, not whether the residual is positive or negative. In Example 2, which is applicable to China today, households spend less than they earn. The resulting savings are intermediated by the financial system and transformed into investment, creating new debt along the way. In Example 4, which is applicable to the U.S. before the financial crisis, households spend more than they earn, leading them to take on new debt in order to finance imports. The increase in debt may get amplified, as in Example 5, if some households save while others dissave. As discussed in Box 1, Example 5 also helps explain why inequality and debt levels tend to rise and fall together over time. The Future Of Chinese Household Savings Chinese household savings now stand at nearly 40% of disposable income, notably higher than in other major developed and emerging economies. The increase in China's household savings, along with a widening gap between rich and poor, have been important drivers of faster debt growth (Chart 1). As time goes by, China's household saving rate will begin to decline due to the aging of its population, the expansion of household credit, and the emergence of a stronger "consumer culture." Yet, that shift is likely to be a gradual one. Progress in building out a social safety net has been painfully slow. This has forced households to maintain high levels of precautionary savings. The share of China's population in its 'prime savings years' (between the ages of 30-and-59) will also continue to increase over the next 15 years, which should support an elevated saving rate (Chart 2). Chart 1China: Higher Saving Rate And ##br##Inequality Went Hand In Hand With Debt Growth Chart 2China: Share Of Population In Its High ##br##Saving Years Has Not Yet Peaked In addition, sky-high property prices have forced young people to save a large fraction of their incomes in order to have any hope of owning a home. This is particularly true for men. Brides are in short supply in China. The saving rate among single-child households with one son is about four percentage points higher in rural areas and two percentage points higher in urban areas, compared to single-child households with one daughter. One academic study concluded that about half of the increase in China's household saving rate since the late-1970s could be attributed to this factor.5 Unfortunately, this problem is not going to go away anytime soon. The ratio of men between the ages of 25-and-39 and women between the ages of 20-and-34 - a proxy for gender imbalances in the marriage market - will surge from 1.06 at present to 1.35 by the middle of the next decade (Chart 3). What do countries with surplus savings and surplus men tend to do? Historically, the answer is that they have sent them off to fight. China's military spending has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade (Chart 4). This trend is bound to continue, making East Asia an increasingly likely setting for future military conflicts.6 Chart 3A Shortage Of Chinese Brides Chart 4China: A Lot Of Dry Powder Understanding Chinese Corporate Debt Dynamics Chart 5China: State-Owned Companies Are ##br##Not The Only Ones With Access To Cheap Financing Many companies around the world rely heavily on retained earnings and equity sales to finance new investment projects. When this happens, investment can take place without the need for the creation of new debt. China has its fair share of consistently profitable companies that fund capital expenditures using internally generated funds, while tapping the equity markets as necessary to finance larger projects. However, the country is also awash with companies that are in constant need of debt financing. Perhaps not surprisingly, the former tend to be private firms while the latter are often state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Pundits like to assert that the secret to boosting growth in China is to wean these money-losing public companies off cheap credit, forcing them to cut back on production and capital spending. This will allow scarce economic resources to migrate to better-managed firms that will use them more wisely. But is this really a sensible assumption? What exactly is the evidence that China's well-run private companies have been starved of credit because most of it is flowing to money-losing companies? The data does not fit this "crowding out" story at all (Chart 5). The Japan Analogy A more sensible narrative is that the Chinese government has been prodding state-owned banks into lending money to state-owned companies and local governments in order to support aggregate demand and keep unemployment from rising. The experience of Japan is instructive here. Starting in the early 1990s, Japan entered an extended era where the private sector was trying to spend less than it earned (Chart 6). In order to keep unemployment from rising, the Japanese government was forced to try to export these excess savings abroad via a current account surplus or, failing that, absorb them with dissavings from the public sector. While Japan was able to lift its current account surplus from 1.4% of GDP in 1990 to 3% of GDP in 1998, this was not enough to fully offset the surge in desired private-sector savings. This necessitated the government to run large budget deficits. The same sort of fiscal trap now stalks China. Up until the Great Recession, China was able to export much of its excess savings. The current account surplus hit a record high of nearly 10% of GDP in 2007. In effect, China was doing what the islanders in Example 3 were able to do. The subsequent appreciation of the RMB undermined this strategy, forcing the government to take steps to boost domestic demand. It is no surprise that China's debt stock began to grow rapidly just as its current account surplus started to dwindle (Chart 7). Chart 6Japan Relied On Fiscal Largess And Current Account Surpluses To Offset The Rise In Private-Sector Savings Chart 7China: Debt Increased When Current ##br##Account Surplus Began Its Descent Keep in mind that fiscal policy in China entails much more than adjustments to government spending and taxes. Central government spending accounts for a fairly small share of GDP. The vast majority of fiscal stimulus is done via the banking system. This makes Chinese fiscal policy nearly indistinguishable from credit policy. Chart 8Chinese Private Firms: Liabilities-To-Assets Trending##br## Lower For A Decade From this perspective, China's so-called "debt mountain" is not much different from Japan's debt mountain once we acknowledge that the bulk of China's corporate debt in China is, in fact, quasi-fiscal debt. As evidence, note that in sharp contrast to the SOE sector, the ratio of liabilities-to-assets among private Chinese companies has actually been trending lower over the past decade (Chart 8). Yes, many of the investment projects undertaken by SOEs and local governments are of questionable economic merit. But that's beside the point. China's money-losing SOEs are the equivalent of Japan's fabled "bridges to nowhere." From the Chinese government's point of view, an SOE that is producing something is still preferable to one that is producing nothing. The ever-rising debt burden that these state-owned firms must carry to cover operating losses and finance new investment is just the price the government must pay to keep the economy afloat. Little Evidence Of A Genuine Credit Bubble Genuine credit bubbles tend to happen during periods of euphoria. U.S., Spanish, and Irish banks all traded at lofty multiples to book value on the eve of the financial crisis, having massively outperformed their respective indices in the preceding years. That's obviously not the case for Chinese banks today, which remain one of the most loathed sectors of the global equity market (Chart 9). The U.S., Spanish, and Irish housing booms also occurred alongside ballooning current account deficits, something that doesn't apply to China (Chart 10). One can debate whether China is in the midst of a property bubble, but even if it is, it looks a lot more like the one Hong Kong experienced in the late 1990s. When that bubble burst, property prices plummeted by 70%. Yet, Hong Kong banks were barely affected (Chart 11). Chart 9Chinese Banks: Unloved And Unwanted Chart 10Recent Credit Bubbles Developed ##br##Amid Widening Current Account Deficits Chart 11Hong Kong Is The Correct Analogy There is a lot of debt in China. However, most of it has not been centered on the property market (Chart 12). Rather, just as in Japan, debt has served a fiscal purpose - it has been used to absorb the excess savings of the private sector, so as to keep unemployment from rising. Chart 13 shows that national saving rates and debt-to-GDP ratios are positively correlated across emerging economies. China sits close to the trend line, suggesting that its debt stock is roughly what you would expect it to be. Chart 12Chinese Debt: Not Predominately ##br##Tied To The Property Market Chart 13Positive Correlation Between National Savings And Indebtedness Investment Conclusions Where does this leave investors? For global bonds, the implications of our analysis are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the high probability that the Chinese government can maintain the status quo of continued credit expansion for the foreseeable future means that a hard landing for the economy - and the associated drop in safe-haven developed economy government bond yields that this would trigger - is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, high levels of Chinese savings will continue to fuel the global savings glut, keeping real long-term bond yields lower than they would otherwise be. On balance, investors should maintain a modest underweight allocation toward global bonds. Our analysis does not warrant either a very bearish or very bullish stance towards the RMB. Granted, a banking crisis could prompt Chinese savers to look for ways to move more of their money overseas, leading to further capital flight and a tumbling currency. As noted, however, such an outcome is not in the cards. On the flipside, a chronic shortfall of domestic demand will keep the pressure on the government to try to export excess production abroad by running a larger current account surplus. As we foretold in our March 2015 report "A Weaker RMB Ahead," this will push the authorities to weaken the currency.7 We expect the real trade-weighted RMB to depreciate by a further 3%-to-5% over the next 12 months, with the bulk of the decline coming against the U.S. dollar. If China averts a debt crisis, that's good news for global equities. In the developed market universe, Europe and Japan stand to benefit the most, given the cyclical bent of their stock markets. We are overweight both regions (currency hedged). Despite a weak start to the year, both markets have outperformed the U.S. in local-currency terms since bottoming last summer, a trend we expect will resume over the coming months (Chart 14). What about Chinese shares specifically? Clearly, there are many risks facing the Chinese economy that transcend debt worries, a possible trade war with the U.S. being the prominent example. Yet, considering that Chinese stocks trade at fairly cheap valuation levels, our sense is that these risks have been more than fully priced in by investors. With this in mind, we are going long Chinese H-shares relative to the overall EM basket.8 Chart 15 shows that H-shares now trade at a substantial discount to the EM index. Chart 14Euro Area And Japan: Rebound Will Continue Chart 15Chinese Investable Stocks Are Cheap Finally, one housekeeping note: Since we already have exposure to the H-share market via our strategic recommendation to be long China/Europe/Japan versus the U.S., we are closing that trade and opening a new one that is simply long Europe and Japan versus the U.S. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1: Debt And Inequality Chart 16U.S.: Positive Correlation Between ##br##Income Inequality And Debt-To-GDP Income inequality and the ratio of private debt-to-GDP have been positively correlated in the U.S. over the past century (Chart 16). The existence of this relationship is not merely due to a third factor: economic growth. Growth was strong in the 1920 and 1980s/90s - two periods of rapidly increasingly inequality - but it was also strong during the 1960s, a decade when inequality was falling. Our analysis helps shed light on this relationship. Return to Example 5, but this time assume that each resident consumes 100 coconuts, with half the population producing 75 coconuts and the other half producing 125 coconuts. 10,000 coconuts are still produced and consumed in aggregate, resulting in no net savings. But because half the population is borrowing money to acquire coconuts from the other half, debt levels still rise. Higher inequality leads to more debt. To be sure, the correlation between inequality and debt runs in both directions. Rising debt has historically led to an expansion of the financial sector. This has helped enrich Wall Street elites. In this way, rising debt can exacerbate inequality. On the flipside, rising income inequality entails a shift of income from poorer households - with high marginal propensities to consume - to richer ones - who generally save a large fraction of their income. This tends to reduce aggregate demand. Lower aggregate demand, in turn, leads to lower real rates, making it easier for poorer households to load up on debt and live beyond their means. 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Reflation Trade Rumbles On," dated February 17, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy, "Be Aware Of China's Fiscal Tightening," dated February 16, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 A few technical caveats are in order. Think of a simple closed-economy "Keynesian" model where aggregate demand determines income and where savings (S), by definition, are equal to investment (I). In this model, investment is usually treated as exogenous. Thus, if increased bank credit is used to finance new investment projects, this will also translate into higher savings (i.e., if "I" goes up, "S" must also rise). In contrast, if the credit ends up flowing into consumption, savings will remain unchanged. More plausibly, one can imagine that investment is subject to an "accelerator effect," so that increased aggregate demand prompts firms to increase capital spending. In that case, even if the credit flows into consumption, investment will still rise - and since savings is equal to investment, this means that savings will also go up. Intuitively, this happens because the increase in income derived from higher employment more than offsets the increase in consumption. This leads to higher aggregate savings. 4 The word "persistent" is important here. To see why, suppose that in Example 5, the people who consumed 125 coconuts each had previously been thrifty, which had allowed them to build up large bank deposits. Then they could finance their additional spending by running down their accumulated savings, rather than taking on new debt. Likewise, if those who consumed 75 coconuts had previously lived beyond their means, then instead of adding to their deposits, they would be paying back existing debt. The net result would be less debt, not more. 5 Shang-Jin Wei and Xiao Zhang, "The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence From Rising Sex Ratios And Savings Rates In China," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 3, 2011. 6 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Weaker RMB Ahead," dated March 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 The exact trade is to be long China H-Shares versus the MSCI Emerging Market index, currency unhedged. The corresponding ETFs for this trade are the Hang Seng Investment Index Funds Series: H-Share Index ETF (2828 HK), and the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (EEM US). The Hang Seng China Enterprise index comprises of China H-Shares (Chinese stocks available to international investors) currently trading on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Today we are publishing an overview of EM external debt. As EM currencies have resumed their depreciation over the past few months, the issue of foreign currency debt has once again become acute. Feature The tables and charts in this report rank EM countries by size of external debt relative to their GDP, and also provide details about foreign liabilities by category of borrower (government, non-financial companies or financials), by type of debt (loans versus bonds issued) and by maturity (short-term up to 1 year versus medium- and long-term). The charts and tables particularly elaborate on short-term external debt across various types of borrowers. In our opinion, from a macro perspective the most relevant statistic are foreign funding requirements, which are calculated by subtracting the current account balance from external debt servicing in the next 12 months. The chart below shows that based on this parameter the most vulnerable countries are Turkey, Malaysia and Colombia, while the least exposed ones are Korea, China and Thailand. Chart 1Dependency On Foreign Funding Table 1External Debt Statistics Chart 2Overall Outstanding External Debt Ranking Chart 3Government External Debt Ranking Chart 4Non-Financial Corporate External Debt Burden Chart 5Financials External Debt Burden Chart 6Outstanding External Inter-Company Loans Table 2Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Table 3Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Table 4Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Table 5Short-Term External Debt Statistics ##br##(Does Not Include Intercompany Debt) Chart 7Aggregate External Short-Term Debt Chart 8Non-Government External Short-Term Debt Chart 9Companies' External Short-Term Debt Chart 10Financials' External Short-Term Debt Table 6Short-Term External Debt Composition Table 7Short-Term External Debt Composition Chart 11Financials' Short-Term Foreign Loans Chart 12Private Sector Short-Term Foreign Loans Table 8EM Aggregate (Excludes Taiwan And China) Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations